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Attractive Nuisance.  Burton v. State, 80 A.3d 856 (R.I. 2013).  The State 
of Rhode Island owed no duty to a seventeen-year-old trespasser who was 
injured while breaking into a facility at the abandoned Ladd Center.  
Although it was unreasonable that the State allowed bottles of sulfuric acid 
to remain on the premises, the doctrine of attractive nuisance did not apply.  
Despite Plaintiff-trespasser’s status as a minor, he was deemed capable of 
recognizing and assessing the risks associated with trespassing on the 
premises.  As a result of the determination that Plaintiff was capable of 
recognizing the risks, even though he was a minor his injury resulted from a 
failure to protect himself rather than an inability to do so. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In November 2005, seventeen-year-old Steven T. Burton 
(“Plaintiff”), entered the premises of the former Ladd Center in 
Exeter, Rhode Island with four friends.1  The purpose of the 
group’s excursion was to explore the abandoned facility, which had 
developed a reputation for being haunted after its closure in 
1994.2  Plaintiff visited the property on two previous occasions and 
acknowledged that he did not seek permission to do so; 
additionally another member of the group (“L.V.”) later testified 
that it was “general knowledge” that the group should not get 
caught.3  While there were a number of “No Trespassing” signs 
posted around the property, no fence enclosed the grounds.4  
Plaintiff and his friends sought entry into an old hospital building 
that was boarded up with plywood on the first two stories, in 
addition to metal grates being welded shut and the presence of 
chains on the doors.5  In order to access the interior of the 
building, Plaintiff and his friends “shimmied” up a pipe and 
 
 1.  Burton v. State, 80 A.3d 856, 859 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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entered through a third story window.6 
Once inside, the group discovered a Styrofoam container 
among various broken and abandoned medical supplies in an 
unlocked locker.7  The contents of the container consisted of 
several gallon bottles with indecipherable labels, all of which 
contained a clear liquid.8  L.V. testified that he “poured a small 
amount of liquid from one of the bottles onto a table, to see what it 
was.”9  Given the liquid’s viscous consistency, the group 
recognized that it was not water.10 Although Plaintiff testified 
that he believed the liquid was hazardous, the group took three 
bottles with them as they proceeded through the building.11 
As the group exited the building from the first floor the 
carrier of two of the gallon bottles dropped one from his cargo, 
which broke open.12  The substance splattered Plaintiff who 
preceded the carrier in his exit.13  Plaintiff experienced a “burning 
sensation” on his legs where the material landed, and when he 
rubbed at it, his hand burned as well.14  Plaintiff then stripped off 
his clothes and ran to his friend’s truck, and from there the group 
drove him to Kent County Hospital.15  The liquid contained within 
the bottles was sulfuric acid.16  While being treated Plaintiff told 
staff he “found the bottles in the woods.” However after he was 
later transferred to Rhode Island Hospital, Plaintiff told staff he 
“found the bottles in sand dunes and then slipped on concrete.”17 
The following year in November 2006, Plaintiff brought an 
action in the Rhode Island Superior Court against the State of 
Rhode Island on the grounds the State (“Defendant”) “negligently 
failed to inspect, repair, and/or maintain its premises free from 
defect and/or dangerous condition.”18  A bench trial was conducted 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 859–60. 
 16.  Id. at 859. 
 17.  Id. at 860. 
 18.  Id. at 860 n.7. The Plaintiff also filed claims against Phoenix Houses 
of New England and several John Does.  Id.  The claims against Phoenix 
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on January 18, 2012, at which, in addition to his own testimony, 
Plaintiff presented testimony from L.V. and Mr. Carl Abruzzese, 
the former State Buildings and Grounds Coordinator.19  Despite 
Mr. Abruzzese testimony that, “kids and adults” alike sought out 
“ghosts and spirits and whatever the hell else they were looking 
for” in buildings on the property,20 the trial justice ruled in favor 
of Defendant.21  The justice held that because Plaintiff was a 
trespasser, Defendant owed him no duty; furthermore, the justice 
ruled that the doctrine of attractive nuisance did not apply in this 
case.22 
Plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the trial justice erred 
in failing to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine because 
Plaintiff “did not fully realize the risk in taking the bottles of 
sulfuric acid and he further contends that the justice erred by not 
finding Defendant shared ‘some comparative fault for the 
accident.’”23  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted review 
and affirmed the ruling of the superior court.24 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review the Supreme Court of Rhode Island established 
the standard of review to overturn the decision of a trial justice 
sitting without a jury, requiring a finding that the trial justice’s 
decision was clearly erroneous.25  In light of this standard, the 
court examined the facts to determine what duty, if any, 
Defendant owed Plaintiff.26 The existence of a duty hinged on 
 
Houses were dismissed with prejudice on April 20, 2007.  Id. at 860 n.7.  
Subsequently Plaintiff substituted Rhode Island Economic Development 
Corporation (“EDC”) for one of the John Does, and on January 4, 2011, 
summary judgment was entered in favor of EDC.  Id. 
  19. Id.at 860. 
 20.  Id. at 860, 862. 
 21.  Id. at 860. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 858. 
 25.  Id. at 860.  In establishing the standard of review the court quoted 
from Reagan v. City of Newport, 43 A.3d 33, 37 (R.I. 2012) (quoting 
Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 144 (R.I.2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), stating that “[i]t is well settled that [t]his Court 
will not disturb the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury unless 
such findings are clearly erroneous.”   
 26.  Burton, 80 A.3d at 860–61. 
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whether or not Plaintiff was a trespasser when the injury at issue 
occurred; if Plaintiff was found to be a trespasser then no duty 
existed.27  The court defined trespasser as “[o]ne who intentionally 
and without consent or privilege enters another’s property.”28  
Plaintiff’s own testimony established that he did not have, nor did 
he seek, permission to be on the property.29  This lack of 
permission was further corroborated by L.V.’s testimony that it 
was “general knowledge” that the group should not be discovered 
on the property.30  This testimony sufficiently established that at 
the time Plaintiff’s injury occurred he was a trespasser, and 
therefore, the Defendant did not owe him a duty other than 
avoidance of willful or wanton conduct upon discovering him in a 
position of danger.31 
After determining that under the general rule Defendant did 
not owe Plaintiff a duty, the court then turned to whether or not 
the attractive nuisance doctrine was applicable.32  If the doctrine 
of attractive nuisance applied, then it was possible that, despite 
Plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, Defendant was liable for harm 
that Plaintiff suffered while he was on Defendant’s property.33 
As the trial justice found and the court upheld, the main focus 
in determining whether Plaintiff fell within the exception was 
whether Plaintiff could establish that “because of [his] youth” he 
“[did] not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in 
intermeddling with [the dangerous condition] or in coming within 
the area made dangerous by it.”34  This is due to Mr. Abruzzese’s 
 
 27.  Id.  The court quoted its decision in Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 
110, 113 (R.I. 2011) to establish the duty property owners owe to trespassers. 
Burton, 80 A.3d at 860–61.  In that decision the court stated, “[i]t is a well-
established principle of law that property owners owe no duty of care to 
trespassers but to refrain wanton or willful conduct; even then only upon 
discovering a trespasser in a position of danger.”  Id. 
 28.  Burton, 80 A.3d at 861 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. 
Napolitano, 746 A.2d 138, 141 (R.I. 2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 29.  Id. at 859, 861. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 860–61. 
 32.  Id. at 861. The court first adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine 
according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 at 197 (1965) in Haddad 
v. First National Stores Inc., 280 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I. 1971).  It is noteworthy 
that the plaintiff in this case was a five-year-old.  Id. 
 33.  Burton, 80 A.3d at 861. 
 34.  Id.  
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testimony that the state was aware of the frequency with which 
“kids and adults” alike entered the Ladd Center grounds.35 The 
court’s rationale for adopting the doctrine in the first place was 
because “[a] young child cannot because of his immaturity and 
lack of judgment be deemed to be able to perceive all the dangers 
he might encounter as he trespasses.”36  If a child is in fact fully 
aware of the danger he or she encounters and capable of 
comprehending its magnitude then he or she is capable of avoiding 
it and there is no need for application of a doctrine intended to 
protect those incapable of appreciating the danger they 
encounter.37   The court found that Plaintiff was indeed capable of 
comprehending the risks associated with his behavior, as he 
testified regarding the bottles of sulfuric acid that he believed they 
contained some kind of hazardous material.38  Additionally L.V.’s 
testimony that he poured some of the liquid out onto a table 
indicates that there was enough caution within the group to 
initially avoid contact.39  In holding that, although Plaintiff was a 
minor he was old enough to appreciate the risks associated with 
breaking into the former hospital, the court noted that “[i]t strains 
credulity to think that a seventeen-year-old who was about to 
complete his G.E.D., did not realize the risk involved in climbing a 
pipe to an upper-story window and entering a dark abandoned 
building.”40  Due to Plaintiff’s status as a trespasser to whom the 
attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply, Defendant did not have 
a duty; therefore, no negligence was established on Defendant’s 
behalf, and it did not share “some comparative fault.”41 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged the doctrine 
of attractive nuisance as an exception to the general rule that a 
land owner owes no duty to trespassers except to refrain from 
willful or wanton conduct.42  The rationale behind this exception 
 
 35.  Id. at 862. 
 36.  Id. at 861. 
 37.  Id. at 863. 
 38.  Id. at 859, 863. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 863. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 860–61. 
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is that children often lack the ability to perceive danger in the 
same way as an adult can and are, therefore, more susceptible to 
harm.43  The doctrine is intended to protect those who are unable 
to protect themselves, and this goal takes precedence over a 
landowner’s right to exclusive use and enjoyment of his or her 
land.44 
The court here applied the doctrine with that rationale in 
mind.  Based on the facts, the court appropriately determined 
Plaintiff did not fall within the attractive nuisance exception, 
despite the fact that it was unreasonable and even irresponsible 
for the State to allow bottles of sulfuric acid to remain on a 
property frequented by trespassers.45  In determining whether or 
not Plaintiff was, because of his youth, incapable of recognizing 
the risk associated with breaking into an abandoned medical 
facility at night, the court relied on the Plaintiff’s own statements 
and testimony regarding the trespass at issue.46  He had been to 
the property on two prior occasions, each time without 
permission,47 and another witness who was present the night of 
the trespass admitted that it was general knowledge that they 
should not get caught.48  Entering the building required the group 
to “shimmy” up a pipe to break into a third story window,49 which 
should have been an indication of the risk the group was 
undertaking.  Plaintiff’s testimony that he believed the bottles 
contained a hazardous material made it evident that he was 
indeed capable of perceiving the potential risk associated with 
coming into contact with the substance they contained.50  The fact 
that another member of the group testified that he poured a small 
amount of the liquid out onto a table to assess what it was, further 
demonstrates that the plaintiff was cognizant of the potential for 
harm and, therefore, capable of taking measures to prevent it. 
However, the court’s focus on age is somewhat concerning.  
The fact that Plaintiff was seventeen and the court had never 
 
 43.  Id. at 861 (quoting Haddad v. First Nat’l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d 93, 96 
(R.I. 1971)). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 862. 
 46.  Id. at 863. 
 47.  Id. at 859. 
 48.  Id. at 859, 861. 
 49.  Id. at 859. 
 50.  Id. at 859, 863 
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before applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance to a child over 
the age of twelve was deemed significant.  While the court did not 
go so far as to say the Plaintiff’s age was the determinative factor, 
it did note that it “strained credulity” to think that a seventeen-
year-old on the verge of completing his G.E.D. was incapable of 
recognizing the risks associated with his activity.51 In an 
overgeneralization, the court attributed Plaintiff’s failure to 
protect himself to the general recklessness and bravado of 
seventeen-year-old boys.52 Though Plaintiff certainly appeared 
capable of recognizing risk, it would be unfair to assume that 
every time a teenager exercises poor judgment or fails to identify a 
potential source of harm, it is merely the result of bravado and 
recklessness.  Seventeen-year-olds are still minors often lacking in 
experience, and compensating for “immaturity and lack of 
judgment” in children is the goal of the attractive nuisance 
doctrine.53  According to comment c of § 339 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, “in our present hazardous civilization some 
types of dangers have become common, which an immature 
adolescent may reasonably not appreciate, although an adult may 
be expected to do so.”54  Additionally, even where minors recognize 
the presence of a dangerous condition, comment k of the 
Restatement specifies that “[t]he lack of experience and judgment 
normal to young children may prevent them from appreciating the 
full extent of the risk.”55  Minors as old as seventeen may be 
capable of understanding that there is some level of risk 
associated with their undertaking a particular activity, but that 
doesn’t mean they are capable of fully appreciating the extent of 
the risk.  So long as the trespasser is a minor, a stronger emphasis 
should be placed on the circumstances surrounding the injury, 
rather than the age of the trespasser.  Such an emphasis is more 
faithful to the goals of the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is to 





 51.  Id. at 863. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See id. at 861. 
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 339 cmt. c (1965). 
 55.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 339 cmt. k (1965). 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the State did not 
owe a duty to a seventeen-year-old trespasser who was burned by 
sulfuric acid while trespassing on the Ladd Center grounds.  As a 
result of Plaintiff’s age and testimony regarding the lengths he 
went to gain access to the facilities and his recognition of the 
potential dangers associated with his actions, Plaintiff did not fall 
within the exception of the attractive nuisance doctrine.  The 
doctrine is meant to protect child trespassers on the grounds they 
are less capable of assessing certain dangers and, therefore, less 
capable of protecting themselves. 
Amy Brown 
 





Civil Procedure.  Burns v.  Moorland Farm Condo. Ass’n, 86 A.3d 354 
(R.I. 2014). A subset of condominium owners were levied repair 
assessments by the Condominium Association despite the fact that this 
subset would not benefit from the proposed repairs. Following a judicial 
declaration that the assessments were illegal, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island held that the judgment was null and void because the owners which 
would benefit from the repairs were not a party to the original declaratory 
judgment action. The court reasoned that the declaration would impact the 
interests of the benefitting owners and could lead to future controversies, 
thereby rendering them indispensable parties to the action. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Moorland Farm Condominium (“Moorland Farm”) in 
Newport, Rhode Island consists of thirty-three housing units in 
ten buildings.1  The units at Moorland Farm are not uniform, and 
vary in terms of time of construction, size, amenities, and 
configuration.2  Based on the time of construction, the housing 
units are classified as Phase I, Phase II, or Phase III.3  While 
Phase I contains smaller “A units” and larger “B units,” the Phase 
II and Phase III elements of the Moorland Farm Condominium 
contain only the smaller “A units.”4 
Between 2005 and 2008, the Moorland Farm Condominium 
Association (the “Association”) and its management committee 
initiated repairs to decks attached to Moorland Farm housing 
units.5  According to the bylaws of Moorland Farm, the 
management committee had the authority to levy assessments on 
individual condominium owners for the purpose of repairing 
 
 1.  Burns v. Moorland Farm Condo. Ass’n, 86 A.3d 354, 355 (R.I. 2014).  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 355–56. There was apparently some confusion at trial 
regarding whether the “A units” or “B units” are larger, but the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island clarified that the “B units” are clearly larger than the 
“A units.” Id. at 355–56 nn.1–2.   
 5.  Id. at 356.  
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common areas.6  Further, the bylaws allowed for the management 
committee to use discretion in its determination of expenses 
required for general repairs, provided that the expenses were only 
used for common and lawful purposes.7 
The management committee issued four special assessments 
which focused primarily on repairs to Phase I housing units.8  In 
its evaluation, the committee sought to repair various Phase I 
decks which were, in the eyes of the Phase II and Phase III 
owners, not “common areas” for the purposes of the Association’s 
bylaws.9 
Accordingly, Phase II and III unit owners (“Plaintiffs”) filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of Rhode Island 
which sought to establish that the four special assessments were 
illegal and unenforceable.10  Further, the Plaintiffs sought 
reimbursement of any monies previously paid to the Association 
for the purposes of the four assessments.11  Additionally, the 
Plaintiffs requested that the court order the Association to 
reevaluate and reallocate the cost of completed and future repairs 
to the Phase I owners who directly benefited from the deck 
repairs, rather than improperly spreading the cost to all unit 
owners.12 
Significantly, the Plaintiffs named only “the [A]ssociation and 
individual members of the management committee, in their 
 
 6.  Id.; Burns v. Moorland Farm Condo. Ass’n, No. NC-2007-0610, 2010 
WL 3451823, at *4–5, *8–9 (R.I. Super. Aug. 27, 2010) (citing specific joint 
exhibits and bylaws to further define the scope of power bestowed upon the 
management committee and Association).  
 7.  Burns, 86 A.3d at 356.  
 8.  Id.  Specifically, the first assessment in the amount of $205,600 was 
allocated to repair four decks attached to Phase I units.  Id.  The second 
assessment in the amount of $500,000 was allocated to repair the remaining 
decks attached to Phase I units.  Id.  The third assessment in the amount of 
$180,000 was allocated, in part, for general repairs to Phase I buildings.  Id.  
The fourth assessment in the amount of $100,050 was not explicitly 
explained by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 356–57; see Burns, 2010 WL 3451823, at *4, *10 (finding that 
certain decks are restricted for the “private, exclusive use of the unit to which 
they are connected” and that “Phases II and III unit owners received no 
benefit from the replacement of the decks and entry court areas in Phase I”).  
 10.  Burns, 86 A.3d at 356–57.  
 11.  Id. at 357. 
 12.  Id.  
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capacity as members of that body, as defendants.”13  In its answer, 
and again before the start of trial, the Association raised the 
affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs had failed to join all 
necessary and indispensable parties to the lawsuit.14  The 
Association argued that the Phase I owners had an interest in the 
action, and accordingly, joinder was required for the trial to 
continue.15  The trial justice proceeded despite the Association’s 
objections.16 
Following a two-day bench trial in July of 2010, the trial 
justice issued an order in favor of the Plaintiffs.17  The order 
declared the assessments to be illegal and ordered the Association 
to refund the Plaintiffs for any cost incurred as a result of the 
assessments.18  Additionally, the trial justice further instructed 
the Association to reassess the cost of deck replacements to the 
individual Phase I unit owners who had benefitted from the 
assessments.19  The Association timely appealed the adverse 
declaratory judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 
arguing, in relevant part, that the trial justice erred by failing to 





 13.  Id. at 356. 
 14.  Id. at 357.  
 15.  Id. at 357–58. 
 16.  Id. at 357. 
 17.  Burns v. Moorland Farm Condo. Ass’n, No. NC-2007-0610, 2010 WL 
3451823, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2010).  The trial justice, acting as the 
sole fact-finder in the bench trial, evaluated the case on its merits and 
concluded that the unambiguous language of The Condominium Act and the 
Moorland Farm Condominium Declaration established that the decks in 
question were not common areas and, thus, declared that the assessments 
levied to the non-benefitting plaintiffs for repairs to private decks were 
illegal.  Id. at *11–16.  
 18.  Id. at *15–16. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Burns, 86 A.3d at 355, 357–58.  The Association further argued that 
the trial justice erred in his evaluation of the merits of the case and, 
additionally, in his imposition of sanctions on the Association for bringing a 
Rule 60(b) motion at trial.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island declined 
to discuss the merits at length after finding judicial error in the threshold 
question of indispensable parties which thereby rendered the merits of the 
dispute moot. Id. at 360.  However, the Court vacated the order imposing 
sanctions on the defendants for bringing a Rule 60(b) motion.  Id. at 361.   
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the 
Association argued “that the lawsuit’s critical defect [was] its 
failure to include the Phase I unit owners who received the benefit 
of the [A]ssociation’s assessment for deck repairs but who would 
bear the financial burden of the reallocated costs as set forth in 
the judgment.”21  However, the Plaintiffs insisted “that the 
[A]ssociation is the only necessary defendant because the 
judgment imposes an obligation only upon the [A]ssociation to 
reallocate and reassess the deck repairs.”22  The Plaintiffs 
reasoned that the Phase I unit owners are not indispensable 
parties to the lawsuit because “[a]ny unit owner’s responsibility to 
pay legal assessments . . . is a contractual obligation that is based 
on the declaration [of condominium], and not on the result of this 
action.”23  The court sided with Association and declared that the 
owners of the Phase I units had an interest in the declaration and 
were therefore an indispensable party to the suit.24 
The court turned to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
(“UDJA”) to evaluate the indispensable party issue on appeal.25  
Section 9-30-11 of the UDJA provides “‘[w]hen declaratory relief is 
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the 
proceeding.’”26  The court stated that this statutory requirement 
“furthers the purpose of [the act], which is ‘to facilitate the 
termination of controversies.’”27  The court relied on the statutory 
objective of section 9-30-11 as an analytical motif throughout the 
discussion.28 
The court declared that section 9-30-11 is a mandatory 
provision in declaratory judgment actions and noted that it is 
generally fatal to a declaratory judgment when a party with an 
 
 21.  Id. at 358. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 360. 
 25.  Id. at 358. 
 26.  Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-30-11 (2012)). 
 27.  Id. (quoting Abbatematteo v. State, 694 A.2d 738, 740 (R.I. 1997)).  
 28.  Id. at 358–60 (noting the importance of avoiding controversies 
throughout a discussion of case precedent and reiterating this concern in 
holding for the Association).  
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interest in the declaration is not properly joined.29  The court 
relied on several Rhode Island cases to establish how the courts 
have handled cases involving indispensable parties to declaratory 
judgments in the past.30  Additionally, the court drew from an 
Ohio case with similar factual circumstances in support of its 
conclusion that the Phase I owners were indispensable parties.31 
First, the court discussed Abbatematteo v. State, where 
certain participants in the Employees’ Retirement System of the 
State of Rhode Island sought “a declaration that the retirement 
system’s payment of more generous benefits to some [third-party] 
retirees was unconstitutional and . . . an injunction putting an end 
to those payments.”32  There, the trial court dismissed a 
declaratory judgment action on the grounds that the third-party 
employees who had allegedly received better benefits were 
indispensable parties to the suit.33  The Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island affirmed the trial court’s ruling and reasoned that a 
declaration in the plaintiff’s favor “would reduce or eliminate the 
benefits for th[e] ‘favored’ members of the retirement system.”34  
The court used this as an example of a third-party “interest” that 
would have been adversely affected in the event of a declaratory 
judgment, similar to the interest at issue in Burns.35  
Additionally, the court rationalized it’s reluctance to grant 
declarations where a third-party has an interest in the 
declaration, citing a concern for potentially needless future 
litigation arising out of the judicial decree.36 
 
 29.  Id. at 358.  
 30.  Id. at 358–59. 
 31.  Id. at 359–60.  
 32.  Id. at 358 (citing Abbatematteo v. State 694 A.2d 738, 740 (R.I. 
1997)).  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. (quoting Abbatematteo, 694 A.2d at 740).   
 35.  See id. at 358, 360.  The court also identified “a city council member’s 
interest in the municipal budget process” as an additional example of a third-
party interest which would require joinder. Id. at 358–59 (analyzing Sullivan 
v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 749–50, 754 (R.I. 1997)).  
 36.  Id.  The court discussed a case where it had previously held that 
members of certain municipal boards in the City of Warwick, Rhode Island 
were indispensable parties to a declaratory judgment action by the Mayor 
which “sought a declaration as to whether the municipal charter or general 
statutes controlled the selection of members of certain municipal boards.” Id. 
at 358 (citing In re City of Warwick, 97 R.I. 294, 295–96 (R.I. 1964)).  There, 
the court explained that all members of the boards were required parties 
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Moreover, the court went on to analyze a factually similar 
case decided in the Court of Appeals of Ohio.37  Much like Burns, 
the declaratory judgment action under review there originated 
when certain condominium owners were assessed the cost of 
balconies owned by other condominium owners.38  That court 
applied a similar declaratory judgment statute and “held that the 
unit owners whose condominiums had balconies were necessary 
parties”39 because the unit owners with balconies “[we]re . . . 
individually responsible for the cost of the repair and maintenance 
of the balconies, whereas the cost was previous to be shared by the 
entire association.”40  There, the court also expressed a concern 
about the possibility of “piecemeal litigation” between the two 
groups of condominium owners if all parties were not properly 
joined to the case.41  While not bound to this unpublished Ohio 
decision, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island still made use of the 
remarkably similar factual circumstances in arriving at its 
conclusion.42 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island equated the interests 
discussed in previous declaratory judgment cases to the interests 
of the Phase I deck owners.43  The court noted that the judgment 
requested by the Plaintiffs, and eventually granted by the trial 
justice, sought “specific decrees that the association ‘allocate costs’ 
to [the Phase I owners].”44  In the eyes of the court, the fact that 
the Phase I owners were essentially ordered to shoulder the 
financial burden of the reallocated deck costs represented a clear 
and unmistakable interest in the litigation.45 
The court further reasoned that a declaration that would 
adversely affect the interests of the Phase I owners would 
ultimately “undermine the purpose of declaratory-judgment 
 
because their absence “deprive[d] the decree . . . of any binding effect” and 
could potentially lead to future needless litigation on the issue.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 359. 
 38.  Id. (citing Cerio v. Hilroc Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 83309, 
2004 WL 529106 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004)).  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Cerio, 2004 WL 529106, at *3) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 41.  Id. at 359–60.  
 42.  See id.  
 43.  See id. at 358–60. 
 44.  Id. at 359. 
 45.  Id.  
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actions”—avoiding and eliminating controversies.46  The court 
juxtaposed this underlying rationale against constrictive 
precedential pronouncements in previous declaratory judgment 
actions and held that “the failure to join [the Phase I owners] in 
this case was fatal and that the judgment [by the trial court] is 
null and void.”47 
 
COMMENTARY 
By all accounts, it appears that the court came to the correct 
conclusion in this case.  The fact that the Plaintiffs explicitly 
sought a declaration which put a cognizable financial burden on 
the Phase I owners clearly made them indispensable parties to the 
action.48  The court correctly identified this purported cost-
shifting as a genuine “interest” in the litigation which could 
potentially lead to “piecemeal” litigation between the Association 
and the Phase I owners or the Phase I owners and the Plaintiffs.49  
Having identified the underlying rational of declaratory judgment 
actions for the purposes of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act—“to facilitate the termination of controversies”50—the court 
correctly reiterated precedential concerns that could arise from 
declarations, such as this one, which fail to join indispensable 
parties.51 
The court correctly held that “failure to join indispensable 
parties in this case was fatal and that the [previous] judgment is 
null and void.”52  However, in a footnote attached to this holding, 
the court mentioned that it had previously “assumed without 
deciding that joinder might be excused if it would be impracticable 
because the parties to be joined were too numerous or service 
 
 46.  Id. at 359–60. 
 47.  Id. at 360.  “Our statutes and cases make clear that the Phase I unit 
owners should have been joined in this case.”  Id. at 360 n.6.  
 48.  Id. at 357 (“[P]laintiffs requested that the court ‘order defendants to 
reassess the four special assessments to the individual unit owners whose 
properties specifically benefited from the illegal assessments’ and, if those 
reassessments were not paid, to file liens against the benefited units.”). 
 49.  Id. at 357–60. 
 50.  Id. at 359 (quoting Abbatemateo v. State, 694 A.2d 738, 740 (R.I. 
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  See id. at 358–60.  
 52.  Id. at 360. 
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would be unreasonabl[y] burden[some].”53  The court correctly 
distinguished the factual circumstances of this case from this 
apparent limitation on mandatory required joinder rules.54  While 
this footnote could be read as mere dicta, it could also have an 
important impact on future complex litigation in Rhode Island. 
As the public pension crisis looms in Rhode Island, it is 
reasonable to expect an upturn in complex declaratory judgment 
actions involving multiple parties.  Rhode Island courts have 
already turned to the discussion in Burns as a means of succinctly 
reiterating the previously established rationales of required 
joinder.55  Thus, Burns currently stands as a tool for establishing 
the courts’ precedential standard for applying the rationales of the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.56  However, as complex 
litigation begins to involve more parties, it is reasonable to foresee 
the required joinder rationale, as presented through the policy 
prism of Burns, as a double-edged sword.  In other words, at what 
point does the dismissal of declaratory judgment actions on the 
grounds of required joinder begin to encroach on the very policies 
the Burns court sought to protect?57 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island correctly relied on 
precedent and further developed the procedural standards of 
required parties in Burns.  However, adopting the Burns analysis 
to support a broader and more cumbersome set of facts may 
become unwieldy for the courts in the future.  It will be interesting 
to observe how Rhode Island courts will address factual 
circumstances analogous to the “extremely large and hypothetical 
condominium development” noted in Burns, and if the courts will 
consider its role in “facilitat[ing] the termination of controversies” 
 
 53.  Id. at 360 n.6. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 54.  See id.  (“While this may prove to be true in the context of some 
extremely large and hypothetical condominium development, such a case is 
not before us.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, Nos. PC 12-
3167, PC 12-3169, PC 12-3579, 2014 WL 3891229, at *10–11, *13–14 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2014); R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v. Chaffee, No. 
PC123166, 2014 WL 3685916, at *5–7, *10, *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2014).  
 56.  See e.g., Bristol/Warren Reg’l Emps., 2014 WL 3891229, at *10-11; 
R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal., 2014 WL 3685916 at *5–7.  
 57.  Namely, the role of declaratory judgments as a method of 
eliminating controversies. See Burns, 86 A.3d at 358–60. 
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in this context.58 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that certain 
condominium owners were indispensable parties to a declaratory 
judgment action by other condominium owners against the 
condominium association.  As the complaint and judgment shifted 
the cost of repairs to the non-party, they had a clear interest in 
the litigation, and the failure to join them was fatal to the 
judgment.  The court evaluated the purpose of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act and concluded that it was obligated to 
render the dispute moot as the judgment would have adversely 
impacted the non-parties’ interest and could have potentially led 
to further controversies arising out of the same dispute. 
William C. Burnham 
 
 
 58.  Id. at 359, 360 n.6.  





Civil Procedure.  Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 89 A.3d 806 (R.I. 2014).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that, when suing a medical laboratory for 
negligence, the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not apply, but 
instead courts are instructed to apply the general negligence statute of 
limitations. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 16, 2010, Plaintiffs Jean and Bunsan Ho-Rath1 
(“Jean” and “Bunsan”) sued Rhode Island Hospital (“RIH”), 
Women & Infants’ Hospital (“WIH”), as well as Corning 
Incorporated (“Corning”) and Quest Diagnostics, LLC2 (“Quest”) 
on behalf of the Ho-Raths’ minor daughter, Yendee Ho-Rath 
(“Yendee”).3  The Plaintiffs sued on theories of negligence, lack of 
informed consent, corporate liability, and vicarious liability based 
on Yendee’s diagnosis of a genetic blood disorder, alpha 
thalassemia.4  The Plaintiffs’ allege that the Defendants did not 
diagnose or treat Yendee for the disorder, even though Jean, 
Bunsan, and Yendee’s older brother had all been tested starting in 
1993.5 
The three Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims, 
and on June 27, 2011, a superior sourt justice heard the motions.6  
On January 4, 2011, Corning argued that under R.I. General 
Laws section 9-1-14.1,7 Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claims and 
 
 1.  The Plaintiffs will be referenced by their first names to avoid 
confusion, just as the case did, but no disrespect is intended.   
 2.  While the Plaintiffs named many other Defendants in both the 
original and amended complaints, the three Defendants listed here are the 
only pertinent Defendants discussed in this case.  
 3.  Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 89 A.3d 806, 808 (R.I. 2014). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 808–09. 
 7.  Id. at 807–08 n.1 (“In pertinent part, G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1 provides 
that an action for medical . . . malpractice shall be commenced within three 
(3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to 
the action; provided, however, that: (1) One who is under disability by reason 
of age, mental incompetence, or otherwise, and on whose behalf no action is 
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the claims brought by Plaintiffs for Yendee were barred by the 
statute of limitations.8  Additionally, regarding the Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint, Corning argued that because the suit was 
filed on a minor’s behalf, the parent Plaintiffs could not be added 
beyond that three-year statute of limitations.9 
On February 8, 2011, RIH10 argued that the loss of 
consortium claims were not part of the tolling portion of the 
statute of limitations and, therefore, were time-barred.11  On 
February 28, 2011, WIH12 argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were 
barred because of the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice claims and for the lack of pleading the necessary 
discovery rule in section 9-1-14.1(2).13  Lastly, Quest argued on 
April 13, 2011 that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the 
claims only dealt with blood tests taken in December 1993.14 
The Plaintiffs argued against the motions to dismiss on 
grounds that section 9-1-14.1(1) actually tolls the statute of 
limitations for any minor who sues on a medical malpractice 
theory for three years after that child is no longer a minor.15  
Additionally, the Plaintiffs said that their loss of consortium 
claims are included in the claims that are tolled until after the 
child is no longer a minor for the very fact that the claims are 
 
brought within the period of three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of 
the incident, shall bring the action within three (3) years from the removal of 
the disability.  (2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of 
medical . . . malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which 
gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the 
time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-
14.1 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 8.  Id. at 808. 
 9.  Id.; see also Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I. 1995).  
 10.  Defendant RIH also included some other defendants, including 
Miriam Hospital and four doctors.  Ho-Rath, 89 A.3d at 809. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Defendant WIH also included three medical personnel.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  WIH also argued that Yendee cannot even bring a claim on her 
own behalf once she is no longer a minor as her parents have already filed a 
claim for her.  Id; see also Bakalakis v. Women & Infants’ Hosp., 619 A.2d 
1105, 1107 (R.I. 1993).  Quest later made the same argument in its motion to 
dismiss.  Ho-Rath, 89 A.3d at 809.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  
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derivative.16  Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that the laboratory 
Defendants, Corning and Quest, would fall under section 9-1-1917 
since the laboratories only dealt with testing blood samples.18 
In a bench decision on July 7, 2011, the trial justice concluded 
that the Plaintiffs’ claims19 in their entirety should be considered 
under medical malpractice.20  After the final judgment was 
rendered for the Defendants, the Plaintiffs, WIH, Corning, and 
Quest each appealed.21 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review,22 the court sought to interpret section 19-1-
14.1(1) in order to address the main dispute between the parties.23  
The Plaintiffs’ argument was that a party can bring medical 
malpractice claims for a minor child at any time until the child is 
no longer a minor, when the statute then allows for three 
additional years that the child can bring his or her own claim.24  
 
 16.  Id.  On the contrary, RIH had argued that, because the loss of 
consortium claims were derivative and not the actual medical malpractice 
claims of the minor child, those claims of the parents were not included in the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations.  Id. 
 17.  R.I. General Laws section 9-1-19 is “the general disability tolling 
statute applicable to causes of action other than medical malpractice.” Id. 
(citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-19 (2012)).  
 18.  Id. at 809–10. 
 19.  The trial justice also remanded the following issues to the court’s 
general calendar for a full hearing: (1) whether all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are 
time-barred due to the passage of time between the alleged injury and the 
time the action was actually filed in 2010; (2) whether the Plaintiffs’ claims 
against Corning and Quest are time-barred due to the complaint being 
amended far past the three-year mark of any blood testing; and (3) whether 
Yendee can still bring her own claim when she was no longer a minor.  Id. at 
810.   
 20.  Id.  The trial justice stated that minors had two options with medical 
malpractice suits, “either an action could be commenced on behalf of the child 
within three years of the injury . . . or the injured minor could bring suit on 
his or her won behalf within three years of attaining the age of majority.”  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  For the court to affirm a lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, it 
must be “‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be 
proven in support of the plaintiffs claim.’”  Id. (quoting Tarzia v. State, 44 
A.3d 1245, 1251 (R.I. 2012)).  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
CIVILPROCEDURE_HORATH_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  1:39 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 607 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs pointed to section 9-1-4125 to argue 
that they were correct in bringing all their derivative actions 
when they brought Yendee’s claims.26  Although the trial justice 
was right in dismissing the parents’ claims, the Defendants 
argued that the trial justice was incorrect in stating that the child 
can bring her own suit when she is no longer a minor.27 
The court determined that the claims against Corning and 
Quest were of ordinary negligence and not medical malpractice 
claims.28  The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs’ claims 
against the laboratories are for medical malpractice and cited 
Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital for the distinction 
between ordinary negligence and medical malpractice.29  The 
court looked to the legislative definition of medical malpractice30 
and determined that laboratories are not included in the 
definition.31  Since laboratories are not explicitly included, the 
court concluded that the legislature did not intend for such claims 
against laboratories to be considered as medical malpractice 
 
 25.  R.I. General Laws section 9-1-41 provides that:  
(c) Parents are entitled to recover damages for the loss of their 
unemancipated minor child’s society and companionship caused by 
tortious injury to the minor.  (d) Actions under this section shall be 
brought within the time limited under § 9-1-14 or 9-1-14.1, 
whichever is applicable, for actions for injuries to the person.  
Id. at 810–11 n.8. (quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-41 (2012)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 26.  Id. at 810–11. 
 27.  Id. at 811. 
 28.  Id. at 812.  This determination places the claims against Corning 
and Quest under the statute of limitations in section 9-1-19.  
 29.  Id. at 811–12; Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Mem’l Hosp., 481 A.2d 1, 3 
(R.I. 1984). 
 30. R.I. General Laws section 5-37-1(8) defines medical malpractice as 
“any tort, or breach of contract based on health care or professional services 
rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a physician, dentist, 
hospital, clinic, health maintenance organization or professional service 
corporation providing health care services and organized under chapter 5.1 of 
title 7, to a patient.” Ho-Rath, 89 A.3d at 812 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 5-37-1(8) (Supp. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 31.  The court concluded by looking at the plain language of section 5-37-
1(8) that Corning and Quest do not fall under the definition of medical 
malpractice.  Id.  Additionally, since health maintenance organizations are 
licensed according to chapter 17 of title 23 or chapter 41 of title 27, 
laboratories are not even included in health maintenance organizations 
because laboratories are licensed under chapter 16.2 of title 23.  Id. at 812 
n.13. 
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actions.32  The court held that the claims against Corning and 




The court has expanded risk for healthcare consumers in 
Rhode Island by ruling that the extra safeguards for plaintiffs 
provided by the medical malpractice statute of limitations exclude 
laboratories.  The medical malpractice statute of limitation was 
expanded to provide extra time for plaintiffs to discover injuries 
caused by negligence on the part of healthcare professionals.34 
While the court here concluded that the legislature did not 
mean to include laboratories within the reaches of “medical 
malpractice,” the definition of “health care facility”35 provides that 
“(o) ‘[h]ealth care facility’ means an institution providing health 
care services or a health care setting, including but not limited to 
hospitals . . . diagnostic, laboratory and imaging centers, and 
rehabilitation and other therapeutic health settings.”36  Under 
this line of reasoning and plain language analysis, laboratories do 
indeed fall under the health maintenance organization overview 
that is mentioned within the medical malpractice definition.37 
However, the issue arises because “health care facility” is 
defined differently in chapter 17 of title 23, and the definition 
expressly excludes clinical laboratories.38  The definition refers to 
chapter 16.2 of title 23, where the licensing procedure of clinical 
laboratories is described, perhaps because laboratories require 
less-extensive licensing than hospitals that offer many more 
services.39  When there are conflicting definitions, the legislative 
 
 32.  Id. at 812. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See 1 RHODE ISLAND TORT LAW AND PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE § 188 
(LEXIS Law Publishing 1999); see also Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 
745 (1968).   
 35.  The definition of “health care facility” is found in chapter 41 of title 
27, which discusses the health maintenance organizations that are included 
within medical malpractice, as the court points out in its analysis.  Ho-Rath, 
89 A.3d at 812.  
 36.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-2 (Supp. 2014). 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-2 (Supp. 2014). 
 39.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS  §§ 23-16.2-4, -17-4 (Supp. 2014). 
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intent is relevant, and since the initial definition that seems to 
include laboratories is in the same section that defines medical 
malpractice, it seems more likely that the legislature would have 
included laboratories among the agencies against which a plaintiff 
may bring a medical malpractice claim.40 
Here, the court seems to be lessening the liability on certain 
healthcare professionals, specifically laboratories, but it is unclear 
why.41  Perhaps the court views the difference between medical 
doctors and laboratory technicians as significant enough to loosen 
liability, yet that reasoning is never mentioned within the 
distinctions provided in the court’s analysis.  Whatever the 
purpose may be behind the court’s analysis, a wider reading of the 
laws regarding health care organizations indicates that 
laboratories are included within the broad category of health 
maintenance organizations, and as such, were meant to be 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that laboratories were 
not intended to be within the statute of limitation for medical 
malpractice and were subject to the statutes for ordinary 
negligence.  The court requested further briefing on the issues of 
whether or not a claim may be brought for a child when the child 
is a minor and, further, what the implications of the relevant 
statute of limitations would be.  Thus, the court vacated in part, 
remanded in part, and assigned to the court’s calendar in part. 
Rita E. Nerney 
 
 
 40.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS  §§ 5-37-1, 23-16.2-4, -17-4 (Supp. 2014). 
 41.  See Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 89 A.3d 806, 812 (R.I. 2014). 
 42.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS  § 27-41-2. 





Contract Law.  NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, 84 A.3d 800 
(R.I. 2014).  A usury savings clause in a commercial loan document does not 
validate an otherwise usurious contract as a matter of public policy.  A 
contract is usurious when the interest rate calculated based on the amount 
paid to the borrower exceeds the state’s maximum allowable interest rate set 
by applicable usury or other such laws. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 17, 2007, NV One, LLC, Nicholas E. Cambio and 
Vincent A. Cambio (“Plaintiffs”)1 entered into a loan agreement 
with Potomac Realty Capital, LLC (“Defendant”) in order to 
renovate a former post office in West Warwick, RI.2  The Plaintiffs 
signed a promissory note and a loan agreement for a total amount 
of $1,800,0003 and granted the Defendant a mortgage on the 
property as part of the security agreement.4  The parties also 
executed a Sources and Uses of Funds sheet and a Loan 
Disbursement Authorization (collectively referred to as the “loan 
documents”),5 which established an “interest reserve” and a 
“renovation reserve,” with amounts set at $62,500 and $940,000 
respectively, and also set an interest rate at either 5.3%, or the 
LIBOR rate plus 4.7%, whichever was greatest.6  Significantly, the 
 
 1.  Occasionally, there will be reference to Nicholas E. Cambio and 
Vincent A. Cambio collectively as “the Cambios.”  
 2.  NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, 84 A.3d 800, 801 (R.I. 
2014). 
 3.  Id. at 801—02.  There was also an initial deposit of $15,000 that 
increased the value of the loan to $1,815,000.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 801.  The security agreement also granted Defendant a 
“mortgage, assignment of leases and rents, security agreement, and fixture 
filing with respect to the property.”  Id. at 801—02. 
 5.  Id. at 802.  The loan documents also set a number of fees ($18,000 
exit fee, $25,000 origination fee) and provided that interest-only payments 
were due at the first of each calendar month until the loan’s maturity date 
(August 1, 2008).  Id. 
 6.  Id.  The LIBOR Rate (London Interbank Offered Rate) is calculated 
based on a ‘“daily compilation by the British Bankers Association of the rates 
that major international banks charge each other for large-volume, short-
CONTRACTLAW_NVONE_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  1:46 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 611 
loan documents also set a default interest rate at “the lesser of (a) 
twenty-four percent (24%) per annum and (b) the maximum rate 
of interest, if any, which may be collected . . . under applicable 
law.”7  The maximum interest provisions in the promissory note 
and the mortgage also contained a usury savings clause8 as an 
attempt to conform to Rhode Island usury laws.9 
By the time the note initially closed, Defendant had only 
disbursed $761,478.54—approximately forty-two percent of the 
principal amount.10  In August 2008, Defendant and Plaintiffs 
agreed to the execution of an allonge, thereby extending the 
maturity date of the loan to June 1, 2009.11  However, when the 
loan ultimately matured, the interest reserve had been completely 
exhausted but Defendant had only disbursed $1,007,390.52—
 
term loans of Eurodollars, with monthly maturity rates calculated out to one 
year.’”  Id. at 802 n.2 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (9th ed. 2009)).  
 7.  Id. at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8.  Id.  The usury savings clause found in the note provides:  
A.  It is the intention of Maker [Plaintiffs] and Payee [Defendant] to 
conform strictly to the usury and similar laws relating to interest 
from time to time in force, and all agreements between Maker and 
Payee, whether now existing or hereafter arising and whether oral or 
written, are hereby expressly limited so that in no contingency or 
event whatsoever, whether by acceleration of maturity hereof or 
otherwise, shall the amount paid or agreed to be paid in the 
aggregate to Payee as interest hereunder or under the other Loan 
Documents or in any other security agreement given to secure the 
Loan Amount, or in any other document evidencing, securing or 
pertaining to the Loan Amount, exceed the maximum amount 
permissible under applicable usury or such other laws (the 
‘Maximum Amount’).   
B.  If under any circumstances Payee shall ever receive an amount 
that would exceed the Maximum Amount, such amount shall be 
deemed a payment in reduction of the Loan owing hereunder and 
any obligation of Maker in favor of Payee . . . or if such excessive 
interest exceeds the unpaid balance of the Loan and any other 
obligation of Maker in favor of Payee, the excess shall be deemed to 
have been a payment made by mistake and shall be refunded to 
Maker.   
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9.  Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-1 et seq. (1956).  Additionally, the note 
provided that the Plaintiffs “would not accrue any interest on the [interest 
reserve and renovation reserve] funds” that were to be placed in escrow.  NV 
One, 84 A.3d at 802—03. 
 10.  Id. at 803.  Defendant also failed to place the reserve funds in 
escrow.  Id. 
 11.  Id.   
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approximately fifty-six percent of the $1.8 million loan.12  
Significantly, the Defendant continued to charge interest rates 
calculated against the face amount of the loan ($1.8 million) 
rather than the amount actually disbursed.13  Subsequently, on 
December 14, 2009, Plaintiffs “filed a verified complaint against 
Defendant claiming fraud, breach of contract, and usury” and 
sought to enjoin Defendant from foreclosing on the property and 
collecting the outstanding debt from the Cambios’ personal 
guarantees.14 
On August 16, 2011, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment for liability due to Defendant’s violation of Rhode Island 
usury law, which the trial court granted in a written decision on 
December 16, 2011.15  In granting summary judgment, the trial 
justice stated that the maximum allowable interest rate in Rhode 
Island is twenty-one percent (21%)16 and that any loan agreement 
in violation of this percentage renders the agreement usurious and 
void.17  The trial justice found that since Defendant routinely 
charged interest on the face amount of the loan rather than the 
amount disbursed, the “rate was undoubtedly usurious, at least 
for some period” and that the Defendant “never . . . lower[ed] it 
below twenty-one percent.”18  Accordingly, in order to determine 
usury in such a situation, the trial justice determined that “the 
value for computing the maximum permissible interest is not the 
amount on the face of the loan, but, rather[] the actual amount 
 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.  Interest rates were calculated at ten percent (10%) prior to the 
allonge, twelve percent (12%) from the execution of the allonge to February 
2009, and twenty-four percent (24%) after Plaintiffs defaulted for failure “to 
complete renovations within the time provided in the security agreement” 
and for failing to cure the default within the thirty-day grace period (i.e. by 
March 2009).  Id.  On October 9, 2009, Defendant sent the Plaintiffs another 
notice of default along with a payment demand and, approximately one 
month later, Defendant also sent a foreclosure notice pursuant to the 
mortgage agreement for failure to pay the loan amount plus interest by its 
maturity date.  Id.  Additionally, Defendant demanded payment from the 
Cambios pursuant to their personal guarantees.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at 803—04. 
 15.  Id. at 804.   
 16.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2 (1956); NV One, 84 A.3d at 804. 
 17.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 804; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-26-4; Sheehan v. 
Richardson, 315 B.R. 226, 234 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2004). 
 18.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 803—04. 
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received by the borrower.”19  Therefore, since Defendant charged 
interest calculated against the entire amount rather than the 
amount disbursed, there was “no doubt that [the] interest 
amounts charged exceeded twenty-one percent (21%) of the 
disbursed loan.”20 
In response to the Defendant’s argument that the usury 
savings clause rendered them immune from liability, the trial 
justice found that since there was no binding case law regarding 
Rhode Island’s allowance of use and any effects of such a clause, 
he would need to examine the issue “in light of the public policy, 
legislative intent, and plain meaning” of the usury statutes.21  
Accordingly, the court “embarked on an extensive analysis of the 
policies behind Rhode Island usury jurisprudence, as well as the 
policies of other states with substantially developed usury laws, 
such as Texas, Florida, and North Carolina.”22  After determining 
that the intent behind Rhode Island’s usury statutes aims toward 
strongly discouraging usurious transactions, the trial justice 
declined to honor Defendant’s request to uphold the loan because 
“[l]ending effect to a usury savings clause would contradict this 
state’s articulated public policy in favor of the borrower.”23  
Therefore, he granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 
judgment and entered an order on January 11, 2012 declaring the 
loan agreement void.24 
Defendant timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court and contended that “the trial justice erred when [he] 
granted . . . partial summary judgment on liability . . . by 
declaring the usury savings clause of the loan agreement 
unenforceable” and that the trial court also “erred in failing to 
 
 19.  Id. at 804 (quoting NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, 
C.A. No. PB 09-7159, 2011 WL 6470557, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20.  Id. (quoting NV One, 2011 WL 6470557, at *10) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.; see, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.001 et seq. (West 2005); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 687.01 et seq. (West 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1 et seq. 
(West 2014). 
 23.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 804 (quoting NV One, 2011 WL 6470557, at *16) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 24.  Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4 (1956).  The trial justice also voided 
the mortgage and removed the liens on the property from the land records.  
NV One, 84 A.3d at 804. 
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perform a proper analysis when it rendered a commercial contract 
term unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.”25  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court granted certiorari.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island conducted a de novo 
review of the case, since summary judgment is considered a 
“drastic remedy, and . . . should be dealt with cautiously.”27  The 
court first examined the interest rate to determine whether it was 
usurious under section 6-26-2(a) of the Rhode Island General 
Laws.28  Writing for the court, Chief Justice Suttell immediately 
stated that it was “abundantly clear . . . that the loan between 
[Defendant] and [Plaintiffs] was usurious” and found it of “critical 
importance” that Defendant calculated the interest rate on the 
face amount of the loan rather than the amount actually 
disbursed.29  Additionally, the court stated it was not even 
necessary to “engage in complex arithmetic in order to discern 
usury” because the default rate, set at “the lesser of (a) twenty-
four percent (24%) per annum and (b) the maximum rate of 
interest . . . under applicable law [(twenty-one percent (21%)]” was 
usurious on its face, as the Defendant demanded twenty-four 
percent interest throughout the default period rather than 
conforming to Rhode Island usury laws.30  Nonetheless, the court 
examined the sequence of events between March 24, 2009 and 
November 19, 200931 to calculate the actual rate of interest 
 
 25.  Id. at 804–05 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26.  Id. at 801. 
 27.  Id. at 801, 805 (quoting Carreiro v. Tobin, 66 A.3d 820, 822 (R.I. 
2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Great Am. E & S Ins. Co. 
v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571, 574 (R.I. 2012); 
Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Arbella Prot. Ins. Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I. 2011). 
 28.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 805. 
 29.  Id. at 805—06.  The court determined that the August 2007 interest 
rate calculated at 10.125 percent of the face value ($1.8 million) resulted in a 
23.17 percent rate per annum based on the amount actually disbursed by 
that time ($797,500).  Id. at 806 n.10.  This rate alone exceeded the maximum 
allowable 21 percent interest rate in section 6-26-2 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws, and was therefore usurious.  Id. at 806. 
 30.  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2 (1956). 
 31.  The former date represents the end of the “cure period” Defendant 
provided for Plaintiffs to cure the initial default on February 23, 2009, while 
the latter date represents the date which Defendant sent a payment demand 
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Defendant charged.32  Again, throughout this time period 
Defendant charged twenty-four percent interest calculated on the 
face value of the loan, which in itself was “facially usurious.”33  
However, the court found that when calculated in proportion to 
the amount Defendant had actually disbursed ($1,007,390.52), the 
interest rate “skyrocket[ted] to 43.48 percent per annum, more 
than double the maximum permissible interest rate.”34  Having 
found that the interest rate was unquestionably usurious, the 
court proceeded to analyze the heart of the Defendant’s appeal—
the applicability of the usury savings clause.35 
The court stated that, as a matter of first impression, usury 
savings clauses should be examined in light of public policy.36  The 
court analyzed the plain language of the statute and found that by 
including the word ‘shall’ in the language of the statute, the 
Legislature “evince[d] a certainty . . . [that when a lender] charges 
interest in excess of 21 percent[,] [it] is liable for usury.”37  
Furthermore, there is only one specific exception38 to the 
maximum allowable interest rate included in Rhode Island 
commercial usury law.39  Therefore, the court found it clear that 
 
to the Cambios based on their personal guarantees.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 806.   
 32.  See id. at 803, 806. 
 33.  Id. at 806. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See id. at 804—07. 
 36.  Id. at 801, 807.  The court noted that “[i]t is well settled in Rhode 
Island that ‘a contract term is unenforceable only if it violates public policy.’”  
Id. at 807 (quoting Gorman v. St. Raphael Acad., 853 A.2d 28, 39 (R.I. 2004)).  
A contract term violates public policy in four identified situations: 1) when it 
is “injurious to the interests of the public”; 2) when it “interferes with the 
public welfare or safety”; 3) when it “is unconscionable”; or 4) if it “tends to 
injustice or oppression.”  Id. (quoting Gorman, 853 A.2d at 39) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 37.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 807. 
 38.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(e) (1956) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsection (a) of this section and/or any other provision in this chapter to the 
contrary, there is no limitation on the rate of interest which may be legally 
charged for the loan to, or use of money by, a commercial entity, where the 
amount of money loaned exceeds the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000) 
and where repayment of the loan is not secured by a mortgage against the 
principal residence of any borrower; provided, that the commercial entity has 
first obtained a pro forma methods analysis performed by a certified public 
accountant licensed in the state of Rhode Island indicating that the loan is 
capable of being repaid.”). 
 39.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 809. 
CONTRACTLAW_NVONE_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  1:46 PM 
616 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:610 
the Legislature had “consider[ed] (and reject[ed]) . . . any and all 
other circumstances whereby a lender may charge interest in 
excess of 21 percent.”40  Additionally, in determining civil usury 
violations, the court found that the lender’s intent was immaterial 
based on the fact that intent is only mentioned in the criminal 
usury statute.41  Accordingly, it was clear to the court that the 
“Legislature intended an inflexible, hardline approach to usury 
that is tantamount to strict liability.”42  The court nevertheless 
continued to analyze binding precedent and ultimately declared 
that “the public policy behind the usury statute [is] [f]or [the] 
protection of the borrower.”43  Therefore, “it is incumbent upon the 
lender to ensure full compliance with the provisions for maximum 
rate of interest, and apart from the explicit exception in § 6-26-2(e) 
of Rhode Island’s General Laws, anything short of full compliance 
renders the transaction usurious and void.”44  Shifting the burden 
of compliance on the lender was a sufficient means to highlight 
the State’s “strong public policy against usurious transactions.”45 
 
 40.  Id.; see § 6-26-2(e). 
 41.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 807; see § 6-26-3. 
 42.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 43.  Id. at 809; see, e.g., Colonial Plan Co. v. Tartaglione, 147 A. 880, 881 
(R.I. 1929) (reasoning that contracting around maximum interest laws would 
permit abuse and would allow lenders to “take advantage of small 
borrowers,” thereby undermining the deterrence aspect of the statute); 
Burdon v. Unrath, 132 A. 728, 730 (R.I. 1926) (holding that a lender’s 
intention to abide by the maximum interest rates “is no excuse for the 
violation of the statute” and that a contrary holding “would furnish to 
avaricious lenders a convenient excuse” when they fail to abide to usury 
laws). 
 44.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 809 (emphasis added).  The court additionally 
stated that “[u]surious interest rates are to be avoided at all costs.”  Id. at 
808. 
 45.  Id. (quoting DeFusco v. Giorgio, 440 A.2d 727, 732 (R.I. 1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Two decisions from the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Bankruptcy 
Court were also persuasive in the court’s reasoning.  See id.  In Sheehan v. 
Richardson, the court refused to apply the in pari delicto doctrine against a 
borrower when usury arose in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, stating 
that “Rhode Island usury law places the burden on charging a legal interest 
rate on the lender.”  315 B.R. 226, 240 (D.R.I 2004).  The court here found 
that Sheehan was “illustrative of the public policy underlying the usury 
statute” that Rhode Island refuses to punish borrowers when lenders try to 
capitalize on usurious interest rates.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 808; see 315 B.R. at 
240.  The court then cited In re Swartz as “perhaps the most telling reflection 
of the rigidity of the usury statute” where the Rhode Island Bankruptcy 
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The court additionally rejected Defendant’s argument that 
“sophisticated business entities” should be bound by usury savings 
clause terms to which they both agreed.46  Noting that section 6-
26-2(e) applies to commercial loans, the court determined that 
“the very existence of th[e] exception . . . recogniz[es] that some 
borrowers are different” and are only eligible for protection if the 
transaction meets the codified requirements within the 
exception.47  However, since the Defendant did not “secur[e] the 
requisite pro forma analysis,”48 Defendant “failed to avail itself to 
the exception and [was] therefore bound by the maximum interest 
rate.”49 
With these policy considerations in mind, the court flatly 
rejected honoring any usury savings clauses as a matter of law, 
since “the enforcement of [such] clauses would entirely obviate 
any responsibility on the part of the lender to abide by the usury 
statute, [which] would, in essence, swallow the rule.”50  The court 
reasoned that if usury savings clauses were enforceable, lenders 
could “circumvent the maximum interest rate by including a 
boilerplate usury savings clause” which “would have the reverse 
effect of incentivizing lenders,” who are “typically in a better 
position to understand the terms of [a] loan,” to comply with usury 
laws.51  Furthermore, the burden of “ensuring compliance [would 
rest] squarely on the shoulders of the borrower,” with an end 
result “injurious to the money-borrowing public.”52  The court 
therefore held that “usury savings clauses are unenforceable as 
against the well-established public policy of preventing usurious 
transactions,” and as a result, Defendant was unable to shield 
itself from liability.53  Since there were no “remaining issues of 
 
Court invalidated a loan when usury arose due to a four dollar filing fee.  NV 
One, 84 A.3d at 808; see In re Swartz, 37 B.R. 776 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984).  
 46.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 809, 810.   
 47.  Id. at 809. 
 48.  Indeed, the loan in question fit into the exception because the loan 
exceeded the $1,000,000 requirement and neither of the Cambios’ primary 
residences secured the loan in the form of the mortgage.  Id. at 809 n.19; see 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(e) (1956). 
 49.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 809 n.19; see § 6-26-2(e). 
 50.  NV One, 84 A.3d at 809—10. 
 51.  Id. at 810. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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material fact . . . [Plaintiffs were] entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law” on the issue of the usury.54 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court took a rigid stance against 
usurious transactions by declaring that usury savings clauses in 
general are unenforceable as a matter of public policy.55  In 
compliance with Rhode Island’s commercial usury statute, its 
underpinning legislative intent, and an abundance of precedent 
and nonbinding authorities, the court took the stance advocated 
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina that protecting citizens 
against usurious transactions is one of the highest public 
interests.56  It should be clear after this ruling that strict 
compliance with Rhode Island usury laws is the only method to 
evade severe penalties,57 and the burden of doing so lies solely on 
commercial lenders. Furthermore, unless the loan agreement 
strictly adheres to the requirements of section 6-26-2(e), 
sophisticated business entities cannot contract loan agreements 
past twenty-one percent interest.  Additionally, showing good faith 
on the lender’s behalf is futile, as intent is irrelevant when the 
standard is “tantamount to strict liability.”58 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See id. at 805—10. 
 56.  See id. at 810 (“The [usury] statute relieves the borrower of the 
necessity for expertise and vigilance regarding the legality of rates he must 
pay.  That onus is placed instead on the lender, whose business it is to lend 
money for profit and who is thus in a better position than the borrower to 
know the law.  A ‘usury savings clause,’ if valid, would shift the onus back 
onto the borrower, contravening statutory policy and depriving the borrower 
of the benefit of the statute’s protection and penalties.”  (alteration in 
original) (quoting Swindell v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 409 S.E.2d 892, 896 
(N.C. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  However, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court did not mention that in North Carolina, a party arguing 
usury is required to show “corrupt intent to charge usurious interest” and 
that “[t]he penalty for usury . . . is only forfeiture of interest, not principal.”  
NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, C.A. No. PB 09-7159, 2011 WL 
6470557, at *14 n.5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011).  Although “corrupt 
intent . . . can be established simply by showing a usurious rate was actually 
imposed,” intent is nonetheless a factor considered in North Carolina’s usury 
analysis.  Id.  
 57.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(a) (1956) (“Every [usurious] contract . . . 
and every mortgage, pledge, deposit, or assignment made or given as security 
for the performance of the contract, shall be usurious and void.”).  
 58.  See NV One, 84 A.3d at 807. 
CONTRACTLAW_NVONE_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  1:46 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 619 
This decision further underscores the firmly rooted and 
unforgiving approach that Rhode Island courts take in deciphering 
usury, leaving no room for anything short of a lender’s full and 
utmost compliance.  Although the agreement here seemed to fit 
the statutory exception for high dollar loan amounts on its face, 
without “first obtain[ing] a pro forma methods analysis performed 
by a certified public accountant licensed in the state of Rhode 
Island indicating that the loan is capable of being repaid,”59 the 
lender was cast to sea without a sail.  Although the usury savings 
provision was freely contracted between both parties, the missing 
pro forma analysis was an inexcusable oversight in the court’s 
mind, with no mention of penalizing the borrower that had a 
practice of defaulting due to negligent nonpayment.  This allowed 
the borrower to harbor the fruits of the seemingly superfluous 
provision to the tune of one million dollars in no strings attached 
principal.60  Consequently, Rhode Island usury law appears to be 
a punitive means to a protectionist end.61 
Although it was a dreary result for the Defendant here, the 
ultimate consequences of NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capitol, 
LLC should be relatively nonexistent.62  Commercial lenders 
doing business in Rhode Island should already be aware of the 
state’s moored stance on usury given its strong jurisprudence.  In 
light of this, diligent lenders should not rely on usury savings 
clauses in the first place.  The only additional burden now rests on 
the legal and compliance departments of in-state and multi-state 
commercial lenders to review the Rhode Island form contracts and 
delete any usury savings clauses (if only to save the company 
dozens annually on ink).  Absent a widespread mimicking of the 
practice at issue here,63 lenders should not face anything more 
 
 59.  § 6-26-2(e); NV One, 84 A.3d at 809. 
 60.  § 6-26-4(a). 
 61.  See, e.g., Nazarian v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 78 A.2d 7, 10 (R.I. 1951) 
(stating that the “best method” for preventing usurious transactions is 
displayed by the legislative policy that severely penalizes lenders who violate 
maximum interest statutes against aggrieved borrowers).  
 62.  Furthermore, it should not be a surprise that the court stepped in to 
invalidate usury savings clauses.  Cf.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 
(1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (“[S]tate laws may regulate life in many ways 
that we . . . might think injudicious[;] . . . usury laws are [an] ancient 
example.”).  
 63.  The Defendant here routinely charged usurious interest rates, 
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than a minor inconvenience.  What this decision represents, 
however, is a symbolic tipping of the scales that has potential to 
deter the current and potential commercial lenders that provide 
the ancillary capital for businesses from a state that is notoriously 
bad for business.  However, this is not the court’s fault64—maybe 
it is time that the Rhode Island General Assembly considers less 
antiquated and draconian65 ways to protect the public from falling 
prey to overpowering lenders while also being more welcoming 
towards lenders with good faith. 
For example, the trial judge in this case, although ultimately 
rejecting alternative approaches, analyzed the purpose of usury 
laws in various other states before doing so.  For example, in 
Florida, where the usury laws, “[l]ike Rhode Island . . . [are 
designed] ‘to protect borrowers from paying unfair and excessive 
interest to overreaching creditors’” usury is, unlike Rhode Island, 
“largely a matter of intent” and usury savings clauses are merely 
one “factor in the determination of intent.”66  By making intent 
relevant in usury determinations, the Florida legislature sought to 
“balance [the public] policy of protecting borrowers with its 
 
ultimately relying on the usury savings clause.  If other commercial lenders 
have a similar practice, then there are surely many actionable contracts.  
Attorneys representing commercial borrowers ought to calculate the interest 
rate charged to their client based on the amount actually disbursed before 
renegotiating the terms of a loan agreement as a purely precautionary 
measure.  If the amount at any point exceeds twenty-one percent, even by 
four dollars, the client can unquestionably reap the rewards of the lender’s 
unfounded reliance regardless of whether the client personally guaranteed 
repayment.  See, e.g., NV One, 84 A.3d 800; In re Swartz, 37 B.R. 776 (Bankr. 
D.R.I. 1984).  In other words, Rhode Island usury law allows borrowers to be 
on the prowl.  
 64.  The court’s role in this case was only to review summary judgment, 
not dictate a new law.  However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court missed an 
opportunity to raise this type of concern in dicta directed towards the General 
Assembly.  Although commercial lenders probably do not put much weight on 
a state’s usury laws before setting up shop, if in-state commercial lenders 
start floundering, it would deter business from entering the state.  Without 
considering such effects on the industry, the public policy analysis was left 
only partially complete.   
 65.  See In re Swartz, 37 B.R. at 779 & n.5 (reasoning that the 
“Draconian tenor” of Rhode Island usury laws provide borrowers maximum 
protections).  
 66.  NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC, C.A. No. PB 09-7159, 
2011 WL 6470557, at *12 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011) (quoting Jersey 
Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 658 So. 2d 531, 534 (Fla. 1995)). 
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interest in facilitating complex commercial loan transactions.”67  
Until the General Assembly seeks such a balance, Rhode Island 
will remain unattractive to commercial lenders. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that usury savings 
clauses do not validate an otherwise usurious contract as a matter 
of law.  The court found this to be the intent of the legislature in 
enacting section 6-26-2 and ultimately in favor of the strong public 
interest for protecting borrowers.  Accordingly, the court voided 
the loan agreement between Defendant and Plaintiffs and 
affirmed the trial court’s partial summary judgment order in favor 
of the Plaintiffs. 




 67.  Id. 





Criminal Law.  State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101 (R.I. 2014).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court addressed a procedural and an evidentiary issue for 
the first time, holding that: (1) when assessing whether joinder is proper the 
trial court should conduct its analysis based on the charges and allegations 
that are contained in the indictment and not based on the charges that are 
ultimately considered by the jury; and (2) a police sketch that cannot be 
authenticated in court by the person that gave the description to the sketch 
artist is not admissible under the Rule 804(b)(5) “catch-all” exception to 
hearsay. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On the evening of August 4, 2008, Jorge Restrepo (“Mr. 
Restrepo”) was savagely beaten, robbed, and left for dead while 
making the short1 walk to his Watson Street home in Central 
Falls, Rhode Island after completing his shift at Vac-Forming 
Unlimited Inc.2  Central Falls police officer Patrick Rogan arrived 
on the scene at approximately 5:37 p.m. to find Mr. Restrepo lying 
on his back, surrounded by neighbors, with his eyes barely open, 
breathing slowly, having urinated on himself, and apparently 
unconscious.3  Within a minute, emergency rescue personnel 
arrived.4  Mr. Restrepo was stabilized and brought to Memorial 
 
 1.  Vac-Forming, where Mr. Restrepo worked, is located at 161 Rand 
Street in Central Falls, Rhode Island.  VAC-FORMING UNLIMITED, 
http://www.vac-formingunlimited.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).  Mr. 
Restrepo lived on Watson Street in Central Falls, which directly connects to 
Rand Street.  State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1106 (R.I. 2014).  Although the 
exact address of Mr. Restrepo’s home is unknown, the walk could not have 
been more than 0.2 miles and could have been as little as 370 feet.  See 
GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Vac+Forming+Unlimited 
+Inc,+161+Rand+St,+Central+Falls,+RI+02863/41.8838287,-71.4000852/@41.
8841354,-71.3989042,18z/data=!4m9!4m8!1m5!1m1!1s0x89e4434549bc4abf:0
xaee2d8b303f678ad!2m2!1d-71.395632!2d41.884442!1m0!3e2 (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2014). 
 2.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1106. 
 3.  Id. at 1107. 
 4.  Id. 
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Hospital.5  Due to the severe nature of the trauma Mr. Restrepo 
suffered, he was later transported to Rhode Island Hospital.6  Mr. 
Restrepo died at Rhode Island Hospital at 11:05 p.m. that same 
night.7 
There were multiple eyewitnesses to Mr. Restrepo’s attack.8  
Two of the witnesses, Diego Rodriguez and James Major, testified 
that two men carried out the brutal robbery and that one of the 
two perpetrators was carrying a red handgun.9  Although the 
descriptions of the assailants varied slightly, the eyewitnesses 
generally agreed that the two men who attacked Mr. Restrepo 
were young, black, and one of the men was wearing a doo-rag.10 
On August 6, two days after Mr. Restrepo was murdered, two 
Providence police officers initiated a traffic stop after observing a 
white Acura drive between forty to forty-five miles per hour in a 
twenty-five-mile-per-hour zone on North Main Street.11  Although 
the vehicle did briefly pull over, the traffic stop resulted in a chase 
through Providence that approached 100 miles per hour.12  
Eventually, the Acura became disabled, and the two occupants 
fled on foot.13  In the end, both suspects were apprehended and 
identified as Kayborn Brown (the “Defendant”) and his brother 
Keishon Brown.14  During the pursuit, one of the officers observed 
that the passenger of the vehicle had a gun in his right hand.15  
Subsequently, the officers found a red Cobra handgun in the 
bushes near where the car was abandoned.16  “Police later 
identified [D]efendant [Kayborn Brown] as the driver of the 
Acura.”17 
When Central Falls police learned that the Providence police 
recovered a red gun near a vehicle abandoned during a car chase, 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 1106. 
 9.  Id. at 1106–07. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 1107. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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they determined that there was a high probability that the 
occupants of the Acura were connected to Mr. Restrepo’s 
murder.18  The Central Falls Police showed a photo array that 
included a picture of Defendant to Diego Rodriquez, one of the 
eyewitnesses.19  Mr. Rodriguez identified Defendant as one of the 
attackers.20 
On February 27, 2009, Defendant was charged with ten 
offenses stemming from his roles in both the death of Mr. Restrepo 
on August 4th and the traffic stop and ensuing high-speed chase 
on August 6th.21  Three of the charges were dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 48(a),22 and Defendant was tried for the remaining seven 
charges in a single jury trial that began on November 18, 2010.23  
After the State’s case concluded, Defendant moved for and was 
granted, judgment of acquittal on two more charges under Rule 
29.24  The jury returned a guilty verdict on the five remaining 
charges on November 23.25  Defendant then moved for and was 
denied his motion for a new trial, and on April 14, 2011, 
Defendant was sentenced.26 
Defendant filed a timely appeal arguing improper joinder of 
charges, denial of severance of charges, that a police sketch should 
have been admitted into evidence, that certain autopsy 
 
 18.  Id. at 1108. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. Rule 48(a) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure reads, “[t]he attorney for the State may file a dismissal of an 
indictment, information, or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon 
terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the 
consent of the defendant.”  R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). 
 23.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1108. 
 24.  Id. at 1105, 1108.  The relevant section of Rule 29 of the Rhode 
Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: 
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order 
the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in 
the indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on 
either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction of such offense or offenses. 
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 29(a)(1). 
 25.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1108.  The five charges that Defendant was found 
guilty of were: (1) first-degree murder; (2) first-degree robbery; (3) conspiracy 
to commit robbery; (4) carrying a pistol without a license; and (5) reckless 
driving.  Id. at 1105–06. 
 26.  Id. at 1108–09. 
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photographs should have been excluded from evidence, and that 
his motion for a new trial should have been granted.27 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.  Rule 8(a) Joinder 
Defendant asserted on appeal that the August 4 and August 6 
incidents were separate events that had “no similarity of 
character, plan, or purpose” and, therefore, were improperly 
joined.28  The trial justice allowed the joinder of charges, noting 
that the unusual nature of the red gun29 involved in both the 
August 4 and August 6 incidents created a “clear nexus” between 
the events of both days.30  The court reviewed the trial justice’s 
decision to allow joinder de novo because it was a question of law, 
noting that Rule 8(a) is generally interpreted broadly to enhance 
judicial efficiency.31 
The court recognized that the procedural circumstances 
surrounding this case were unusual in that they created a joinder 
question that the court had not yet faced.32  At first glance, there 
did not appear to be sufficiently similar character between the 
charges arising from the August 4 and August 6 incidents because 
five of the ten original charges were either dismissed or received a 
judgment of acquittal prior to jury deliberations.33  Of the five 
remaining charges, the lone surviving count from the August 6 
incident was a reckless driving charge, while the other four 
 
 27.  Id. at 1109. 
 28.  Id.  Rule 8(a) allows for: 
[t]wo (2) or more offenses [to] be charged in the same indictment, 
information, or complaint . . . if the offenses charged . . . are of the 
same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). 
 29.  At trial, the State called three expert witnesses to testify about the 
unusual nature of the red gun involved in both incidents; during their 
combined forty-two years of experience, none had ever seen another red 
handgun with the same or similar color as the one seized after the car chase.  
Brown, 88 A.3d at 1108. 
 30. Id. at 1109. 
 31. Id. at 1109–10. 
 32. Id. at 1110. 
 33. Id. 
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surviving charges were from the August 4 murder of Mr. Restrepo 
(“murder, robbery, conspiracy, [and] carrying a firearm without a 
license”).34 
The court held that joinder was proper and in doing so defined 
the point in time that is critical to a Rule 8(a) analysis.35  The 
court clarified that when assessing whether joinder is proper the 
trial court should conduct its analysis based on “the charges and 
allegations that are contained in the indictment, perhaps 
supplemented by a bill of particulars” and not on the charges that 
the jury ultimately considers.36 
Here, although a charge of carrying a pistol without a license 
stemming from the August 6 incident was not considered by the 
jury because it was subject to a judgment of acquittal, it was 
present in the indictment, and, therefore, should be included in 
the Rule 8(a) joinder analysis.37  Consequently, two of the base 
offenses—carrying a pistol without a license—one arising from 
August 4 and the other from August 6, were not just similar, but 
identical.38  Because the offenses were identical and they both 
involved a unique red handgun that served to identify the 
Defendant, the court held that joinder was proper.39 
 
B.  Rule 14 Severance 
The Defendant asserted that even if joinder were proper, the 
trial justice should have granted his Rule 14 motion to sever the 
charges.40  The Defendant argues that joinder of the August 4 and 
August 6 charges was unduly prejudicial because the jury inferred 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1111. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1112–13.  The court also noted that because the red handgun 
was used to identify the Defendant, even if the charges had not been joined, 
evidence of the red handgun would certainly have been admissible at both 
trials.  Id. at 1112. Therefore, having one trial using the same evidence 
promotes judicial efficiency.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 1113.  The relevant part of Rule 14 reads, “[i]f it appears that a 
defendant or the State is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses . . . in an 
indictment, information, or complaint . . . the court may order an election or 
separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever 
other relief justice requires.”  R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 14. 
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from the joinder that he had a propensity to commit criminal acts, 
which culminated in a guilty verdict.41  The court stated that 
when reviewing a trial justice’s decision to deny a Rule 14 motion 
it is looking only for abuse of discretion.42  Notably, the court also 
said that it would not overturn a trial justice’s decision to deny a 
Rule 14 motion if “the outcome would have been the same had 
separate trials been held.”43 
Here, the court reiterated the rule that “[w]here evidence of 
one crime would be admissible at a separate trial of another 
charge, a defendant will not suffer any additional prejudice if the 
two charges are tried together.”44  The court went on to say that 
evidence of the red handgun and the August 6 car chase would 
have been admissible at both trials if they were severed and that 
“[i]t is unlikely that testimony relating to charges arising from the 
police chase prejudiced the jurors, [who were] deciding the more 
serious charges emanating from the August 4 incident.”45  
Therefore, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the Defendant’s Rule 14 motion.46 
 
C.  The Police Sketch 
The Defendant argued that the trial justice interfered with 
his right to present a defense when he excluded a police sketch 
from evidence.47  The Defendant asserted that Captain Linda 
Eastman’s drawing of the suspect in Mr. Restrepo’s murder, which 
was created using a description from Efirain Benitez, an 
eyewitness, did not look like the Defendant.48  The Defendant 
wanted to present the sketch to rebut Diego Rodriguez’s 
eyewitness identification, but by the time the trial was underway, 
Mr. Benitez could not be located to be called as a witness to 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (quoting State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137, 144 (R.I. 2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 44.  Id. at 1115 (quoting State v. Cline, 405 A.2d 1192, 1209 (R.I. 1979)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1114. 
 47.  Id. at 1115. 
 48.  Id. at 1115–16.  Linda Eastman is a sketch artist and retired 
Warwick police captain.  Id. at 1116.  
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authenticate the drawing.49  Therefore, the trial justice excluded 
the sketch from evidence, ruling that it was hearsay.50 The 
Defendant next attempted to get the drawing admitted into 
evidence by calling Captain Eastman as an expert witness and 
having her authenticate the drawing as representative of Mr. 
Benitez’s description of Mr. Restrepo’s assailant.51  Again, the 
trial justice excluded the sketch as hearsay, ruling that Captain 
Eastman was not an expert.52  On appeal, the Defendant argued 
that sketch was admissible because it fell under the Rule 804(b)(5) 
“catch-all” exception to the hearsay rule, or because Captain 
Eastman was an expert under Rule 702 and that the sketch could 
be admitted into evidence supported by her explication.53  
Alternatively, the Defendant asserted that the sketch was not 
subject to the hearsay rule at all because the sketch was the 
functional equivalent of a photograph, which does not amount to 
an assertion.54 
The court recognized that it had not previously ruled on 
whether a police sketch is hearsay.55  Furthermore, the court 
noted that circuit and state courts are split on the issue.56  
However, the court declined to rule definitively on whether the 
police sketch was hearsay, stating that it merely needed to 
determine whether the trial justice abused his discretion in 
 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id.  Rule 804(b)(5) allows for exceptions to the hearsay rule when: 
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. 
R.I. R. EVID. 804.01(b)(5).  Meanwhile, Rule 702 states that “[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of fact or opinion.”  R.I. R. EVID. 702.01. 
 54.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1117. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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excluding it.57  Mr. Benitez was not available to testify at trial to 
authenticate the sketch; so, even if it was not considered an 
assertion similar to a photograph, the sketch would not have been 
admitted into evidence.58 
Defendant argued that even if the police sketch was hearsay, 
it should still be admitted under Rule 804(b)(5)’s exception to the 
hearsay rule, which allows an out-of-court statement made by an 
unavailable witness if “the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”59  However, 
the court did not accept Defendant’s argument because in “each 
case where Rule 804(b)(5) is invoked, the court is essentially 
creating a new exception to the hearsay rule.  If the hearsay rule 
is to retain any life, a demand for the creation of a new exception 
counsels caution and should be granted only where special 
‘trustworthiness’ is shown.”60  The court was reluctant to carve 
out a new exception to the hearsay rule, and although the court 
did not cast any doubt on the work of Captain Eastman, it also 
concluded that there is no “indication of special trustworthiness 
that would justify a conclusion that the trial justice abused his 
discretion.”61 
Alternatively, the Defendant asserted that the sketch was 
admissible under Rules 702 and 703 because, the Defendant 
maintained, Captain Eastman was an expert.62  He argued that 
had Captain Eastman been allowed to testify as an expert, the 
sketch would have then been admissible.63  However, the trial 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. (quoting State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 750 (R.I. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 60.  Id. at 1118 (quoting Estate of Sweeney v. Charpentier, 675 A.2d 824, 
827 (R.I. 1996)). 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  Rule 702 is quoted supra in note 53, and Rule 703 states that: 
[a]n expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical question, facts 
or data perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, or facts or 
data in evidence. If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the 
subject, the underlying facts or data shall be admissible without 
testimony from the primary source. 
R.I. R. EVID. 703.01 (emphasis added). 
 63.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1118. 
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justice ruled that Captain Eastman was not an expert, and the 
court agreed, reasoning that a “sketch artist must rely solely upon 
the word of another person to produce his product,” while a doctor, 
for example, “performs his own examination and diagnostic tests 
seeking objective conditions and symptoms.  It is those findings, 
combined with his education and experience that allows the 
physician or other expert to render an opinion.”64 
 
D.  The Autopsy Photos 
The Defendant argued that the trial justice was wrong to 
include three of the eight autopsy photographs that the State 
wished to submit into evidence.65  The Defendant maintained that 
the three photos in dispute were so graphic and disturbing that 
they were unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded pursuant to 
Rule 403.66  The court reviewed the trial justice’s decision under 
an abuse-of-discretion standard.67 
In Brown, the court was asked to consider “a more nuanced 
argument” regarding the admissibility of photographs than ever 
before.68  Normally, the court allows any photograph into evidence 
that tends prove or disprove some material fact at issue because 
the state has the burden of proving each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.69  However, here, Defendant did not challenge 
all of the photographs presented by the State, but only the three 
most gruesome ones.70  Furthermore, Defendant contended that 
“because the cause of death was not in dispute, the photos served 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 1118–19. 
 66.  Id. at 1119.  The first of the three photos in dispute pictured the 
deceased Mr. Restrepo’s “neck, shoulders, and head with his skin peeled back 
over his skull and hair protruding from the folded over skin from his scalp,” 
while the second and third photos showed Mr. Restrepo’s “brain, one after the 
top of the skull [had] been cut away and the other with the brain removed 
from the skull and placed by itself on a towel.”  Id. at 1120. 
  Rule 403.01 reads, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”  R.I. R. EVID. 403.01. 
 67.  Brown, 88 A.3d at 1119. 
 68.  Id. at 1120. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id.  
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no purpose but to inflame the jury.”71 
The court recognized that the contested photographs were 
“disturbing to the point of being grisly,” and only a few other 
courts had dealt with circumstances similar to the one presented 
by the Defendant.72  Furthermore, the court noted that the courts 
that had taken up the issue provided inconsistent guidance on the 
matter.73  Ultimately, the court held that the trial justice did not 
abuse his discretion74 even though the court appeared troubled by 
the graphic nature of the photographs, stating that “even though 
the cause of death was not in dispute, the state still bore the 
burden of proving every element of the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”75 
 
E.  Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial 
The Defendant’s final issue on appeal was his contention that 
the trial justice was wrong not to grant a new trial.76  The 
Defendant argued that a new trial was appropriate because one of 
the State’s witnesses used a “‘purported language barrier’ to gain 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Because the court merely held that the trial justice did not abuse his 
discretion, it avoided drawing a clear line about when autopsy photos are so 
prejudicial that they should not be admitted into evidence.  The court 
recognized that it was supposed to take up the Rule 403 balancing test to 
determine whether the photos were “marginally relevant and enormously 
prejudicial” when reviewing the trial justice’s discretion; however, the court 
never actually walked through that analysis.  Id.  The court never discussed 
the probative value of the photographs—why these three photographs shed 
light on the cause of the death in a way the five other photographs that were 
uncontested did not—but it did seem to recognize that they were highly 
prejudicial when it noted that the contested photographs were “disturbing to 
the point of being grisly.”  Id. 
  Although the court did not make any new law with this part of the 
decision, it let us know that the bar is very high to have a photo excluded.  
See id. at 1120–21.  Here, the cause of death was not contested, and 
furthermore, the Defendant did not challenge all the photographs that the 
State used to prove cause death.  Id. at 1120.  Rather, the Defendant 
challenged only the most gruesome photographs.  Id.  This holding begs the 
question, how “grisly” and prejudicial must a photograph be before it is 
unfairly prejudicial?  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 1121. 
 76.  Id. 
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more time to formulate his answer and was generally 
nonresponsive to defense counsel’s cross-examination 
questioning.”77  However, the court stated:  
[We are] loath to overturn the credibility findings of a 
trial justice because it is the trial justice who has the 
opportunity to observe the witnesses as they testify and 
therefore is in a better position to weigh the evidence and 
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses than is this 
[c]ourt.78   
The court held that the “trial justice’s denial of the motion for  
new trial was not clearly wrong,” therefore the Court saw “no 
basis for disturbing his decision.”79 
 
COMMENTARY 
The court was presented with two new issues in State v. 
Brown and gave varying degrees of guidance on each.  The 
clearest point the court made was defining that a Rule 8(a) joinder 
analysis should be based on the charges that are present in the 
indictment and not the charges that remain for a jury to 
consider.80  This holding brings Rhode Island in line with many 
other jurisdictions81 and is a logical holding because the relevant 
moment for a joinder decision is before a trial begins.  Otherwise, 
courts that found inappropriate joinder midway through a trial 
would be faced with either starting over with new trials for the 
separate charges or having to give limiting instructions to juries 
 
 77.  Id. at 1122. 
 78.  Id. (quoting State v. Richardson, 47 A.3d 305, 318 (R.I. 2012)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See id. at 1111. 
 81.  In its analysis the court cited the following examples of other 
jurisdictions that assess joinder at the time of the indictment: United States 
v. Locklear, 631 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Whether joinder was proper 
under Rule 8(a) is determined by the allegations on the face of the 
indictment.” (quoting United States v. Chavis, 296 F.3d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 
2002))); United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
bottom line is that the similar character of the joined offenses should be 
ascertainable—either readily apparent or reasonably inferred—from the face 
of the indictment.”).  See also, e.g., United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 21 
(1st Cir. 2004) (“A plausible basis for the joinder of multiple counts ordinarily 
should be discernible from the face of the indictment.”). 
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that would be confusing and unhelpful. 
The court was less clear on the issue of whether a police 
sketch is hearsay.82  The court avoided making a definitive ruling 
by merely concluding that the trial justice did not abuse his 
discretion in excluding the sketch form evidence.83  The court 
appears to have decided that a sketch is inadmissible unless the 
person that gave the description to the sketch artist authenticates 
it in court.84  If the court’s decision is taken at face value it 
effectively bars the admission of police sketches by a defendant 
because the situation in which a defendant would need to use the 
sketch is precisely the situation that arose in Brown; that is, if the 
witness is no longer available to testify in court that the defendant 
is not the person he saw commit the crime, then all that remains 
of that eyewitness account is the sketch. 
However, the court’s rationale for deciding that the trial 
justice did not abuse his discretion was, at best, confusing.  The 
court appears to have conflated two evidentiary rules into one 
when it reasoned that the sketch was inadmissible because the 
person that gave the description was not available to authenticate 
the sketch at trial.  Authentication and hearsay are separate 
evidentiary rules that are not co-dependent.  Evidence that is 
hearsay does not become admissible if it is authenticated; rather, 
it becomes admissible if there is some compelling reason that the 
evidence is reliable. 
Here, Captain Eastman or any other police officer that was 
present when the sketch was made could easily have 
authenticated the sketch under Rule 901 (so authentication 
couldn’t have been the real reason that the sketch was not 
admitted into evidence).  Presuming that the sketch was 
hearsay—that is, the reason the defendant was trying to get the 
out-of-court assertion admitted into evidence was for the truth of 
the matter—the court ably reasoned that the facts surrounding 
Captain Eastman’s sketch did not meet the standard of “special 
trustworthiness” that would allow an 804(b)(5) exception to 
hearsay.85  However, the court failed to take up the constitutional 
 
 82.  See Brown, 88 A.3d at 1117. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  See id. at 1116. 
 85.  See id. at 1118.  This holding implies that polices sketches are 
generally not trustworthy enough to be admitted into evidence without some 
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argument86 that the Defendant had a right to introduce any 
evidence, including hearsay evidence, if it helps his case, unless 
the prosecution can show that the evidence is so inherently 
unreliable that the jury would have no rational basis for 
evaluating its truth.87 
Additionally, there was another avenue through which the 
police sketch could have been properly admitted that the court, 
and perhaps the Defendant, did not address.  It is possible that 
the sketch was not hearsay at all.  Instead, the sketch could have 
been used to impeach the other eyewitnesses that testified at the 
trial.  Under this theory, the sketch would not have been admitted 
for the truth of the matter, but rather to show that there were 
conflicting descriptions of the person that attacked Mr. Restrepo.  
Here, the sketch would simply have been used to cast doubt on the 
reliability of the identification provided by the eyewitnesses that 
made an in-court identification of the Defendant as the assailant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed all of the trial 
justice’s decisions.  The court held that the joinder of charges was 
proper, and going forward, joinder should be assessed based on the 
charges in the indictment, not on the charges the jury ultimately 
considers.  The court also held that the trial justice did not abuse 
his discretion in determining that the police sketch was hearsay 
and that the sketch artist was not an expert, which will have the 
effect of barring any unauthenticated police sketches from being 
introduced into evidence. 
 
additional authentication.  The court did leave the door open to police 
sketches being admitted into evidence if the witness that gave the description 
authenticates the sketch at trial.  However, the logic behind this avenue is 
similarly confused because it seems to require authentication to admit 
hearsay evidence. 
 86.  It is unclear from the case whether the Defendant ever raised a 
constitutional argument for admitting the evidence.  It is possible that the 
court chose not to address this argument because the Defendant did not ask 
them to consider it. 
 87.  See MARK J. MAHONEY, THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE at 61 
(2009), available at http://www.harringtonmahoney.com/documents/Rtpad 
2009%20v1.pdf (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) 
(“[T]he hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice”)). 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Matthews, 88 A.3d 375 (R.I. 2014).  A defendant 
who is charged with two counts of the same crime rather than one count with 
different theories or lesser included offenses cannot utilize the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as a defense to the charges.  While bringing one count of 
the charge is preferable, the Rhode Island Supreme Court holds that bringing 
two counts of the same crime is not impermissible. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May 2009, Markus Matthews (“Defendant”) and two other 
men attacked Cesar Lopez, who was delivering a pizza.1  The 
Defendant and his accomplices phoned in their order to Domino’s 
and listed as the delivery address an abandoned building in 
Providence.2  Mr. Lopez realized that something was amiss at the 
address and called the phone number from the order, which 
directed him to deliver the pizza to the back door.3  When Mr. 
Lopez attempted to complete the delivery, one of the assailants 
struck him with a pipe as he exited his vehicle.4  Another 
assailant, who later was identified as the Defendant, held Mr. 
Lopez in a choke-hold.5  The assailants stole twenty dollars from 
Mr. Lopez and continued to beat him with their fists and the pipe 
as they attempted to drag him up the driveway.6  Mr. Lopez 
eventually fought back and escaped his assailants, despite 
suffering injuries that continue to cause Mr. Lopez problems.7 
Several days later, Mr. Lopez was driving with his wife and 
spotted one of the assailants, who was standing on a street 
corner.8  He phoned the police and pursued the man on foot.9  Mr. 
 
 1.  State v. Matthews, 88 A.3d 375, 377 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id. at 378. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
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Lopez caught up with the assailant and held him until police 
arrived.10  Police arrested and questioned the assailant, Michael 
Long, who eventually confessed to the crime and implicated the 
Defendant as an accomplice.11 
At trial, the prosecution called Long to testify regarding the 
statements he made to police at the time of his arrest, but when 
he was called to the stand he claimed not to remember any of the 
events.12 The professed memory loss and a failed attempt to 
refresh Long’s memory caused the prosecution to treat Long as an 
adverse witness and ask specific leading questions.13  The 
defense’s objection was overruled, and the admission of Long’s 
testimony into evidence was at issue on appeal.14 
Also at issue was the key testimony of Jeannine Labossiere, 
Long’s former fiancé.15  Labossiere testified that Long borrowed 
her cell phone the night of the attack and used it to order the 
pizza from Domino’s; that he was away with her phone for a few 
hours before returning with the Defendant; and that while Long 
disclosed the details of the robbery to her, the Defendant did not 
deny Long’s disclosure.16  Labossiere further testified that the 
Defendant demonstrated a choke-hold as Long disclosed the 
events of the robbery and that the Defendant replied “[w]e just 
told you what we did” when Labossiere asked what they had 
done.17  The trial court justice overruled the hearsay objection and 
admitted Ms. Labossiere’s statements.18 
The Defendant was charged with three offenses: first degree 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, first degree robbery resulting 
in injury, and conspiracy to rob.19 He was found guilty of first 
degree robbery resulting in injury, but acquitted of the conspiracy 
and first degree robbery with a dangerous weapon charges.20  The 
jury was instructed that the Defendant was only charged with one 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 379. 
 13.  Id. at 382. 
 14.  Id. at 382–83. 
 15.  Id. at 379. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 386–87. 
 18.  Id. at 387. 
 19.  Id. at 379. 
 20.  Id.  
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count of robbery, but that there were two theories on how it had 
been committed.21  The instructions were as follows: 
There’s only one robbery being charged but two factual 
elements that are different from each count.  One is the 
dangerous weapon; one is the injury.  You make separate 
decisions for each one.  But they clearly are one count, 
one charge of the robbery.  He’s not being charged with 
two separate counts of robbery.22 
Furthermore, the Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied.23 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Defendant argued that “[c]harging one 
robbery as two crimes and permitting the jury to deliberate twice 
on one robbery violated double jeopardy principles.”24  The 
Defendant did not raise the defense to double jeopardy prior to 
trial, thereby waiving the defense on appeal.25  However, the court 
addressed the double jeopardy issue as if it had been preserved for 
appeal, and determined that the argument lacked merit.26 
The court reasoned that the main purpose of the double 
jeopardy clause is to protect an individual from receiving “multiple 
criminal punishments for the same offense,” and this Defendant 
was only being punished once for one crime.27  Furthermore, it is 
proper for the prosecution to charge lesser-included offenses at 
trial for the greater offense.28  The court held that although the 
trial court brought two separate counts of robbery, the harm that 
the double jeopardy clause seeks to protect against was not at 
issue because the Defendant here was punished for only one 
offense.29  The court said that because the trial justice instructed 
the jury there was “only one robbery being charged but two factual 
elements that are different from each count,”30 the danger that 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 380. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). 
 28.  Id. (citing State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1286 (R.I. 1994)). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 379. 
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the Defendant would be punished twice was mitigated.31 
The court also rejected the Defendant’s double jeopardy 
argument that he was acquitted of first degree robbery with a 
deadly weapon but convicted of first degree robbery resulting in 
injury.  The Defendant argued that according to precedent set in 
State v. Bolarinho, the court should vacate his conviction and 
order a new trial because he could not be “both innocent and 
guilty of the same crime.”32  Similar to the facts here, the 
Bolarinho defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of 
felony assault arising from a single incident.33  There, the court 
vacated one of the convictions rather than vacating both and 
ordering a new trial.34  Here, the court distinguished Bolarinho by 
stating that the Defendant was only convicted on one count, so 
there was no danger of double jeopardy.35 
The court also made a point of instructing the trial court that, 
although permissible, it is better practice to charge a defendant 
for one count of a crime and allege multiple theories rather than 
charging multiple theories as multiple counts.36  The court 
explained that “[n]othing precludes the assertion of multiple 
theories in a single count,”37 and that asserting multiple theories 
in a single count is fair to the Defendant because it reduces the 
risk of multiple convictions for the same offense.38  It also does not 
disadvantage the prosecution because it allows multiple theories 
to be asserted and allows the jury to determine which theories are 
credible.39  Ultimately the court determined “it is the trial justice’s 
responsibility . . . to ensure that a defendant stands convicted, if 
at all, of a single offense.”40 
Also at issue in this case was the admission of the recorded 
statement Michael Long made to the police.  This recorded 
statement was admitted at trial because Mr. Long claimed not to 
 
 31.  Id. at 380. 
 32.  Id. at 380–81; see also State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907 (R.I. 2004). 
 33.  Matthews, 88 A.3d at 380. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 381. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  The court cited both Rule 7(c) of the Superior Court Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12–12–1.4 (2002). Id. 
 38.  Matthews, 88 A.3d at 382. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 381–82. 
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remember any of the statements he made to the police, and 
attempts to refresh his memory using leading questions failed.41  
In evaluating the trial justice’s decision to admit the statements 
over the defense’s objections, the court reasoned that “‘the 
applicable standard of review . . . is a clear abuse of discretion,’” 
which was not the case here.42 
Likewise, the court rejected the defense’s argument that 
admitting the statements violated the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.43  The court held here that the Confrontation 
Clause was a “procedural, rather than substantive, guarantee[,]” 
and because Mr. Long took the stand and was available for cross 
examination, the procedural prong was met.44 
Moreover, the defense argued that the court should not have 
admitted the statements Mr. Long made to Ms. Labossiere as 
adoptive statements by the Defendant.45  The court replied that 
the Defendant’s demonstration of a chokehold can be construed as 
an admission by conduct, and consequently, the admission of the 
adoptive statement was permissible.46 
Finally, the court held that the trial justice did not err in 
denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.47  Only if the trial 
justice “misconceived material evidence relating to a critical issue 
or . . . was otherwise clearly wrong” would the court reverse the 
 
 41.  Id. at 382. In accordance with Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(A), the trial justice allowed the prosecution to admit the recorded 
statement over the defense’s hearsay objection.  Matthews, 88 A.3d at 382–
83.  The defense also argued that admitting the statement violated the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 383. 
 42.  Matthews, 88 A.3d at 383 (quoting State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 
1234 (R.I. 2010)).  Rule 801(d)(1)(A) states that “‘a statement is not hearsay 
if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial . . . concerning the statement, and 
the statement is . . . inconsistent with the declarant’s [previous] testimony.’” 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting R.I. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(A)). Further, the 
court stated that it was for the jury to decide if Long’s lack of memory 
regarding his prior statements was actually a denial of the prior statements, 
and therefore the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting them 
as evidence.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 384–85. 
 44.  Id. (“‘[T]he [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but . . . [i]t commands, not that evidence be reliable, 
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner.’” (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004))). 
 45.  Id. at 383. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 388. 
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decision.48  Here, the court found no reason to disturb the trial 
justice’s ruling.49  
 
COMMENTARY 
The court has determined that charging a defendant with two 
counts of the same crime does not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.50  The defense offers a compelling argument that the 
court’s decision allows the jury to deliberate twice for the same 
crime.51  Seemingly, this is comparable to having two trials.  
However, given the facts here, it is apparent that the jury was 
convinced that the Defendant had committed a robbery, but was 
divided on how it was committed.  Therefore, the Defendant was 
never in danger of being convicted of two robberies when he only 
committed one. 
In the event that he was convicted on both counts of robbery, 
the court reasoned that there existed a common law solution, 
which is enunciated in State v. Bolarinho.52  There, the defendant 
was convicted on two counts of the same crime and the court 
vacated one of the convictions and upheld the other.53  What the 
court did not discuss was how to determine which conviction 
should be overturned; this is where a defendant is likely to face 
injustice. 
Suppose a defendant is convicted on two counts of a crime, 
one count carrying a twenty-year sentence and the other carrying 
a ten-year sentence.  Is the court arbitrarily assuming the right to 
determine which verdict to impose, thus eliminating the jury’s 
role?  Presumably, if the defendant is convicted on both counts, he 
is guilty of the offense that carries the longer sentence, as if it 
were one charge with lesser included offenses.  Facially it is 
logical, but allowing the judge to decide which count to vacate 
could deprive the defendant of his right to have the jury determine 
his guilt, which in turn influences his punishment.  This calls into 
question whether the justice process is properly carried out, which 
 
 48.  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Ferreira, 21 A.3d 355, 365 
(R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 380. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  850 A.2d 907 (R.I. 2004) 
 53.  Id. at 911. 
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may be the reason the court so strongly admonished the trial 
justice to ensure that a defendant is only charged with one count 
of a single crime. 
The court was clear that the trial justice must ensure that a 
defendant is charged with only one count, even if multiple theories 
are present.54  The trial justice probably is more capable than the 
jury to distinguish the nuance between one count alleging 
multiple theories and two counts of the same crime.  Entrusting 
this responsibility to the trial justice mitigates the risk that a 
defendant is charged twice for the same crime, and helps avoid the 
Bolarinho problem.  Although there is a common law solution if a 
defendant is convicted on two counts of one crime, the court 
understands that it is more expedient to prevent the problem than 
to fix it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that it is 
permissible to charge a defendant with two counts of the same 
crime without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.  While the 
court warns the trial court that this is not the preferred method of 
alleging multiple theories of a crime, it is not unconstitutional.  
The court established that the trial justice is responsible for 
ensuring that multiple theories of a crime are charged as a single 
count. 
Ann P. Bryant 
 
 
 54.  Matthews, 88 A.3d  at 381–82. 





Criminal Law.  State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014).  The Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island affirmed in part and vacated in part a superior court 
order granting numerous motions to suppress evidence on the part of the 
Defendant in the criminal first-degree murder trial of a six-year-old boy.  
The appeal, brought by the Rhode Island Attorney General pursuant to 
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-24-32, argued that the decision, 
written by the hearing justice after a month-long series of evidentiary 
hearings was in error.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated part of the 
order and held that for cellular phone text message communications, the 
Defendant in a criminal case does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy if the messages have been received and stored on the cellular phone 
of a third party.  The court affirmed the suppression of evidence related to 
the Defendant’s personal cellular phones holding that the State waived the 
issue of the illegality of the search of those phones.  Additionally, the court 
determined that in order to have a facially valid Franks challenge, the 
Defendant has to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item that is 
to be searched and the item has to be searched and seized legally. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At approximately 6:15 a.m. on October 4, 2009, Cranston 
Rescue and Fire Department and Cranston Police responded to 
the apartment of Trisha Oliver (“Ms. Oliver”) because she had 
called 9-1-1, indicating that her six-year-old son was 
“unresponsive and not breathing.”1  Within minutes, the 
ambulance arrived and “transported Marco [Ms. Oliver’s son] to 
Hasbro Children’s Hospital.”2  Later that same day, despite the 
efforts of rescue and medical personnel, Marco succumbed to his 
injuries and died.3 
When police arrived at the scene that morning, Ms. Oliver 
showed Sergeant Matthew Kite (“Sgt. Kite”) from the Cranston 
 
 1.  State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 43 (RI 2014). 
 2.  Id.  Marco arrived at the hospital shortly after 6:30 am.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 48.   
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Police Department around the apartment.4 While inside, he 
observed Michael Patino (“Mr. Patino”), the Defendant, with the 
couple’s fourteen-month-old daughter, the remnants of Marco’s 
illness throughout the house, and numerous cellular phones.5  Sgt. 
Kite testified that at this time he did not consider Ms. Oliver’s 
apartment to be a crime scene; however, Sgt. Kite requested 
another officer to start a crime scene roster to document those who 
came into and left the apartment.6 
Cranston police transported Ms. Oliver to Hasbro Children’s 
Hospital soon after they arrived and started their investigation.7  
Ms. Oliver’s daughter, Jazlyn, was transported there by 
ambulance a short time later “as a precaution.”8 
Sgt. Kite testified that while at the scene, Mr. Patino asserted 
to him that “he [did] not own a cell phone” and had arrived at Ms. 
Oliver’s apartment that morning “by chance.”9  During their 
conversation, the LG cell phone on the kitchen counter indicated 
that it was receiving a message.10  Sgt. Kite went to the phone 
and picked it up, “checking to see if it was Marco’s father or 
someone else calling regarding Marco’s condition.”11  Sgt. Kite 
testified that when he picked up the phone he “viewed an alert on 
the front screen of the phone indicating there was one new 
message,” and he “opened the phone to view the interior screen.”12  
The interior screen of the phone indicated that there was a new 
message but insufficient credit on the account to receive the 
message.13  Sgt. Kite testified that “[i]n an effort to acknowledge 
 
 4.  Id.  at 43. 
 5.  Id.  The phones observed were “[1] an LG Verizon cell phone (LG 
phone) on the kitchen counter; [2] a Metro PCS Kyocera cell phone (Metro 
PCS phone) on the dining room table; [3] a T-Mobile Sidekick cell phone (T-
Mobile phone) on the headrest of the couch behind defendant; and [4] an 
iPhone (iPhone) on the armrest of the couch.”  Id. at 44. 
 6.  Id. at 43. 
 7.  Id. at 43–44.  
 8.  Id.  After telephone conversations with Sgt. Kite regarding activities 
at the scene, Lt. Sacoccia consulted with the Department of Children, Youth, 
and Family (“DCYF”) headquarters, who recommended transportation by 
ambulance for Jazlyn.  Id. at 44.   
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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receipt of the message and thereby avoid repeat notifications . . . 
he ‘manipulated the button’ on the phone, which led to a mailbox 
listing incoming and outgoing text messages.”14  Finally, Sgt. Kite 
testified “upon seeing the word ‘hospital’ in a text message, he 
clicked the phone to view the message in the ‘outbox’ folder.”15 
After Mr. Patino was escorted to the police headquarters, Sgt. 
Kite noticed that “the T-Mobile phone that had been on the 
headrest behind [the] defendant was no longer there.”16 Sgt. Kite 
called headquarters “and suggested that, [t]here is possibly some 
information that needs to be protected on [the missing phone].”17  
When Mr. Patino emptied his pockets at headquarters, the T-
Mobile phone from the apartment was amongst his belongings and 
it was “confiscated immediately.”18 
There is “considerable discrepancy” about what happened at 
the apartment while the officers waited to continue their 
investigation.19  The hearing justice determined that “detectives 
received a call from Lt. Sacoccia informing them that a search 
warrant had been signed, at which time they began to photograph 
and videotape the scene, as well as gather and bag items for 
evidence.”20  Items bagged for evidence included the LG phone, 
“the contents of which had been previously photographed.”21  The 
LG phone belonged to Ms. Oliver and the contents of the phone, 
photographed by the detectives, “reveal[ed] text messages that 
include[d] not only vulgar and profane language, but also 
information inculpating [the] defendant with respect to Marco’s 
injuries.”22 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  The message stated: “wat if I got2 take him 2 da [hospital] wat 
wil I say and does marks on his neck omg.”  Id.  “The message was addressed 
to ‘DAMASTER’ at phone number (401) XXX-XX80; a subsequent 
investigation revealed that ‘DAMASTER,’ the intended recipient of the text 
message was, in fact, [Mr. Patino].”  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 45. 
 17.  Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 WL 
3886269, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2012)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 18.  Id. at 44. 
 19.  Id. at 45. 
 20.  Id.   
 21.  Id.  Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) detectives placed the 
phone in a brown paper bag, rather than securely sealing it; Sgt. Kite took 
the phone to headquarters and eventually returned it to the detectives.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  For example, the following text messages were “sent between 
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While the investigation was being conducted at Ms. Oliver’s 
apartment, Detective Jean Slaughter (“Det. Slaughter”) and 
Detective John Cardone (“Det. Cardone”) interrogated Mr. Patino 
“at the police headquarters for nearly three hours, during which 
time, [Mr. Patino] signed a form waiving his Miranda rights.”23  
Throughout the interrogation, the detectives “raised the topic of 
the defendant’s incriminating text messages to [Ms.] Oliver” and 
left the interrogation room several times to discuss the cell phone 
messages with other officers, adjusting their questioning tactics 
accordingly.24  Initially, Mr. Patino denied “his participation in 
the text messaging, as well as any physical contact with Marco,” 
but eventually, after additional text messages were revealed and 
after Det. Slaughter explained the possibility of leniency, the 
“defendant admitted playing with Marco before he died, even 
admitting that he hit him in the ribs.”25 
 
Oliver’s LG phone and defendant’s T-Mobile Phone” on October 3, 2009, 
between approximately 4:48 p.m. and 5:57 p.m.: 
Sent: of course he is gonna be all hurt and cryin cuz u fuckin beat 
the crap out of him im not with that shit. 
Read: I PUNCH DAT LIL BITCH 3 TIMES AND DAT WAS IT. DA 
HARDEST 1 WAS ON HIS STOMACH CUZ HE MOVED. BUT LET 
HIM BE A MAN AND NOT A LIL BITCH LIKE YOU. 
Read: WAT KIND OF DISCIPLINE OR ANYTHIN U GONNA KNO 
Sent: wateva u always think u didn’t hit hard but u du u hurt me 
could imagine wat u did 2 him 4 ur info he isn’t complaining just him 
throwin up and in pain is enough 
Sent: idk wat u did but u hurt is stomach real bad 
. . .  
Sent: wtf did u do 2 my son mike 
Read: I TOLD U. I WENT 2 PUNCH HIM ON HIS BACK AGAIN 
AND HE MOVED AN I HIT HIM ON HIS STOMACH. 
. . .  
Sent: mike he is in madd pain u had 2 hit him real hard mike wtf 
Read: I HIT HIM DA SAME WAY EVERYWHERE BUT ITS DAT 
HE MOVED AND I HIT HIM BAD. 
Id. at 45 n.5. 
 23.  Id. at 46. 
 24.  Id. at 46, 47. 
 25.  Id. at 47.  The Defendant eventually provided a formal statement 
that the detectives had him modify when it did not include “some of the 
language used earlier in the interview with regard to Marco” including “a 
statement about Marco taking a ‘body shot.’”  Id. 
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After Mr. Patino made this statement, the detectives 
proceeded to Hasbro Children’s Hospital to continue their 
investigation with Ms. Oliver.26  Ms. Oliver provided two detailed 
statements regarding the events leading up to the morning’s 
activities and the interactions between Marco and Mr. Patino.27  
In the first statement she stated that the “[Defendant] said he 
went to go hit [Marco] and [Marco] moved causing him to hit my 
son in the stomach.”28  In the second statement, the timeline was 
basically the same, but Ms. Oliver focused on “the [D]efendant’s 
involvement with the situation,” including stating that the 
“[Defendant] said Marco was ‘acting stupid and I hit him.’”29  She 
also detailed her strained relationship and fear of Mr. Patino to 
the police, stating, “in the past his temper gets . . . out of control.  
He throws things and sometimes [gets][physical] with me.”30 
Mr. Patino was indicted on a charge of first-degree murder for 
the death of Marco on April 2, 2010.31  The Defendant filed several 
evidentiary motions prior to his trial on the grounds “that 
collection of such evidence violated his rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, 
sections 6 and 13 of the Rhode Island Constitution.”32  These 
motions included:  motions in limine prior to the trial to “exclude 
text messages, including those sent by and to Trisha Oliver”; 
“motions to suppress evidence that had been seized during the 
course of the October 4, 2009, investigation”; and motions to 
suppress “all [of] the information seized from the cell phones.”33  
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 47, 48.  
 28.  Id. at 47.  The first statement was taken by Cranston police 
personnel at 12:30 p.m.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 48.  
 30.  Id. (alterations in original).  The second statement was taken by Det. 
Cardone at 6 p.m., approximately an hour after Marco’s death.  Id.   
 31.  Id.  First-degree murder under R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp. 
2014).  Id. n.13. 
 32.  Id. at 48–49. 
 33.  Id. at 48; see also id. at 49 n.14 (“Specifically, [D]efendant filed 
motions to suppress: (1) evidence seized on or about October 4, 2009; (2) all 
information seized from [D]efendant’s T-Mobile phone; (3) all information 
seized from Oliver’s LG phone; (4) all information seized from Marco’s 
biological father, Rafeel Nieves’s phone; (5) all information seized from 
[D]efendant’s friend, Mario Palacio’s phone; (6) all information seized from 
Oliver’s landline phone; (7) the 8mm videotape of the crime scene; and (8) all 
CRIMINALLAW_PATINO_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  2:08 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 647 
Additionally, the Defendant argued that his statements to the 
police on October 4, 2009, both video taped and written, were the 
result of “coercive and threatening police tactics, and thus were 
made involuntarily in violation of his due process rights under the 
United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.”34 
The superior court held a multi-week series of evidentiary 
hearings to “address the issues raised by [the D]efendant in his 
pretrial motions.”35  During the course of the hearings, the 
Defendant, “filed an amended motion seeking a Franks36 hearing, 
arguing that the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing 
indicated that members of the Cranston Police Department made 
numerous material misrepresentations in their affidavits to obtain 
warrants throughout the course of the investigation.”37 
Following the evidentiary hearings, the hearing justice 
“rendered a one-hundred-ninety page decision and order” on 
September 4, 2009, “granting [the D]efendant’s motions to 
suppress the evidence seized at scene and all information seized 
from the various cell phones, including all of the text message 
evidence” and denying the “[D]efendant’s motion to suppress the 
videotape of the crime scene.”38  Within the decision and order, 
the hearing justice “made comprehensive findings with respect to 
the [D]efendant’s constitutional claims.”39 
Specifically, the hearing justice found that with respect to 
standing, the “Defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his alleged text messages, so as to confer upon him standing to 
challenge the police search that led to the discovery of the text 
 
information seized from the Metro PCS phone.”). 
 34.  Id. at 49. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  In Franks, the Court held: 
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing 
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the 
finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
hearing be held at the defendant’s request.   
Id. at 156–57.  Subsequently, hearings held for this purpose have been 
referred to as Franks hearings.  
 37.  Patino, 93 A.3d at 49.  The amended motion was filed on June 29, 
2012.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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messages.”40  Additionally, the hearing justice found “people have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their text 
messages with no distinction between whether the messages were 
sent or received by them, and the third-party doctrine should not 
apply to diminish the expectation of privacy in the contents of 
electronic communications.”41  Finally, with regard to standing, 
the hearing justice found that, “as a frequent overnight guest, [the 
D]efendant had standing to challenge the search and seizure of 
evidence in [Ms.] Oliver’s apartment.”42 
The hearing justice also found that “Sgt. Kite’s action of 
viewing the text messages on the LG phone during the initial 
stages of the October 4, 2009 sweep of [Ms.] Oliver’s apartment 
did not fall within the exigent circumstances, plain view, or 
consent exceptions to the warrant requirement, and therefore 
constituted an unreasonable search.”43  Additionally, the hearing 
justice found “that the searches and seizures by the police of all 
the cell phones in evidence, as well as the photographs taken of 
the contents thereof, were either ‘illegal as warrantless or in 
excess of the warrants obtained’” and, thus, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.44 
Finally, it was found that nearly all of the evidence obtained 
by the Cranston Police Department during the investigation was 
inadmissible at trial due to the “illegal search made by Sgt. Kite 
or the other illegal searches and seizures of cell phones and their 
contents” making the evidence “fruit of the poisonous tree.”45 
 
 40.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 41.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 49–50 & n.15 (“Specifically, the hearing justice excluded from 
use at trial the following pieces of evidence: (1) the LG phone; (2) the Metro 
PCS phone; (3) the iPhone; (4) the landline phone; (5) the T-Mobile phone; (6) 
the photographs of the contents of the LG phone taken at [Ms.] Oliver’s 
apartment; (7) the photographs of the contents of the LG phone taken at 
police headquarters; (8) the photographs of the contents of the Metro PCS 
phone; (9) the photographs of the contents of the T-Mobile phone; (10) the 
contents of the LG phone extracted by use of Cellebrite software; (11) the 
phone records and communications of [D]efendant provided by T-Mobile; (12) 
the phone records and communications of Mario Palacio provided by T-
Mobile; (13) the phone records and communictions of [Ms.] Oliver provided by 
Verizon; (14) the phone records and communications of Rafael Nieves 
provided by Sprint Nextel; (15) the phone records and communications of 
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Regarding the Franks motion, “the hearing justice found that 
there existed sufficient evidence in the record to ‘find that 
Defendant made a preliminary showing that the affidavits for the 
warrants do contain certain false statements, as specifically 
identified by Defendant, that were deliberate or made in reckless 
disregard of the truth.’”46  Despite that, the hearing justice 
“reserved decision” regarding the Franks hearing, “subject to 
further argument as to standing and probable cause.”47 
The State appealed the hearing justice’s decision on 
September 12, 2012.48  “That same day, the hearing justice 
entered an order that the Franks motion trial proceedings” would 
continue, despite the appeal and “were not to be stayed by 
operation of law or in the discretion of the hearing justice, and 
that, absent a stay by [the Rhode Island Supreme Court], the 
proceedings would continue forthwith.”49  The State immediately 
filed a motion with the Rhode Island Supreme Court to “compel 
compliance with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-33 (1956) to stay the 
Franks proceedings in the Superior Court” until resolution of the 
appeal.50  The court granted the motion on September 25, 2012, 
“determining that because section 9-24-33 provides for a stay of 
any further proceedings with respect to those findings pending the 
State’s appeal, all further proceedings are stayed until further 
Order of this Court.”51 
On appeal, the State, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws 
section 9-24-32, argued that: 
(1) [D]efendant lacks standing to contest the lawfulness of 
the search of Trisha Oliver’s cell phone; (2) [D]efendant 
does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in sent text messages; (3) [D]efendant has no 
 
[D]efendant’s sister, Angie Patino, provided by Sprint Nextel; (16) the 
landline phone records for the apartment provided by Cox Communications; 
(17) certain portions of [D]efendant’s interrogation as memorialized on 
videotape and in a written transcript; and (18) [D]efendant’s confession 
regarding the death of Marco Nieves.”). 
 46.  Id. at 50 (quoting Rhode Island v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 WL 
3886269, at *83 (R.I. Super. Sept. 4, 2012)). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
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standing to make a Franks challenge; and (4) even with 
the removal of the materials identified by the hearing 
justice, the relevant affidavits were sufficient to establish 
probable cause.52 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.  Standing 
The court first looked at the general question of standing and 
the search of Ms. Oliver’s apartment by Sgt. Kite.53  The 
Defendant argued “Sgt. Kite was not lawfully in the apartment 
when he searched the LG phone and that, therefore, all the 
evidence seized as a result of that unlawful search should be 
excluded at trial.”54  The court was quick to “dispel [the 
D]efendant’s contention that, because he has standing to 
challenge the search of [Ms.] Oliver’s apartment, everything 
seized without a warrant is subject to suppression as violative of 
his Fourth Amendment rights.”55  The court stated that “as a 
frequent overnight guest at [Ms.] Oliver’s apartment, [he] did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her apartment, [but] 
that does not end our inquiry . . . . it is not sufficient that a 
defendant merely have standing . . . he must also have an 
expectation of privacy.”56 
Additionally, the court held that the hearing justice’s opinion 
that “the police were not lawfully in the apartment after Marco 
and [Ms.] Oliver had been transported to the hospital” was a clear 
error.57  The Defendant claimed that the search of the LG cell 
phone was clearly unconstitutional, but the court held that under 
the circumstances of the case, “an hour was not an unreasonable 





 52.  Id. at 42–43. 
 53.  Id. at 57. 
 54.  Id. at 53–54. 
 55.  Id. at 54. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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B.  Expectation of Privacy in Text Messages 
The court next examined the relatively narrow question 
regarding the expectation of privacy in text messages.59  
Specifically, the court addressed an “issue of first impression in 
the state” of  “whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her text messages stored in a cell phone belong 
to, or possessed by, another person.”60 
The court looked to other jurisdictions that had issued 
opinions regarding “whether a person has an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy” in text messages and found 
that the courts that examined the issue, like the hearing justice 
below, drew “parallels between text messages and other forms of 
communication to aid in their ultimate determination.”61  
Ultimately however, the court found that the determination of 
whether the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
was based on “whether the [D]efendant owned or was the primary 
user of the cell phone.”62 
After careful analysis, the court held that “[i]n determining 
whether a person has an expectation of privacy in his text 
messages, the most important factor, in our opinion, is from whose 
phone the messages were accessed.”63  They continued, “when the 
recipient receives the message, the sender relinquishes control 
over what becomes of that message on the recipient’s phone.  The 
idea of control has been central to our prior determinations of . . . 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 55. 
 61.  Id.  The hearing justice in the instant case had reasoned that Mr. 
Patino had a reasonable expectation of privacy not because a cell phone is 
similar to a closed container, but rather due to the “increasing role that cell 
phones and text messages play in modern society.” Id. at 53.  The hearing 
justice made a detailed analysis of the text message and “rejected the 
comparison of text messaging to other similar forms of communication, such 
as telephone conversations and email exchanges, and determined that text 
message are a ‘technological and functional hybrid’” that required a better 
analogy.  Id.  The hearing justice found that “based on their similar back-
and-forth nature” text messages were more like oral communications; 
however, that analogy was also not perfect because “text messages are more 
vulnerable to discovery than oral communications, which may in itself cause 
individuals to have less of a subjective expectation of privacy, in the content 
of those communications.”  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 55. 
 63.  Id.  
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objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in Fourth 
Amendment cases.64  The court also looked to decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and found that they too “considered 
control as a factor when determining whether a defendant has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a given place or item” and 
“when an individual reveals private information to another a 
reasonable expectation of privacy no longer exists because ‘he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to 
the authorities.’”65 
 
1.  The LG Cell Phone 
After a general discussion, the court specifically looked at the 
application of the principles to the primary cell phone involved in 
this case, the LG cell phone belonging to Ms. Oliver.66  The court 
held that the Defendant  “did not have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in any text messages contained in Ms. 
Oliver’s phone” and therefore, had “no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the LG phone . . . [and] did not have standing to 
challenge the search and seizure thereof.”67  The court found that 
Mr. Patino did not in any way try to control that phone and did 
not try to exclude others from using the phone, noting specifically 
that “he made no motion towards the phone in response to the 
message alert, did not attempt to prevent Sgt. Kite from accessing 
the contents of the phone, and did not bring the phone with him” 
when he went to the police station.68  The Defendant’s only 
connection to the LG phone “[was] the fact that a digital copy of 
the messages he sent from this T-Mobile phone existed on the LG 
 
 64.  Id. at 55–56. 
 65.  Id. at 56 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 
(1984)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 56–57.  In so doing, the court vacated: 
the September 12, 2012, order of the Superior Court insofar as it 
excludes from evidence the LG cell phone; the pictures of the 
contents of the LG cell phone taken at Trisha Oliver’s apartment; 
the pictures of the contents of the LG cell phone taken at Cranston 
Police Department headquarters; the Cellebrite extraction report for 
the LG cell phone; and the phone records and communications of 
Trisha Oliver provided by Verizon.   
Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68.  Id. at 56. 
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phone,” and since he had already sent those messages, he “no 
longer had any control over what became of the messages 
contained in that phone.”69  Additionally, Ms. Oliver “signed a 
consent form allowing the Cranston police officers to search her 
phone, albeit after they had already viewed the incriminating 
messages.”70  The court agreed with the dissent in a Washington 
State Supreme Court case and highlighted the Defendant’s lack of 
standing in this case.71 
Additionally, based on the analysis regarding the LG phone, 
the court “vacated the order insofar as it excludes from trial 
evidence that the hearing justice found to be ‘tainted’ as fruits of 
the poisonous tree.”72 
 
2.  The T-Mobile and Metro PCS Cell Phones 
The court next reviewed the decisions of the hearing justice 
with regard to the other cellular phones that were present during 
the Cranston police investigation.73  For these phones, “[the 
hearing justice] reasoned that the police ‘focused on the cell 
phones and text messages at the earliest stages of the 
investigation and well before they sought or obtained the first 
search warrant for the apartment.’”74  The hearing justice 
explained, “the abysmal handling of the evidence by the police in 
this case—specifically the critical cell phones at issue—play[ed] 
 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 56–57. 
 71.  Id. at 57 (“[The sender] did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in [the recipient’s] cell phone.  He had neither possession nor control 
of the cell phone, and he did not have the right to exclude others form using 
it.  Furthermore, once the text message was delivered to [the recipient’s] cell 
phone, [the sender] had no control over who viewed it . . . [The recipient] 
could have simply shared the contents of the message with others.  [The 
sender] assumed the risk that once sent, the message would no longer be kept 
private.” (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 22 
(Wash. 2014) (Johnson, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 72.  Id.  Evidence allowed based on this vacated ruling included: “the 
phone records and communications of Mario Palacio provided by T-Mobile; 
the phone records and communications of Angie Patino provided by Sprint 
Nextel; and the landline phone records for Trisha Oliver’s apartment 
provided by Cox Communications.”  Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. 
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into [her] view that the police seized and searched all these cell 
phones without a warrant.”75  The hearing justice held that “the 
Cranston Police Department engaged in an illegal warrantless 
search and seizure of all phones in evidence and the contents of 
those phones . . . in violation of [D]efendant’s rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.”76 
For these phones, the State conceded that the “[D]efendant 
had standing with respect to his own cell phones—the T-Mobile 
and Metro PCS phones—but it appeals the hearing justice’s 
decision” only due to the [D]efendant’s Franks challenge.77  The 
court affirmed the findings of the hearing justice with regard to 
the order suppressing the evidence from the other cellular 
phones,78 holding that “[w]ith respect to the legality of the 
searches and seizures, however, the state raises only a cursory 
challenge to the hearing justice’s findings as it pertains” to the cell 
phones, and because the state did not “meaningfully contest the 
hearing justices findings . . . we consider the issue waived.”79 
 
C.   Franks Determination80 
The court held that “because a Franks hearing concerns the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, in order to raise a 
Franks challenge, a defendant must establish standing in the area 
or items sought to be searched and seized by the challenged 
warrants.”81  The State made two arguments on appeal: (1) the 
 
 75.  Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 59 (“Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court order 
suppressing evidence of the Metro PCS phone, the iPhone, the T-Mobile 
phone, and the pictures of the contents of the Metro PCS [and T-Mobile] cell 
phone[s].” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 79.  Id. at 58 (“[S]imply stating an issue for appellate review, without a 
meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist 
the Court in focusing on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes 
a waiver of that issue.” (quoting State v. Chase, 9 A.3d 1248, 1256 (R.I. 2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 80.  In Franks v. Delaware, “the Untied States Supreme Court 
established a procedure for challenging warrants alleged to have been 
obtained through the use of affidavits containing ‘false statement[s] made 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.’”  Id. at 
59 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978)). 
 81.  Id.  
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defendant “except with respect to [his] own phones, he has no 
standing to make a Franks challenge,” and (2) concerning his own 
phones, “the relevant affidavits were more than sufficient to 
establish probable cause, even with the removal of the material by 
the hearing justice, and the lower court’s Franks determination 
cannot stand.”82 
The court decided that based on their previous reasoning, 
they did not have to decide on either basis.83  They agreed with 
the State that with the exception of his own phones, the 
Defendant did not have standing “to raise a Franks challenge to 
those warrants.”84  Additionally, with regard to his own phones, 
the court upheld “the hearing justice’s findings that the Metro 
PCS cell phone, the T-Mobile phone, and the iPhone were 
searched and seized illegally, [and] the [S]tate is precluded from 
introducing those items at trial,” rendering the Defendant’s 




In this case, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was faced 
with several difficult evidentiary rulings regarding the searches of 
cellular phones, text messages, and the validity of search 
warrants that were obtained by the Cranston Police Department.  
One of the most interesting facets of this case is that it was 
decided on June 20, 2014,86 just five days before the United States 
Supreme Court decided Riley v. California.87  In this section we 
will examine the holdings of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
this case and also look at the impact that Riley might have on the 
case following remand. 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island acknowledged the 
difficulty in determining if a defendant has a reasonable right to 
privacy in text messages that were sent from his phone and 
received by a third party.  Since this was an issue of first 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 60. 
 86.  Id. at 40.  
 87.  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
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impression for the court, they had to look to other jurisdictions 
and the reasoned opinion of the hearing justice to determine the 
proper analysis.  The court did not agree with the hearing justice 
that text messages could be likened to “oral communications, 
based on their similar back-and-forth nature[;] . . . a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her text 
messages” regardless of where the messages were eventually 
viewed.88  In my opinion, the court in the end rightly determined 
that the privacy in cellular phone text messages depended 
primarily on “whether the defendant owned or was the primary 
user of the cell phone.”89  The court also rightly determined that 
the fact that the Cranston police were still at the scene of a 
reported crime one hour after the victim was removed was a 
reasonable period of time for their presence.  These decisions left 
the Defendant without a reasonable expectation of privacy to the 
text messages that had been received and stored on Ms. Oliver’s 
cellular phone, and the messages could be admitted into evidence. 
However, the court held that Mr. Patino did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his own cellular phones.90  
The State had failed to argue the legality of the search and seizure 
of those phones, and therefore, the evidence that was found on Mr. 
Patino’s cell phones could be suppressed. 
The court also properly held that in his challenge of the 
warrants under Franks, Mr. Patino either did not have standing 
to challenge the warrants, or if he did have standing, his 
challenges on the other warrants were moot because of the 
evidentiary holdings of the court.  The court also found that “to 
the extent that any of the warrants yet have vitality, we perceive 
no basis to disturb the hearing justice’s findings that the 
[D]efendant has made a substantial preliminary showing that the 
warrant affidavits contain certain false statements that were 
deliberate or made in reckless disregard for the truth.”91  Here, 
the court highlighted the fact that the trial justice will have to 
look carefully at any remaining warrants to ensure that the 
warrants were valid during the lower court proceedings. 
This brings us to our analysis of the case under the new 
 
 88.  Patino, 93 A.3d at 55. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 58. 
 91.  Id. at 60.   
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standard that was developed in Riley.  In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court held that, generally, searches of cellular 
phones without a warrant are a violation of a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.92  The United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged that there may be cases where a cell phone search 
may be allowed without a warrant, such as exigent circumstances; 
however, in Riley the fact that police officers had manipulated 
phones and discovered data and evidence on those phones was a 
violation of the defendants’ constitutional rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.93 
The holding in Riley may call into question the information 
that Sgt. Kite received from Ms. Oliver’s LG cell phone.  In the 
instant case, long before a search warrant was issued, Sgt. Kite 
“picked up the phone and viewed and alert on the front screen . . . 
opened the phone to view the interior screen . . . manipulated the 
button on the phone which led to a mailbox listing incoming and 
outgoing text messages . . . and clicked on the phone to view . . . 
[a] message in the outbox folder.”94  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court noted that the fact that Mr. Patino did not have any control 
over the text messages was “underscored by the fact that Oliver 
signed a consent form allowing the Cranston Police officer to 
search the phone, albeit after they had already viewed the 
incriminating messages.”95 
It would appear that the search of the LG cell phone was 
conducted in violation of the mandates of Riley.  However, in Riley 
the phones in question belonged to the defendants themselves and 
therefore, the court found that they had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy and the phones could not be searched without a 
warrant.96  In this case, the LG cell phone was owned by Ms. 
Oliver and the trial court on remand will still have to determine 
whether Mr. Patino would have standing to challenge the search 
of Ms. Oliver’s phone.  Based on the analysis of the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island in this case, the answer to that question 
would probably be “no,” and the fact that Sgt. Kite manipulated 
the buttons on the phone before obtaining a search warrant would 
 
 92.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Patino, 93 A.3d at 44.   
 95.  Id. at 56–57 (emphasis added). 
 96.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.  
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not cause the text messages on her phone to be suppressed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As stated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in order to 
determine the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy the 
court must “look backwards to history . . . as well as forward, 
considering modern technological developments.”97  In this case, 
the court examined several different evidentiary concerns and 
determined that a defendant does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the text messages that they send once 
the text messages have been sent and received by a third party 
recipient.  The court highlighted the importance of standing when 
determining if the defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment to ensure that evidence is 
not improperly excluded during trial.  This case, along with the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Riley, is sure to be 
a wake up call for the police departments throughout Rhode 
Island of the importance of the control and proper handling of 
cellular phones, especially those phones which may contain 
critical evidence about the case that they are investigating. 
D. Thomas Peterson 
 
 97.  Id. at 52. 





Criminal Law.  Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903 (R.I. 2014).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court decided that good-time credits, and “dead time” credits, 
which qualify a prisoner for early release from prison, do not qualify the 
party for an early start to their probationary period if the total sentence 
would fall under the mandatory minimum set by the state legislature. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The State of Rhode Island accused Alexander Rose (“Rose”) of 
first-degree child molestation on December 23, 1992.1  As Rose 
was unable to produce bail, he was incarcerated in the Adult 
Correctional Institution (“ACI”) to await the disposition of the 
accusation.2  More than a year later, on March 14, 1994, Rose pled 
nolo contendere to a sole charge of first-degree child molestation.3  
On March 17, 1994, the trial court entered a judgment of twenty 
years, consisting of eight years to serve in the ACI and twelve 
years of probation.4 
During the sentencing, the judge spoke to Rose about the 
amount of time he would be serving on probation. 
THE COURT: You heard the [state’s] recommendation of 
a 20–year sentence, eight years to serve. You’ll receive 
credit for time served retroactive to December 23, 1992. 
What I want to make sure you understand is that after 
you’re released from that eight years to serve, you still 
have a 12–year suspended sentence hanging over you and 
12 years’ probation. Do you understand that? 
[Rose]: I understand. 
THE COURT: When I say, ‘hanging over you,’ I just mean 
that for 12 years after your release you are going to be on 
 
 1.  Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 905 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
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probation[.] [D]uring that period * * * you will comply 
with the terms and conditions of probation. If * * * a 
judge after a hearing were to find that you violated 
probation, that judge could then revoke the 12–year 
suspended sentence and you could be ordered to serve up 
to 12 years at the ACI. You understand all that? 
[Rose]: Yes. 
* * * 
THE COURT: In this matter, the defendant is sentenced 
to 20 years at the ACI, eight years to serve, credit 
retroactive to December 23, 1992, the balance, 12 years, 
suspended, and upon release the defendant is placed on 12 
years probation.5 
Three years and nine months after the trial court entered 
judgment, Rose was released from the ACI on parole.6  Rose 
received credit for good behavior and his participation in 
institutional industries under Rhode Island General Laws section 
42-56-24 and another fifteen months credit for time served before 
his case’s disposition.7  In July 1999, Rose completed his period of 
parole.8 
On October 13, 2010, Rose filed a writ of habeas corpus to the 
Rhode Island Superior Court and twelve days later filed for post-
conviction relief under Rhode Island General Laws section 10-9.1-
1(a)(5).9  Rose argued that his probation concluded on December 
17, 2009.10  This, he argued, was because that date was twelve 
years after his release on December 17, 1997.11  Rose argued in 
the alternative that his probation ended in July 2011, twelve 
years after the end of his parole.12  The superior court justice, 
denied both petitions on September 22, 2011.13  The hearing 
justice stated that the “20-year full sentence began on March 14, 
 
 5.  Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 906. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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1994 and [runs] until March 13, 2014.”14 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
examined the statute’s “plain and ordinary meaning[]” to 
determine whether Rose’s credits for good-time and time served 
affected the length of his sentence.15 
 
A. R.I.G.L § 42-56-24 and Good-Time Credits 
Rhode Island law creates a possibility of early release from 
prison for good behavior.16  For every month of good behavior, the 
Director of the Department of Corrections may deduct several 
days from the sentence of the prisoner.17  When the State released 
Rose because of the good-time credits he had earned, he argued, 
his probationary period immediately started.18  Rose supported 
his argument, by citing the sentencing justice’s instructions 
during his sentencing hearing.19  At that hearing, the sentencing 
justice stated that “[i]n this matter, the defendant is sentenced to 
20 years at the ACI, eight years to serve, credit retroactive to 
December 23, 1992, the balance, 12 years, suspended, and upon 
release the defendant is placed on 12 years probation.”20 
Rose also argued that the good-time credits impose an 
additional burden by extending his probationary period.21  The 
court stated that Rose was under no additional hardship as he 
was “still obliged to abide by the same conditions to keep the 
peace and be of good behavior for that period of time.”22 
 
 14.  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15.  Id. (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 16.  See id., See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24 (2006). 
 17.  See Rose, 92 A.3d at 908.  The calculation of the amount of days 
deducted is described in the statute.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24.  
According to Barber v. Vose, the calculation for deducting time from a 
sentence must comply with the law at the end of the sentencing. 682 A.2d 
908, 913 n.3 (R.I. 1996). 
 18.  Rose, 92 A.3d at 908. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 905 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21.  Id. at 911. 
 22.  Id.  
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The court, however, stated that the good-time statute is 
meant to simply deduce time from imprisonment.23  Justice 
Indiglia cited Gonsalves v. Howard, in which the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing justice’s ruling regarding 
the start of probation could not be enforced if it conflicts with a 
statutory provision.24  Rose was convicted under Rhode Island 
General Laws section 11-37-8.2, which prescribes twenty years as 
the mandatory minimum for the crime of first degree child 
molestation.25  The court reasoned that, because the Legislature 
imposed a minimum sentence for the crime, a lesser sentence 
could not be given for such a conviction and mitigation is against 
the statutory intent.26 
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty disagreed with how the 
majority has defined “sentence” as used in the statute to only 
mean “imprisonment.”27 He wrote that “it is my opinion that the 
majority is in error by concluding that the only ‘sentence’ from 
which the Legislature intended the credits to be deducted is one of 
imprisonment.”28 
The majority, however, stated that “we have previously 
refused to construe a sentencing provision, even an ameliorative 
one, in a manner that would “authoriz[e] sentencing justices to 
impose a sentence less than that for which the Legislature ha[s] 
otherwise specifically provided.”29  The court ruled that Rose’s 
good-time credit could not cause his probation to start 
immediately upon Rose’s release from incarceration, but that he 
was to serve his probation until the full twenty year sentence was 
completed.30 
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty wrote that the court’s 
conclusion with regards to good-time credits creates two 
problems.31  The first problem is that the court has, in essence, 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 909 (citing Gonsalves v. Howard, 324 A.2d 338, 340–41 (R.I. 
1997)).  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 913. (Flaherty, J.dissenting). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. 
Holmes, 277 A.2d 914, 917 (R.I. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).. 
 30.  Id. at 909. 
 31.  Id. at 913. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
CRIMINALLAW_ROSE_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  2:14 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 663 
added to the good-time credit statute.32  That addition creates a 
new part that restricts the use of good-time credits if the 
application of the time credits of the sentence would then fall 
below the mandatory minimum.33  Justice Flaherty explained that 
another problem with the ruling is that it extends probation 
further than the sentencing judge had prescribed.34 
B. Rule of Lenity and R.I.G.L. § 42-56-24 
The court also disagreed with Rose’s argument that the rule 
of lenity requires the court to apply the credit to his overall 
sentence.35  Rose argued that there is an inconsistency and 
ambiguity between mandatory minimum statutes and that the 
good-time deduction statute requires the court to make a decision 
in his favor.36  The rule of lenity requires that a court, in all 
criminal contexts, resolve any ambiguity in favor of the 
defendant.37  The majority did not find the legislation to be 
ambiguous but rather unambiguous; therefore, there was no 
reason to apply the rule of lenity to the statute.38 
C. Credit for Time Served Under R.I.G.L. § 12-19-2(a) 
In addition, Rose argued on appeal that his probation should 
have started and ended sooner according to Rhode Island General 
Laws section 12-19-2(a), as he had already served more than a 
year and two months while awaiting the outcome of the charges.39  
Rose argued that this “dead time” provision should have allowed 
him to be released from probation in January 2013 in 
acknowledgment of the time he spent awaiting trial.40 
The majority stated that this time did not count towards 
reducing his time on probation either.41  The court referenced 
State v. Bergevine, in which the defendant argued that his 
 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 909 (majority opinion). 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 909–10; see also generally Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2420 (2006). 
 38.  Rose, 92 A.3d at 910.  
 39.  Id. at 911. 
 40.  Id. at 912. 
 41.  Id.  
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probation was no longer in force because it had been started 
earlier due to time served.42  The court in Bergevine did not count 
the dead time served to calculate the probation retroactively, and 
the court declined to do that here for Rose.43  The court 
acknowledged that Rose was careful not to argue that his sentence 
should be retroactive to his imprisonment after failing to make 
bail, but instead, in response to Begevin, Rose argued that his 
probationary period began fifteen months earlier because of his 
time in jail awaiting trial.44  The court stated that this argument 
is simply a different way of looking at the problem and refused to 
deduct such time from Rose’s sentence.45 
Justice Flaherty’s dissent acknowledged that this ruling goes 
against the decision made in State v. Holmes.46  In that case, the 
court stated that every person who has committed an identical 
crime will “be deprived of their liberty for identical periods of 
time.”47  Justice Flaherty argued that the time served credit 
should not elongate the probation of a person simply because they 
were imprisoned before trial.48  He wrote that the court denied 
Rose the relief that the General Assembly had specifically 
designed.49  He further stated that the majority’s holding 
“effectively requires Rose to make up the fifteen months he served 
at the Adult Correctional Institution awaiting disposition by 
extending his probation, an extension that the statute simply does 
not authorize this Court to do.”50 
COMMENTARY 
When looking at this opinion, it is important to realize the 
precedent this case will set for future offenders sentenced to 
crimes that prescribe mandatory minimum sentences.  In Rose, 
the court determined that, when a minimum mandatory sentence 
 
 42.  Id. (citing State v. Bergevine, 883 A.2d 1158, 1158–59 (R.I. 2005)).  
 43.  Id. at 912; Bergevine, 883 A.2d at 1158–59. 
 44.  Rose, 92 A.3d at 912. 
 45.  Id. (“We cannot countenance a result that we have previously 
forbidden simply because it is painted in different terms.”). 
 46.  Id. at 918 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Id. (quoting State v. Holmes, 277 A.2d 914, 917 (1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 48.  Id. at 918–19.  
 49.  Id. at 919.  
 50.  Id.  
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has been given, good-time and “dead time” credits can not impact 
the length of the sentence as a whole.51  Instead, these credits 
simply count towards early release from incarceration and impose 
a longer probationary period by default.52 
When one looks at the good-time statutes, this case comes 
down to the meaning of one word, “sentence” and what the 
legislature means when it uses it.  The court held in Rose that it 
means the incarceration of a convicted person.53  However, the 
disagreement is whether the legislature intended it to be that 
way. 
Justice Indeglia’s opinion is that the good-time credits are 
simply an act of legislative grace.54  This means that the 
legislature is permitting convicted persons to be released early 
from prison for good behavior, but that release is the sole benefit 
of the good-time credit and that an extension of probation is not a 
burden on those who leave jail early. 
Some may argue that his reasoning does not consider 
probation to be an actual burden that causes any hardship to the 
offender.55  Yet, probation inherently limits freedom; just the act 
of reporting to another person to evaluate one’s actions has a 
direct impact on one’s life. There are inherent difficulties for one 
who is on probation, stigma perhaps being the most challenging. 
This elongation of probation seems simply to be unfair to an 
offender who has taken great lengths to serve their time 
responsibly. 
However, the General Assembly enacts mandatory minimums 
for a reason.  And in this instance, probation seems much better 
than the alternative.  The reasoning of the court is clear that good-
time credits are a way for the General Assembly, and the 
Department of Corrections, to reward good behavior in the ACI.56  
The benefit to the prisoners to be released from prison early, when 
weighed against the potential burden of more parole, is great. 
Rose’s argument that he was sentenced to only 12 years on 
probation, so therefore he should only have to serve that amount 
 
 51.  Id. at 909. 
 52.  Id. at 913. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 53.  See generally id. (majority opinion). 
 54.  Id. at 911. 
 55.  See id.  
 56.  See id. at 908. 
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of time at first blush, seems a good one.  But when his prison term 
was cut short, a longer probation period seems to be a price worth 
that benefit.  As the court suggests, all citizens are under an 
obligation to be good citizens, and probation, a form of good citizen 
enforcement, cannot be seen as too high a burden. Rose did not 
dispute this obligation either.57 
Rose made an argument to the ourt that it should apply the 
rule of lenity.58  The majority made quick work of Rose’s argument 
that the statutes combined created ambiguity, and the dissent did 
not mention the rule at all.59 This argument does not seem to have 
been one that the court ceased upon; however if inclined, the 
legislature could clarify the rule of lenity’s impact on good-time 
and “dead time” in order to prevent cases like this from arising in 
the future under different guises. 
Rose’s most compelling argument was that his probation 
should not extend out to twenty years after his sentencing date, 
but from when he began to serve time.60  Although the reasoning 
is similar to that in the good-time analysis, the court may 
unintentionally punish those who make bail. 
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty wrote, “[t]he court’s holding 
today counters our previous pronouncements about the purpose of 
the statute regarding credit for time served, which was meant to 
result in equal time for an equal sentence to balance out the 
situation of the person who can make bail and the person who 
cannot.”61  Unfortunately, the court seems to say that the time 
served before conviction cannot count toward the mandatory 
minimum.  In this case, it is a punishment to those who cannot 
post bail. 
Unlike the good-time credit, which confers a benefit on the 
convicted person by releasing them from jail early, the time served 
credit is not a benefit.  Instead, it is a logical and fair relief to 
those who are not able to post bail.  Those who can post bail will 
serve less probation than those who cannot post bail.  In this 
instance, the justice system will thus punish poorer people more 
than those who can afford bail. 
 
 57.  Id. at 907. 
 58.  Id. at 909–10. 
 59.  Id.; see id. at 913–19 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  
 60.  Id. at 911–13 (majority opinion).  
 61.  Id. at 918 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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This is where the legislature should step in to make clear that 
time served credits should also move up the probation time so that 
our justice system does not have that inequality. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that “dead time,” in 
this case fifteen months served before disposition of the case, did 
not move up the beginning and end date of the probationary 
period ordered.  The court also held that when applying good-time 
credits, a defendant may be released early from prison, but this 
too does not move up the beginning and end date of the 
probationary period ordered.  The court goes further in stating 
that there are no legislative inconsistencies within the statutes, 
and the rule of lenity is not applied to the issue of whether time 
served could move the start date of the probationary period 
forward. 
Andrew Blais 





Criminal Law.  State ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 
412 (R.I. 2014).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a reasonable 
individual would feel free to leave a confrontation with a police officer if the 
officer did not use demanding language in making a request to return to a 
scene of an accident.  Where a police officer uses demanding and 
authoritative language that causes a reasonable person to believe he does not 
have the ability to decline the officer’s request, an arrest has been made.  If 
an officer does not, however, use demanding language when requesting an 
individual to act, a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request 
and leave. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At approximately 3:40 a.m. on December 24, 2011, two police 
officers, Officer Farrar (“Farrar”) and Corporal Harris (“Harris”), 
saw David Simmons (“Defendant”), running down the street 
wearing a t-shirt and shorts while they responded to a rescue call 
on Old Stone Church Road in Little Compton.1  Approximately 
five minutes later, the two officers received a call from the Little 
Compton dispatch informing them of a single-vehicle accident on 
Colebrook Road in Little Compton.2  The driver of the vehicle 
involved in the one-car accident was not found on the scene.3  
While a third officer reported to the scene of the accident, Farrar 
and Harris “decided to pursue the erstwhile jogger” they observed 
earlier under the assumption that he may have been involved in 
the one-car accident.4 
Farrar and Harris followed the path of the jogger into the 
town of Tiverton, and after spotting Simmons, they pulled over 
their police cruiser alongside of him.5  Farrar asked the Defendant 
 
 1.  State ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 412, 413 
(R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id.   
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.   
 5.  Id. 
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if he was out for a jog, to which the Defendant responded 
positively.6  Harris then asked the Defendant if he had been 
involved with the one-car accident on Colebrook Road, to which 
the defendant stated he had.7  At that time, Harris exited his 
vehicle and conducted a frisk of the Defendant “for officer safety” 
and questioned him about why he had left the accident scene.8  
While speaking with the Defendant, Harris observed that there 
was a “strong odor of alcohol coming from [his] breath and that 
Mr. Simmons’[s] eyes were extremely bloodshot and watery.”9  The 
Defendant asked what he had hit and whether anyone had been 
hurt, to which Harris responded that she believed there were no 
injuries “but that [they] need[ed] to respond back to the scene.”10  
The Defendant voluntarily offered to accompany the officers back 
to the scene of the accident and got into the backseat of the police 
cruiser, “which, as is typical of such vehicles, was separated from 
the front by a partition.”11  Significantly, the Defendant was not 
read his Miranda rights and was not handcuffed.12  As police 
cruisers typically do not allow for backseat passengers to exit the 
vehicle once inside, Simmons was unable to open the vehicle door 
“in the event he desired to get out.”13 
Upon arrival to the accident scene in Little Compton, the 
Defendant was released from the backseat of the vehicle and was 
advised to seek medical attention.14  At no point during this time 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  In Terry, the United 
States Supreme Court held that when a police officer has reasonable 
suspicion that an individual is in the act of or had just committed a crime, the 
officer can “stop” and “frisk” the individual.  Id. at 30–31.  The scope of the 
frisk is limited to the suspect’s outer garments to search for weapons and is 
reasonable as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment to ensure the 
officer’s safety.  Id. 
 9.  Simmons, 87 A.3d  at 414. 
 10.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  In Miranda, 
the United States Supreme Court outlined specific warnings a police officer 
must read to a suspect before conducting a custodial interrogation.  Id.  at 
444–45.  These warnings include the right to remain silent, the right to an 
attorney, and that anything the suspect says may be used against them in 
court.  Id. 
 13.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 414. 
 14.  Id. 
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was the Defendant “restrained in any way.”15  After the 
Defendant refused medical assistance, Harris administered a 
series of field-sobriety tests on the Defendant, which he failed.16  
The Defendant was then placed under formal arrest, read his 
Miranda rights, and transported to the Little Compton police 
station in handcuffs.17  Subsequently, the town of Little Compton 
charged Simmons with operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol in violation of Rhode Island 
General Laws section 31-27-2.18 
On January 9, 2012, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
in the district court, claiming unlawful arrest.19  The Defendant 
argued that he was arrested in Tiverton, and as such, the Little 
Compton police did not have the authority to arrest him.20  In 
deciding the  motion, the district court judge “dutifully considered 
the factors outlined in State v. Bailey.”21  These factors include: (i) 
the extent to which a person’s freedom of movement is restricted; 
(ii) the belief of a reasonable person that he or she has the ability 
to leave the confrontation with the police officer and refuse to 
speak to the officer; and (iii) the amount of force used by officers 
during the confrontation.22  In consideration of these factors, the 
district court judge arrived at the decision that the Little Compton 
officers made the arrest in Tiverton and, therefore, exceeded their 
authority to arrest.23  As a result, the case was dismissed, and the 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2 (2013) (“Whoever drives or 
otherwise operates any vehicle in the state while under the influence of any 
intoxicating liquor, drugs, toluene, or any controlled substance as defined in 
chapter 28 of title 21, or any combination of these, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . and shall be punished as provided in subsection (d) of this 
section.”). 
 19.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 414. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 414 (citing State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 917–
18 (R.I. 1980)).   
 22.  See Bailey, 417 A.2d 917–18. 
 23.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 414.  The judge concluded that the officers’ 
actions amounted to an arrest because “(1) . . . defendant could not 
voluntarily leave [the cruiser]; (2) the police had not observed defendant 
commit any crimes; and (3) the police had not informed defendant that he 
could decline to accompany them back to the collision.”  Id.  The arrest was 
therefore ruled unlawful, and the evidence obtained from the encounter was 
suppressed.  Id.  
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town appealed.24 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial court decision, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court sought to address the issue of whether the the 
Defendant’s arrest was lawful.25  The Town of Little Compton 
contended that the arrest was lawful because it was made in Little 
Compton only after the Defendant had failed the field sobriety 
tests that Harris administered.26  The court focused on the lower 
court’s application of the factors laid out in Bailey in determining 
whether a lawful arrest had been made.27  Laying out the 
factors,28 the court noted that “no one factor [was] dispositive” of 
the outcome29 and that the court would “analyze the interchange 
between [the] suspect and the authorities pragmatically to 
determine whether an arrest or seizure [had] in fact occurred.”30  
The court concluded that although the trial judge correctly cited 
the factors established in Bailey and “engaged in a thoughtful 
analysis,” the court disagreed with the trial judge’s ruling and 
held that the Defendant was not placed under arrest in Tiverton 
because a request to return to a scene of an accident is not the 
same as a request to return to the police station.31 
The court applied the Bailey factors to the relevant facts from 
the night of the arrest.32  In addressing the Defendant’s freedom 
of movement, the court determined that the degree of the 
Defendant’s curtailment while riding in the backseat of the police 
cruiser was minimal because the Defendant was only in the 
 
 24.  Id.  The court granted the petition.  Id.  
 25.   Id. at 414–15.  The supreme court noted that its review of the case 
would be ‘“limited to an examination of ‘the record to determine if an error of 
law has been committed.’’”  Id. at 414 (quoting State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 
423 (R.I. 2013)).  The court also noted that the record would be examined to 
determine if the findings of the lower court were supported by “legally 
competent evidence.”  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 415.  
 27.  Id. (citing State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 917–18 (R.I. 1980)).   
 28.  See Bailey, 417 A.2d at 917–18.   
 29.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 415 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 650 (R.I. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 30.  Id. (quoting Collins, 543 A.2d at 650) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See id. at 415–17. 
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cruiser for a few moments and was not restrained.33  The court 
stated that it would be unreasonable to suggest that the two police 
officers had any other way of escorting the Defendant back to the 
scene other than in the back of the police cruiser.34  Next, the 
court addressed the lack of physical force used by the officers and 
concluded that the pat down conducted by Harris for officer safety 
did not rise to the level of force required for an arrest.35  The court 
then addressed the argument that the police had an affirmative 
duty to inform the Defendant of his freedom to decline the request 
to return to the scene of the accident.36  Although the trial court 
found it “significant that the police did not inform [the Defendant] 
that he was free to leave,” the supreme court acknowledged that 
the police did not have the duty to inform Defendant of this 
ability.37  Therefore, this Bailey factor was insignificant in the 
matter.38 
Finally, the court sought to determine if a reasonable person 
in like circumstances would have understood that he was free to 
object to return with the officers to the scene of the accident.39  
First, the court noted that the test to be applied was objective and 
 
 33.  Id. at 415. 
 34.  Id.  The court analogized this instance to State v. Collins, where the 
court found that no arrest was made when the defendant, although unable to 
voluntarily leave a police vehicle, had somewhat reluctantly volunteered to go 
with the police.  Id. (citing Collins, 543 A.2d at 650).   
 35.  Simmons, 87 A.3d. at 416; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
In conducting this analysis, the court specifically noted that the Defendant 
was not restrained in handcuffs while riding in the police cruiser, and the 
officers never drew their service weapons.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 416.  The 
court compared this case to State v. Aponte, where no arrest was made when 
the defendant was “frisked and physically manhandled by the officers” as the 
defendant was being moved into the police cruiser.  Id. (quoting State v. 
Aponte, 800 A.2d. 420, 426 (2002)).   
 36.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 416. 
 37.  Id.  See State v. Girard, 799 A.2d 238 (R.I. 2002).  In Girard, the 
court found that the defendant “had the option of not going to the station . . .  
and, considering that he left freely, his personal freedom apparently had not 
been curtailed.”  Id. at 248.  The court stated that their conclusion ‘“that no 
seizure occurred [at that time was] not affected by the fact that [Girard] was 
not expressly told by the [officers] that [he] was free to decline to cooperate 
with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of [his] responses does not depend 
upon [his] having been so informed’”  Id. (quoting State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 
1178, 1182 (R.I. 1999)).  
 38.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 416.  See also Girard, 799 A.2d 238.  
 39.  Id. (citing State v. Freola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1343 (R.I. 1986)). 
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should not take into account the Defendant’s subjective view of the 
exchange between himself and the officers.40  The court then 
reasoned that an arrest can occur when police use language that 
makes it clear to an individual that he does not have the ability to 
decline to cooperate with the request.41  As the court noted, “the 
outcome of [this] case weigh[ed] heavily” on this factor.42  In 
addressing Harris’s statement that “we need[] to respond back to 
the scene,” the court found it was a critical exchange because it 
“appear[ed] to indicate that the [D]efendant should return with 
them.”43  The court stated that the statement exchange was 
crucial because it could affect whether the Defendant believed he 
was free to object to returning with the officers because Harris’ 
wording could have “indicate[d] that [the D]efendant should 
return with them.”44 
The court ultimately concluded that “a reasonable person 
under like circumstances would have felt free to leave when 
Harris stated that we need to respond back to the scene.”45  To 
reach this conclusion, the court reasoned that the statement made 
by Harris in this instance was similar to the statement made by 
the officers in Kennedy and, therefore, did not constitute an 
arrest.46  Harris’s statement was not like the statement made by 
officers in State v. Mattatall because Harris did not demand that 
the Defendant return to the scene of the accident, and therefore, a 
reasonable person in like circumstances would have felt free to 
 
 40.  Id. (citing Aponte, 800 A.2d at 426).   
 41.  Id.  Compare State v. Kennedy, 569 A.2d 4, 5–6 (R.I. 1990) (holding 
that a defendant was not under arrest when police offered to transport him to 
the police station because the defendant did not have his own 
transportation), with State v. Mattatall, 510 A.2d 947, 951–52 (R.I. 1986) 
(concluding that a defendant was not free to leave when police ordered him to 
go to the police station, finding there was absolutely no option for the 
defendant to decline), vacated on other grounds,  479 U.S. 879, aff’d on other 
grounds, 525 A.2d 49 (R.I. 1987).   
 42.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417. 
 43.  Id.  The court also noted that the hearing judge had not considered 
this factor in making her determination in the case.  Id.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kennedy, 569 A.2d at 
5–6; Mattatall, 510 A.2d at 951–52.   
 46.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417; see also Kennedy, 569 A.2d at 5–6.  There 
was no arrest made in Kennedy where the officers offered to give the 
defendant a ride to the police station and the defendant accepted.  569 A.2d 
at 5–6. 
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decline to return with the officers.47  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court summarized the results from the Bailey test and noted 
that “[t]he [D]efendant did not express any reluctance” in response 
to the officer’s statements, but rather “exhibited a willingness to 
accompany the police” back to Little Compton.48  Again, the court 
emphasized that a reasonable individual in like circumstances 
“would have felt free to leave” when Harris stated “we need[] to 
respond back to the scene.”49  Therefore, the court below erred in 
dismissing the action because the Little Compton officers did not 
abuse their authority as no arrest had been made in Tiverton.50 
 
COMMENTARY 
In applying the Bailey factors to Simmons, the court 
concluded that a reasonable person in like circumstances would 
have felt free to decline to return to the scene of the accident with 
the Little Compton Police.51  In considering this Bailey factor, the 
court made note of the possibility that words or actions of an 
officer could essentially render a defendant unable to refuse to 
cooperate with the requests of the police.52  What the court fails to 
address, however, is how this reasoning would apply to Harris’ 
statement that they “need[ed] to respond back to the scene.”53  In 
making this statement, Harris essentially told the Defendant that 
“they,” collectively, had to return to the scene of the accident.  This 
wording may have influenced the Defendant in a way that a 
different wording may not have.  Had Harris said that they 
“should return to the accident scene,” the argument that a 
reasonable person would have felt able to decline to return with 
the officers would be much stronger.  Harris’ use of the word 
“need” resembles a demand that would cause a reasonable person 
in like circumstances to believe that he could not refuse to 
cooperate with the police. 
The court continued by assessing the Defendant’s lack of 
 
 47.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417; see Mattatal, 510 A.2d at 951–52.   
 48.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417.   
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 414 (emphasis added).  
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reluctance to accompany the officers when Harris said they 
“need[ed] to respond back to the scene.”54  This line of reasoning 
suggests that a reasonable person in like circumstances that does 
not show reluctance to comply with the requests of police officers 
believes he is free to deny compliance.  What the court is asserting 
is that because the Defendant was not reluctant to go with the 
Little Compton officers back to the scene of the accident, he was 
establishing his voluntary compliance with their request.  This 
reasoning can cause confusion.  Is the court saying that a 
reasonable person in like circumstances would not show 
reluctance in returning with the officers if he believed to have 
such an ability to refuse to return with them? 
What the court is suggesting is that a reasonable person 
would not see the choice of words used by Harris as a demand to 
return to the scene of the accident.55  The court is effectively 
saying a reasonable person in like circumstances would not 
succumb to the authority of a police officer making a statement 
that on its face demands the individual to comply with the officer’s 
request.  However, it is more likely here that the Defendant’s 
“voluntary act” of accompanying the officers back to Little 
Compton was an acquiescence to the officer’s authority.56  A 
reasonable person in the Defendant’s circumstances—that is, a 
reasonable person who had just fled the scene of an accident 
which that person had caused—would not believe he had the 
ability to refuse to accompany an officer who states they “need” to 
return to the scene. 
If the court is asserting that an individual who shows no 
reluctance in complying with the requests or demands of a law 
enforcement officer is demonstrating his belief that he is free to 
decline the interaction and requests of the officer, then what 
would a person who is reluctant to comply with an officers’ request 
be demonstrating?  The court does not address this possibility.  
Although it was noted in State v. Collins that a showing that a 
defendant acted “somewhat reluctan[tly]”57 in accompanying the 
police did not constitute an arrest, the court did not address just 
 
 54.  Id. at 416.   
 55.  See supra note 37. 
 56.  But see Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417. 
 57.  543 A.2d 641, 650 (R.I. 1988).  
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how releuctant a suspect must be to establish that he is asserting 
his freedom to decline an officer’s request.58  Therefore, the court 
is telling a person to demonstrate that he does not want to comply 
with the requests of police officers by showing reluctance to do the 
requested acts, which also casts the individual in a suspicious 
light to the officer. 
The court in Simmons does not provide a meaningful test to 
conclude when an individual’s actions can be deemed voluntary or 
when such actions are a mere acquiescence to authority.  It is 
unclear if the court is asserting that an individual must be 
reluctant to comply with the request of an authority figure in 
order to demonstrate his belief that he is free to refuse to comply 
with the officer’s request.  The Defendant in Simmons did not 
show reluctance and voluntarily returned with the officers to the 
accident in Little Compton, but this was only after Harris told the 
Defendant that they “need[ed]” to return.59  The court did not 
address the demanding nature of the phrasing used by Harris in 
making this statement, but rather said that the exchange showed 
that Harris made a request and not a demand of the Defendant.60  
Therefore, the court is concluding that a reasonable person in like 
circumstances would have shown reluctance in returning with the 
officers to the scene of the crime after being told by a law 
enforcement officer that they “needed” to return to the scene.61  
This reasoning is unlikely to transfer into reality.  A reasonable 
person in like circumstances, that is, a reasonable person that had 
just fled the scene of an accident, would not feel free to decline the 
request of an officer that they “need[ed]” to return to the scene,62 
and would certainly not feel comfortable showing reluctance to 
such a request that would almost unquestionably give the officers 
added suspicion that the defendant was implicated in the crime. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a reasonable 
individual would feel free to leave a confrontation with a police 
 
 58.  Simmons, 87 A.3d at 417. 
 59.  Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
 60.  Id. at 416.   
 61.  Id.   
 62.  Id.  
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officer who made a request that was not demanding in nature.  
Because the court found that Harris’ statement to the Defendant 
was not a demand, the court ruled that the Defendant was not 
placed under arrest in Tiverton by the Little Compton police 
officers. 
Sarah E. Driscoll 
 





Employment Law.  Panarello v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 88 A.3d 350 (R.I. 
2014).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the First Circuit’s two-
prong, burden-shifting paradigm for employment discrimination actions 
brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act (USERRA).  When an employee alleges discrimination by his or 
her employer based on the employee’s military status, in violation of 
USERRA, the employee must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that his or her military status or accompanying unavailability was a 
motivating or substantial factor in the adverse employment action.  If the 
employee satisfies the motivating or substantial factor test, the burden of 
proof shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action 
regardless of the employee’s military status. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In June of 2000, Donald Panarello (“Panarello”) left his full-
time job as a corrections officer at the Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) to report for active duty with the Rhode Island Air 
National Guard.1  He returned to the DOC in September of 2006; 
the alleged discrimination occurred when the DOC failed to 
promote him to the position of lieutenant on three separate 
occasions during his six-year military leave.2 
The first instance of alleged discrimination occurred in 2001, 
when the DOC interviewed twelve corrections officers, including 
Panarello, for five vacant lieutenant positions.3  The interview 
panel recommended seven candidates for promotion, but he was 
not one of them.4  Panarello showed up to the interview wearing 
his military uniform, and he later testified that one of the panel 
members, David Caruso (“Caruso”), “chastised” his appearance, 
stating, “[i]t’s not going to look good.”5  Caruso, however, denied 
 
 1.  Panarello v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 88 A.3d 350, 353 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 354, 356. 
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commenting on Panarello’s attire and further testified that 
Panarello had “lacked knowledge of minimum [DOC] standards.”6  
Another panelist testified that Panarello’s interview was merely 
“average,” but he also conceded that he felt Panarello would be a 
better candidate once he had more experience as a corrections 
officer.7  Panel members acknowledged that their leader did not 
recommend candidates for a second interview in accordance with 
their interview rankings.8  Regardless, Panarello’s interview score 
was ranked eleventh out of the twelve candidates.9 
The next alleged discrimination occurred when more 
lieutenant positions opened up in May of 2002; the DOC 
interviewed Panarello again and did not recommend him for 
promotion.10  On this occasion, Panarello, again outfitted in his 
fatigues, brought up the significance of the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), which 
provides employment protections for members of the armed 
services.11  Panarello alleged at trial that one of the panelists, 
Walter Whitman, had told him that he would not be eligible for 
promotion while out on military leave because it would be a bad 
management move, and another, Carol Getter, had commented on 
his active military duty status.12  Yet, these panelists testified 
that Panarello was not “up-to-date” on, and demonstrated merely 
“average” knowledge of, DOC policies and procedures.13  
Furthermore, serving as a panelist for the second time, Caruso 
noted that Panarello did not seem prepared and that at both this 
interview as well as the prior year, there were better candidates 
with more knowledge.14  Panarello’s interview score this time 
ranked him fifth out of seven candidates.15 
Finally, in June of 2002, the last instance of alleged 
discrimination occurred when the DOC offered Panarello a “three-
day rule” appointment as a temporary lieutenant, but 
 
 6.  Id. at 359. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 359, 360. 
 9.  Id. at 356. 
 10.  Id. at 355. 
 11.  Id. at 355, 356–57; see also 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012). 
 12.  Panarello, 88 A.3d at 355, 356. 
 13.  Id. at 358. 
 14.  Id. at 359. 
 15.  Id. at 357. 
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subsequently withdrew the offer.16  When a position is vacant for 
an extended period of time as a result of leave, the Director can 
decide to temporarily appoint someone of a lower rank to that 
position.17  Panarello testified at trial that he told the person who 
offered him the “three-day rule” position that he would be unable 
to begin until late August or early September as that was the 
earliest he could return from active duty.18  The DOC then 
withdrew the offer allegedly because Panarello could not start 
immediately, although he later learned that the position remained 
vacant until late October to early November.19 
Panarello filed a declaratory judgment action on October 21, 
2003, seeking relief from the superior court with respect to the 
DOC’s alleged discrimination based on his military status.20  He 
brought suit under USERRA, as well as the parallel state statute, 
the Employment Rights of Members of Armed Forces.21  Before a 
lengthy bench trial during July and August of 2009 commenced, 
the trial justice issued a preliminary decision in which she ruled 
that the two-prong, burden-shifting paradigm employed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Velázquez-
García v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc. was the appropriate method 
for analyzing Panarello’s federal claims under USERRA, as well 
as his parallel state claims.22 
The trial justice rendered her decision on November 23, 2010, 
finding that Panarello had not met his burden of proof under the 
first prong of the Velázquez-García analysis of proving that his 
military leave was “‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the 
 
 16.  Id. at 355. 
 17.  Id. at 355 n.7. 
 18.  Id. at 356. 
 19.  Id.  Upon his return to the DOC from military leave in 2006, 
Panarello took the written examination for promotion again, and this time he 
received “27A” as his final ranking.  Id.  The DOC promoted him in 
September of 2007.  Id. at 355, 356.  According to Caruso, who was a panelist 
for the third time, Panarello was more prepared and interviewed better, 
appearing to have reviewed DOC policies.  Id. at 359. 
 20.  Id. at 353 
 21.  Id. at 353, 363–64; see also 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 30-11-1 to -9 (2013). 
 22.  Panarello, 88 A.3d at 360–61; Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of 
P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2007).  See also 38 U.S.C. § 4311; R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 30-11-3. 
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DOC’s decision not to promote him.”23  Regarding the evidence 
that Panarello produced which he claimed was demonstrative of 
anti-military bias in the DOC’s promotional process, the trial 
justice found that Caruso’s alleged comments at the 2001 
interview about Panarello’s military uniform were not indicative 
of bias, and Whitman’s comments at the 2002 interview with 
respect to Panarello’s availability, although “‘ill-advised,’” were 
not enough to show that the DOC discriminated against 
Panarello.24  She held that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that Panarello’s unavailability factored into the interview score 
that Whitman gave him.25 
Furthermore, Panarello had drastically improved as a 
candidate when the DOC promoted him to lieutenant in 2007, 
given that he received a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and 
became more familiar with the DOC’s rules and operations.26  
Thus, the trial justice ruled that, in light of said candidacy 
improvements, the fact that the DOC promoted Panarello in 2007 
after he returned from active duty did not serve as evidence that it 
had improperly denied his promotion based on bias in 2001 and 
2002.27  Finally, regarding the temporary “three-day rule” 
promotion that the DOC offered to Panarello in 2002, the trial 
justice found that such a position required immediate availability, 
and Panarello had not offered any evidence that a “three-day rule” 
position had ever been awarded to another employee on leave.28  
Therefore, she held that Panarello had also failed to meet his 
burden of proving that his unavailability accompanying his 
military status was improper for the DOC to take into account 
when it withdrew its offer to temporarily appoint him to a “three-
day rule” position.29 
Following the trial justice’s ruling that the DOC had not 
engaged in employment discrimination against him, Panarello 
timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered on 
 
 23.  Panarello, 88 A.3d at 361. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  The trial justice went on to rule that the DOC provided sufficient 
evidence of the fact that Panarello had not been one of the best candidates in 
2001 or 2002.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 361–62. 
 27.  Id. at 362. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
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November 26, 2010.30 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The dispute on appeal centered on the trial justice’s 
application of the Velázquez-García analytical approach.31  
Panarello conceded that the “the trial justice correctly articulated 
the burden-shifting method of proof applicable in employment 
discrimination cases brought under the [USERRA].”32  Rather, he 
simply argued that the trial justice had erred by incorrectly 
applying said burden-shifting test.33  Further, Panarello asserted 
that the trial justice had overlooked what he considered to be 
relevant and material evidence of his employment discrimination 
case.34 
The court began its analysis by noting that the trial justice 
correctly held that the three-part, burden-shifting paradigm set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, and traditionally applied in Rhode Island 
employment discrimination cases, was not applicable to claims 
brought under USERRA.35  Rather, the court agreed that the 
substantial or motivating factor test adopted by the First Circuit 
was the appropriate test to apply to Panarello’s USERRA and 
parallel state law claims.36  Thus, the court found no error in the 
trial justice’s decision to follow Velázquez-García.37  The court 
went on to hold that an employee alleging discrimination under 
USERRA has to initially establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that his or her military status or relating work 
unavailability was “‘at least a motivating or substantial factor’ in 
the adverse employment action.”38  If the employee satisfies the 
first prong, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to 
 
 30.  Id. at 352–53. 
 31.  Id. at 361. 
 32.  Id. at 353. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 363–64; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802–04 (1973). 
 36.  Panarello, 88 A.3d at 365. 
 37.  Id. (citing Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 
11, 17 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-
11-3 (2013). 
 38.  Panarello, 88 A.3d at 365 (citing Velázquez-García, 473 F.3d at 17). 
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prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have 
taken the same action regardless of the employee’s protected 
status.39 
Yet, Panarello’s main argument on appeal was that the trial 
justice had improperly applied the Velázquez-García analysis to 
his particular set of facts.40  In order to meet the test, Panarello 
need not have shown that his military status was the sole cause of 
the DOC’s failure to promote him, just that the DOC “relied on, 
took into account, considered, or conditioned its decision on that 
consideration.”41  Moreover, Panarello could have used direct or 
circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent or 
motivation.42  If Panarello had met the substantial or motivating 
factor test, the burden of proof would have shifted to the DOC to 
show that its reason for not promoting Panarello was not 
pretextual.43  With this legal framework in mind, the court noted 
its desire that, in future USERRA cases, the two prongs of the 
burden-shifting paradigm be looked at individually.44  The court 
found it clear that, although the trial justice explicitly referenced 
in her opinion only the first prong of the USERRA burden-shifting 
paradigm, she had actually assessed both parts simultaneously.45  
Therefore, the court held that the trial justice’s failure to explicitly 
assess the two prongs separately did not invalidate her decision.46 
The court first turned to the trial justice’s application of the 
substantial or motivating factor test to Panarello’s 2001 and 2002 
interviews.47  Panarello contended that the trial justice had 
erroneously believed that, if the DOC presented any evidence of a 
legitimate motive for not promoting Panarello, she did not need to 
consider whether his protected military status was also a factor; 
“in other words, according to [Panarello], the trial justice required 
him to prove pretext and failed to require the DOC to prove lack of 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 366. 
 41.  Id. at 367 (quoting Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 
F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 367–68. 
 44.  Id. at 369. 
 45.  Id. at 368–69. 
 46.  Id. at 369. 
 47.  Id. at 366. 
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pretext.”48  However, the court found that the trial justice had 
indeed utilized the correct burden of proof.49  She acknowledged in 
her opinion that the panel members’ statements which Panarello 
had felt to be discriminatory.50  Based on the interviewers’ 
testimony about Panarello’s qualifications, as well as her own 
credibility determinations, the trial justice “held that [Panarello] 
had not been promoted because he was less qualified than those 
individuals who were selected for promotion—and not because of 
(even partly) his military status.”51  By determining that 
Panarello had not provided any rebuttal to the DOC’s ample 
evidence that he was not the most qualified for promotion in 2001 
and 2002, “the trial justice was not, as [Panarello] contend[ed], 
improperly requiring him to prove pretext; she was appropriately 
taking all the evidence on the record, from both parties, into 
account in making her conclusion.”52 
With respect to the 2001 and 2002 interviews, Panarello 
further submitted that it was erroneous to find that he had not 
met his burden of proof, as USERRA prohibits the DOC from 
considering military unavailability at all.53  While the court 
agreed that Panarello’s unavailability need not have been the sole 
motive behind the DOC’s decision not to promote him, it reiterated 
that the first prong of the USERRA burden-shifting paradigm 
clearly requires a showing that Panarello’s military status or 
accompanying unavailability was a “substantial or motivating 
factor” in the DOC’s adverse employment action; “[i]t does not 
suffice for an employee to simply show that his military status 
was mentioned or noted in the promotional process.”54  Therefore, 
the court concluded that the trial justice had not erred in her 
application of the two-prong, burden-shifting test with respect to 
the 2001 and 2002 interview processes.55 
The court next turned to the trial justice’s application of the 
substantial or motivating factor test to the “three-day-rule” 
 
 48.  Id. at 369. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 369–70. 
 51.  Id. at 370. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 370–71 (citing Velázquez-García v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 
473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
 55.  Id. at 371. 
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position.56  Panarello argued that the trial judge had erred by 
concluding that availability was a legitimate factor for the DOC to 
consider in filling this temporary position, as unavailability 
should not be considered under USERRA.57  The DOC, on the 
other hand, contended that immediate availability was a 
prerequisite for appointment to a “three-day rule” position.58  The 
court found that the trial justice erred neither factually nor legally 
by determining that the DOC had presented credible and 
adequate testimonial evidence that the ability to begin 
immediately was a basic requirement of a “three-day rule” 
appointment.59  Additionally, the court ruled that, “[w]hile an 
employer may not discriminate based on military unavailability 
during a general promotional process, common sense dictates that 
this rule simply should not apply to a temporary position.”60  
Therefore, just as anyone else who was not available would not 
have been awarded the position, no matter what the reason for the 
absence, the court found that the same prerequisite was applied to 
Panarello.61 
In light of the foregoing analysis, the court affirmed the 
decision of the trial justice to deny Panarello’s claim for a 
declaratory judgment under USERRA.62  Panarello failed to carry 
his burden of proving that his military status or accompanying 
unavailability was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the 
DOC’s decision not to promote him on three occasions.63  
Furthermore, the DOC succeeded in showing that it would not 
have promoted Panarello even if he had not been on military 
leave.64  Thus, the court held that the DOC did not discriminate 





 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 371–72. 
 60.  Id. at 372. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 374. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly reached the correct 
result in this case.  Under USERRA, it was not enough for 
Panarello simply to show that the DOC knew he was on active 
military duty when it decided not to promote him to lieutenant; he 
was required to show that such a consideration was a substantial 
or motivating factor behind its decision.  After all, it appears as 
though Panarello came into his interviews and paraded the fact of 
his military service in front of the panelists, daring them not to 
promote him.  Yet, in reality, his perception of his qualifications 
was plainly not supported by the facts, mainly his interview 
performances.  While the court regarded some of the panelists’ 
comments as imprudent, they were insufficient for Panarello to 
carry his burden of proof.  Furthermore, the DOC succeeded at 
proving that it had valid reasons not to promote him apart from 
his military leave, rebutting any allegations of discrimination.  
Particularly with regards to temporary positions, it is idealistic 
and unrealistic to think that employers cannot consider 
immediate availability.  Although the court may seem to have 
placed a more difficult burden on plaintiffs bringing suit under 
USERRA, this case just was not the one in which to relax the 
standard.  The court gave deferential review to the factual 
findings and credibility determinations of the trial justice, who 
apparently did not believe parts of Panarello’s testimony and his 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the First Circuit’s 
two-prong, burden-shifting paradigm articulated in Velázquez-
García is the proper analytical method to apply in employment 
discrimination cases brought under USERRA.  This requires an 
initial showing by the employee alleging discrimination that his or 
her military status or accompanying unavailability was a 









Employment Law.  Russo v. State, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & 
Hosps., 87 A.3d 399 (R.I. 2014).  An employer’s decision to place an 
employee on paid administrative leave and require him to undergo an 
independent medical examination is not an adverse employment action 
under the Rhode Island Whistleblower’s Protection Act.1 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Peter W. Russo (“Russo”), a housekeeper employed by the 
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and 
Hospitals (“MHRH”), was placed on paid administrative leave and 
required to undergo an independent medical examination (“IME”) 
after he became the subject and source of numerous complaints.2  
Russo had previously made several complaints about co-workers 
bringing dogs to work in addition to reporting to his supervisor 
what he believed to be the theft of a state-owned vacuum cleaner 
by another employee.3  Russo claimed that after a memorandum 
was issued banning the presence of pets in the workplace, his co-
workers retaliated by harassing him and lodging complaints about 
the quality of his work and his workplace behavior.4  Russo’s 
 
 1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-3 (2003) (preventing an employer from 
retaliating against an employee for reporting a “violation . . . of a law or 
regulation or rule promulgated under the law of this state” by 
“discharge[ing], threaten[ing], or otherwise discriminate[ing] against [the] 
employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, 
or privileges of employment”).  
 2.  Russo v. State, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 87 
A.3d 399, 400, 402 (R.I. 2014).  
 3.  Id. at 401–02. Russo claimed these complaints prompted a 
supervisor to issue a memorandum in an effort to stifle the practice; however, 
the supervisor testified that it resulted from his “history of disliking dogs in 
the workplace.” Id. at 402.  From August of 1999 until October 13, 2000, 
Russo complained three times about the presence of dogs in the workplace, 
and on May 12, 2000, Russo reported the alleged theft.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 402, 404.  Russo admitted that there had been two complaints 
filed about his job performance prior to the issuance of the memorandum.  Id. 
at 402.  One complaint in particular concerned a comment allegedly made by 
Russo about an office shooting that had recently occurred in Wakefield, 
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supervisor, however, testified that complaints about Russo’s work 
“had been going on for years.”5 
On January 19, 2001, as a result of the continuous exchange 
of complaints, MHRH management placed Russo on paid 
administrative leave and required him to undergo an IME.6  
Management told Russo “his job was safe” and that management 
was trying to reconcile an issue that had arisen in his building, 
but that it “wasn’t his problem.”7  After being placed on leave 
however, Russo hired an attorney because he felt that his job was 
in jeopardy.8  From January 19, 2001 until March 14, 2001, Russo 
was placed on paid administrative leave after which he returned 
to work with no loss of pay or job responsibilities.9  Following his 
return to work, Russo brought a civil suit against MHRH in 
Providence superior court alleging that his employer had 
“discriminated against him . . . by requiring that he take an 
administrative leave” in violation of the Whistleblower’s 
Protection Act (“WPA”).10 
The trial justice rendered a decision from the bench, holding 
that Russo had established a prima facie case against MHRH, 
finding:  
[T]he reporting by Mr. Russo of the alleged theft, which 
was never really appropriately responded to by the State, 
and his reporting of the canines coming into the office in 
rather large numbers, is sufficient to get over the tenets 
of the statute by reporting what he believed to be 
violations of statutes and/or regulations.11   
MHRH appealed the judgment of the trial court claiming that the 
justice erred in finding: (1) that requiring Russo to take an 
administrative leave and undergo an IME was a violation of the 
 
Massachusetts.  Id.  Following an investigation it was determined that Russo 
had been falsely accused of making the statement.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 402. 
 6.  Id. at 403.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 406.  Russo sought recovery for losses that he attributed to 
being placed on paid leave, namely, fees for the attorney whom he hired while 
on administrative leave and compensation for suffering from “anxiety and 
emotional trauma.”  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 403–04. 
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WPA; (2) that Russo’s reports and complaints satisfied the 
preconditions for obtaining relief under the WPA; (3) that the 
decision to place Russo on leave was caused by his reports and 
complaints; and (4) that MHRH did not have sufficient grounds to 
place Russo on leave and require him to undergo an IME.12 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed de novo 
the trial justice’s finding that placing Russo on paid 
administrative leave constituted a violation of the WPA and 
ultimately reversed the decision, concluding that the justice made 
a clear error of law.13 
MHRH argued that because Russo continued to receive full 
pay, including his shift differential while on leave, and because he 
ultimately returned to the same job for the same pay, it did not 
“discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate” against Russo 
when it placed him on administrative leave.14  Russo responded by 
arguing that the trial justice’s decision was not in error because 
the WPA states that a civil action can be brought under the WPA 
to obtain injunctive relief or actual damages and that he is, thus, 
entitled to recover the losses he sustained as a result of the 
MHRH decision to place him on administrative leave.15 
Confronted with an issue of first impression, the court began 
by analogizing the facts to those of Martone v. Johnston School 
Committee, where the court addressed the issue of how to define 
the suspension of a schoolteacher.16 There, the court determined 
that “[i]f an individual continues to be paid during the period in 
question, he or she ha[d] not been suspended,” and “[t]he use of 
paid administrative leave provides a reasonable means of 
immediately neutralizing a potentially contentious situation while 
 
 12.  Id. at 400.  
 13.  Id. at 405–06, 411. 
 14.  Id. at 406 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-50-3(1) (2003)).   
 15.  Id. at 406.  Russo claimed two losses: (1) the expense incurred as a 
result of having to hire an attorney to participate in negotiations regarding 
his IME and his return to work and (2) anxiety and emotional trauma that he 
suffered as a result of MHRH’s alleged violation of the WPA.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 407; Martone v. Johnston Sch. Comm., 824 A.2d 426 (R.I. 
2003). 
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minimally affecting the [employee].”17 In reliance upon its 
reasoning in Martone, the court thus concluded that, because it 
considered paid administrative leave to be a viable option for 
employers to use in order to solve problems in the workplace while 
“minimally affecting the employee,” then it could not hold that 
MHRH violated the WPA by placing Russo on paid administrative 
leave while it sought to cope with a difficult internal situation.18  
In addition, the court highlighted several federal appellate court 
decisions that specifically held that administrative leave with pay 
is not an adverse employment action,19 while Russo only had one 
case to support his position, which was in stark contrast to the 
facts presented.20 
The court then went on to address whether the added 
requirement of having to undergo an IME altered the facts 
sufficiently enough to distinguish it from Martone.21  Citing 
several federal cases, the court ultimately relied on the reasoning 
in Breaux v. City of Garland,22 where the Fifth Circuit held “that 
neither the psychiatric examination nor the administrative leave 
with pay constituted an adverse employment action.”23  The court 
found no material difference between the facts of the federal cases 
cited and the facts presented by Russo and, therefore, concluded 
that the added requirement of having to undergo an IME does not 
turn a paid administrative leave into an adverse employment 
action.24 
In conclusion the court held that because Russo continued to 
receive his salary while on leave, it was not disciplinary and would 
thus not deter a “reasonable employee” from “engaging in further 
whistleblowing.”25  As such, the court vacated the judgment of the 
 
 17.  Id. at 407 (alterations in original) (quoting Martone, 824 A.2d at 433) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18.  Id. at 407–08.  
 19.  Id. at 408–10. 
 20.  Id. at 411; see also Bushfield v. Donahoe, 912 F. Supp. 2d 944, 957 
(D. Idaho 2012) (finding that the paid administrative leave was coupled with 
an “unrelenting” investigation into the severity and effects of the plaintiff’s 
posttraumatic stress disorder).  The two other cases that Russo relied upon 
concerned suspensions without pay.  Russo, 87 A.3d at 411.  
 21.  Russo, 87 A.3d at 410. 
 22.  205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 23.  Russo, 87 A.3d at 409 (citing Breaux, 205 F.3d at 158). 
 24.  Id. at 410. 
 25.  Id. 
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superior court and held that, as a matter of law, the actions of 
MHRH did not “discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate 
against” Russo in violation of the WPA.26 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court exhibited an appreciation 
for the complex situations that can arise in the workplace.27  
Employers, according to the court, must strike a balance between 
“neutralizing a potentially contentious situation” and 
substantially affecting the employee.28  It is doubtless that being 
placed on paid administrative leave would have an affect on an 
employee.  One is likely to have apprehension about his or her job 
security and suffer some feelings of anxiety, fear, or 
embarrassment.  These feelings would no doubt be exacerbated 
with the added burden of having to undergo an IME.  However, an 
employer faced with a contentious and potentially dangerous 
workplace situation must have an available option to conduct a 
sufficient inquiry in order to take appropriate action.29  
Ultimately, the best course of action for an employer is to place a 
worker on paid administrative leave.30  If, during an 
investigation, the employee’s medical health comes into question, 
it would be reasonable for an employer to require the employee to 
undergo an IME to obtain an unbiased medical assessment.  This 
provides a qualified basis upon which the employer can rely when 
making a final decision.31 
The WPA is intended to prevent employers from retaliating 
against employees for reporting unlawful activity.32  However, the 
WPA should not be construed so as to cripple an employer’s ability 
to adequately manage the workplace.  The court here correctly 
drew a moderate line by properly balancing the need for protection 
of workers’ rights with an employer’s need to maintain a safe and 
 
 26.  Id. at 411. 
 27.  See id. at 408. 
 28.  Id. at 407–08. 
 29.  See id. at 407 (“The MHRH quite understandably opted to use paid 
administrative leave in order to defuse a difficult situation before it might 
escalate further.”). 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  See id.  
 32.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-3 (2003). 
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productive workplace. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that under the WPA, 
employers are free to place an employee on paid administrative 
leave, with the requirement that he or she undergo an 
independent medical examination in order to cope with a 
disruptive situation in the workplace.  Such action, according to 
the court, does not constitute “an adverse employment action” and 
thus cannot be the basis for a claim seeking recovery under the 
WPA.33 
Casey M. Charkowick 
 
 
 33.  Russo, 87 A.3d at 411. 





Evidence and Damages.  Morabit v. Hoag, 80 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2013).  Where 
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that an expert 
witness’s “novel” methods or theories are grounded in valid science, a trial 
justice abuses her discretion when she applies the Daubert analysis too 
rigidly, excludes the testimony, and assumes the jury’s role as trier of fact.  
When trees are removed in violation of section 34-20-1 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws, damages should depend on the trees’ use and whether the 
trees provided special value to the land or the property owner. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Since 1991, Plaintiff George E. Morabit (“Morabit”) has owned 
fifty-three acres of mostly undeveloped woodland property 
adjacent to land owned by Defendant Dennis Hoag (“Hoag”).1  
Hoag acquired his property in 1986.2  A stone wall marks the 
boundary between the properties.3  According to Hoag’s testimony, 
he started clearing his property of trees in 1988 or 1989, trucked 
in loads of fill to raise the level of the property, and began 
constructing a residence around 2000 that was completed in 
2005.4  Morabit testified that, from the time he acquired his 
property and lasting for about ten years, trees were cleared from 
and fill was dumped on Hoag’s property, and this often involved 
the use of bulldozers, backhoes, and other heavy machinery.5  
Sometime in the early 2000’s, Morabit walked his property and 
discovered that a substantial portion of the stone wall had been 
destroyed, and a significant number of trees were missing from his 
side of the wall.6  Morabit filed a complaint in Washington County 
Superior Court in April 2005, seeking damages for the destruction 
and removal of both the trees and the stone wall and injunctive 
 
 1.  Morabit v. Hoag, 80 A.3d 1, 3–4 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. at 3. 
 3.  Id. at 4. 
 4.  Id. at 9. 
 5.  Id. at 5. 
 6.  Id. at 4. 
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and declaratory relief to prevent any further alteration of his 
property.7 
The trial justice limited, after a voir dire hearing, the 
testimony of Morabit’s expert witness Robert Thorson (“Thorson”), 
a geology professor who had studied and published books and 
articles about historic stone walls.8  The justice allowed Thorson 
to offer testimony grounded in his knowledge of geology, but 
barred testimony based on “stone wall science” due to her concern 
that the field was not well-enough established to be reliable.9  In 
effect, Thorson was able to testify that a 120-foot portion of the 
wall appeared to have been deliberately damaged with heavy 
equipment, but he was not allowed to offer his estimate of the cost 
to restore the wall.10 
Morabit also called Matthew Largess (“Largess”), an 
arboriculture expert.11  Taking into account the nature of the 
surrounding uncut forest, Largess formed conclusions about the 
amount of trees removed, along with their age, species, and 
quality.12  He estimated, based on the new growth in the affected 
area, that the trees were removed around 2001 or 2002.13  Largess 
concluded that the tree-related damages totaled about $439,600, 
 
 7.  Id.  There were five counts in Morabit’s complaint: (1) that Hoag 
interfered with Morabit’s easement over Hoag’s land; (2) that Hoag was liable 
for damages for the removal of trees and (3) portions of the stone wall; and (4) 
that Hoag be enjoined from further altering Morabit’s property and (5) from 
further interfering with Morabit’s easement.  Id. at 4 & n.3.  The easement 
issues did not factor in this appeal.  Id.  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-1 
(2011) (providing that anyone who removes trees from another’s property 
without permission shall be civilly liable for twice the value of the trees 
removed); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-41-32(b) (West 2006) (“[A]ny person 
convicted of the theft of an historic stone wall, or portions of a wall, shall be 
subject to the penalties for larceny.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-41-32(d) 
(West 2006) (“Anyone convicted of the larceny of an historic stone wall, or 
portions of a wall, or convicted of attempt to commit larceny, shall be civilly 
liable to the property owner for the cost of replacing the stones and any other 
compensable damages related to the larceny.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2 (2012) 
(providing for civil liability where someone is convicted of a crime that injures 
someone else’s person, reputation, or estate).   
 8.  Morabit, 80 A.3d at 5–6. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 6, 8. 
 11.  Id. at 6. 
 12.  Id. at 6–7. 
 13.  Id. at 6. 
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based on the replacement cost of similar trees.14 
At the conclusion of Morabit’s case,15 Hoag moved for 
judgment as a matter of law.16  Although Morabit could not 
produce any admissible evidence regarding wall-related damages, 
he asked that the jury still be presented the question of liability 
and sought to amend his pleadings to suit the available 
evidence.17  The trial justice denied the motion to amend and 
granted Hoag’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with 
respect to count 3—damaging a portion of the wall.18  The trial 
justice reserved ruling on judgment as a matter of law with regard 
to count 2—the removal of the trees—until Hoag presented his 
evidence.19 
Hoag admitted in his testimony that he hired professionals to 
clear and raise the level of his land, that this work at least 
involved backhoes, and that at one point he directed a backhoe 
operator to place boulders on top of the stone wall.20  He denied 
removing any portion of the wall or clearing any trees from 
Morabit’s property.21 
After Hoag presented his evidence, he renewed his motion for 
judgment as a matter of law with respect to count 2.22  The trial 
justice allowed this motion, reasoning that the proper measure of 
tree-related damages was the change in the fair market value of 
 
 14.  Id. at 7–8. 
 15.  Before concluding his case, Morabit called a third expert witness, a 
biologist experienced in interpreting aerial photographs.  Id. at 8.  She 
examined a series of aerial photographs of the area and testified that the 
damage to the trees and the wall likely occurred between 1999 and 2003.  Id.  
Further, she found that heavy equipment could only have accessed Morabit’s 
property by way of Hoag’s land.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. (“The plaintiff suggested that the trial justice should nonetheless 
submit the issue of liability to the jury.  If the jury found in plaintiff’s favor 
on liability, the trial justice could grant equitable relief in lieu of damages.  
The trial justice pointed out, however, that plaintiff had failed to prove a 
criminal conviction for theft of the stone wall, as required to recover under § 
11-41-32(d).  The plaintiff then suggested that he be allowed under Rule 15(b) 
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to amend his pleadings to 
conform to the evidence.”); see also  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-41-32(d) (West 
2006). 
 18.  Morabit, 80 A.3d at 8. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 8–9. 
 21.  Id. at 9. 
 22.  Id. 
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the land caused by the removal of the trees, rather than the trees’ 
replacement cost.23  Furthermore, Largess, in formulating his 
estimate of damages, presumably relied on replacement tree 
values from between 2005 and 2009, rather than the values from 
the estimated earlier time of removal.24  The trial justice denied 
Morabit’s motion for a new trial.25 
In his appeal, Morabit contended that the trial justice made 
several errors at trial, including her denial of Morabit’s motion for 
a new trial and motion to amend his pleadings, her granting of 
Hoag’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, and her exclusion 
of a neighbor’s testimony26 and some of Thorson’s testimony.27 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Stone Walls28 
The court first discussed the “gatekeeping role” of the trial 
justice with respect to “novel or complex evidence.”29  Rule 702 of 
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence permits an expert in a 
technical or specialized field to testify to certain facts or to help 
the trier of fact understand the evidence.30  Before an expert 
witness may testify before a jury, the trial justice must determine 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 10. 
 26.  On the first day of trial, Morabit sought permission to depose Bruce 
Walker outside of court.  Id. at 5.  Walker was Hoag’s former neighbor and 
was the only witness who could directly testify about Hoag’s actions during 
the relevant period of time, and Morabit’s counsel had learned only the 
previous day that Walker had been unexpectedly confined to a nursing home.  
Id.  The trial justice denied this motion, reasoning that Morabit could have 
deposed Walker prior to trial and should have known to preserve Walker’s 
testimony, given Walker’s age of eighty-four years.  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 3, 10. 
 28.  The court will only reverse a trial justice’s ruling on whether to allow 
an expert witness’s testimony if it determines the trial justice abused her 
discretion.  See id. at 11 (citing Dawkins v. Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1154 (R.I. 
2011); Foley v. St. Joseph Health Servs. of R.I., 899 A.2d 1271, 1280 (R.I. 
2006)). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. (“‘[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of  . . . opinion.’” 
(quoting R.I. R. EVID. 702)). 
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that his testimony will be “based on ostensibly reliable scientific 
reasoning and methodology.”31  In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 
Rhode Island adopted the “Daubert standard,” whereby a trial 
justice looks for any of four nonexclusive factors to support a 
determination of reliability of novel or complex theories or 
methods.32  In this case, the trial justice found the study of 
historic stone walls to be a “new bod[y] of science” and, after 
assessing the DiPetrillo/Daubert factors (“Daubert factors”), 
determined that this field was not sufficiently accepted to be 
considered scientifically reliable.33 
The court was skeptical of the trial justice’s conclusion that 
the study of historic stone walls was a novel field.34  Furthermore, 
even assuming that the field was novel and complex, the court 
found error in the trial justice’s “rigid” application of the Daubert 
factors in this case.35  The court stressed that the Daubert 
analysis is intended to be more, not less, inclusive of expert 
testimony in novel fields.36  The factors need not all be satisfied to 
find evidence admissible,37 and ultimately all that needs to be 
established is that “the expert arrived at his or her conclusions in 
a ‘scientifically sound and methodologically reliable manner.’”38  
According to the court, Thorson’s theories were rooted in well-
settled disciplines of earth science and his published books, while 
not subjected to any formal peer review process, have won awards 
 
 31.  Id. at 11–12 (quoting Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 891 (R.I. 2003)). 
 32.  729 A.2d at 689 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)).  The four factors are “(1) whether the proffered 
knowledge can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate 
of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique has gained general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific field.”  Id. 
 33.  Morabit, 80 A.3d at 5–6, 12. 
 34.  Id. at 12–13.  The court noted that Rhode Island courts have long 
heard cases involving damage to such historic walls and have not shied away 
from calculating damages.  Id. (citing Sweeney v. Brow, 100 A. 593, 595 (R.I. 
1917); Chapman v. Pendleton, 82 A. 1063, 1067 (R.I. 1912)).  It therefore may 
have been inappropriate for the trial justice to analyze the Daubert factors.  
See id. 
 35.  Id. at 13–14. 
 36.  Id. at 13 (citing Owens, 838 A.2d at 892). 
 37.  Id. at 12 (“Satisfaction of one or more of these factors may suffice to 
admit the proposed evidence.”). 
 38.  Id. at 13 (citing Owens, 838 A.2d at 892). 
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as well as positive feedback from his peers.39  Believing that a 
reasonable jury could find Thorson’s testimony reliable, the court 
concluded that the trial justice abused her discretion in excluding 
Thorson’s testimony on historic stone walls and that this 
constituted reversible error.40  A new trial was required on count 
3 because Morabit’s lack of evidence of damages was the basis for 
the trial justice’s denial of Morabit’s motion to amend his 
pleadings and her granting of Hoag’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on this count.41 
 
B.  Judgment as a Matter of Law on Count 242 
When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a 
trial justice must make all inferences, reasonably supported by 
the record, in favor of the position of the nonmoving party.43  
Here, though, the trial justice based her decision to grant Hoag’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law for the tree-related count 2 
on inferences that did not favor Morabit.44  She improperly 
assumed that Largess’s estimate of replacement costs was based 
on tree values from 2005–2009.45  But Largess never testified to 
when he inquired at these nurseries about tree replacement 
values, nor whether he asked the nurseries for then-current tree 
prices or 2001 prices.46  There was also varied testimony as to 
when, exactly, the injuries took place.47  It was for the jury to 
determine the questions of fact as to when the injuries occurred 
and the time upon which Largess’s replacement tree values were 
based.48  As the party opposing this motion, Morabit was entitled 
to the inference that Largess’s estimate of damages was based on 
 
 39.  Id. at 14. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  The court reviews de novo a trial justice’s decision on a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 10 (citing Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 
1251 (R.I. 2012)).  The decision to grant such a motion will be overturned if 
the court determines that the trial justice usurped the jury’s proper role in 
weighing evidence and assessing witnesses’ credibility.  Id. at 11 (citing 
Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251, 1259 (R.I. 2007)). 
 43.  Id. at 14 (citing McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 285 (R.I. 2012)). 
 44.  Id. at 15. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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the time of the injury.49 
The trial justice also abused her discretion when she weighed 
the credibility and ultimately discounted Largess’s estimates of 
the number of trees removed and their quality.50  Since an 
assessment of damages need not be exact as long as “they are 
based on reasonable and probable estimates,” it was for the jury to 
assess Largess’s estimates and his methods of producing them.51  
The trial justice’s weighing of this evidence in a Rule 50 motion 
was an improper invasion of the jury’s role and constituted 
reversible error.52  Therefore, a new trial was required on count 
2.53  Having already found reversible error on counts 2 and 3, the 
court did not address Morabit’s other grounds for appeal.54 
 
C.  Proper Methods of Valuing Trees 
The court had never before determined how to calculate 
damages for trees removed in violation of section 34-20-1,55 so it 
set out some guidelines for the superior court to consider if 
damages need to be assessed upon remand.56  In essence, the 
court said that the proper valuation method will depend upon “the 
use of the trees and their intrinsic value to the property.”57  
Where trees are meant to be eventually sold as commodities, 
damages should be based on the fair market value of the intended 
commodity.58  However, there is no “single uniform measure” 
where, as here, the trees were not meant to be sold.59  The 
question was whether damages in such situations should only be 
based on the loss, if any, of fair market value of the land caused by 
the removal of trees, or if some circumstances allow for awards in 
 
 49.  Id. at 14–15. 
 50.  Id. at 15–16. 
 51.  Id. (quoting Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 350 (R.I. 2002)). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 16. 
 54.  Id. at 19. 
 55.  Id. at 16.  The statute provides that a landowner is entitled to “twice 
the value of any tree . . . cut, destroyed, or carried away” without his 
permission.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-1 (2011). 
 56.  Morabit, 80 A.3d at 16. 
 57.  Id. (citing Evenson v. Lilley, 282 P.3d 610, 614 (Kan. 2012)). 
 58.  Id. (citing Bangert v. Osceola Cnty., 456 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Iowa 
1990)). 
 59.  Id. at 17. 
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excess of the change in fair market value—perhaps amounting to 
the full cost of restoration, as Morabit sought here.60  Generally, 
other jurisdictions have awarded damages exceeding the decrease 
in fair market value where the removed trees had a peculiar value 
to the land or the landowner.61  This condition is more often 
present in smaller, developed properties than in larger, 
unimproved ones.62  On smaller, developed properties, it is often 
the case that the trees provide some specific value such as shade, 
privacy, ornamentation, or sentimental value.63  Another factor is 
whether the trees were installed by the owner (or a previous 
owner) or were the products of indigenous growth.64 
Here, the trees were indigenous, and were removed from a 
fairly large unimproved tract of woodland.65  While some courts 
have found reasons to award restoration costs in similar 
circumstances,66 most courts are more reluctant.67  The court 
acknowledged the trial justice’s valid concern that Largess’s 
estimate of damages might have exceeded not just the 
diminishment in value, but the total value of the unimproved 
land, which would thereby provide Morabit with a significant 
windfall.68  The court stressed that “an overall limit of 
reasonableness on restoration costs” is key to a fair assessment.69  
At trial, the parties presented no evidence of the decrease in value 
of Morabit’s property, but such evidence will be necessary on 
remand to ensure that any damages award based on restoration 




 60.  See id. at 16–18. 
 61.  Id. at 17 (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 154 (2013)). 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  Id. at 17–18. 
 65.  Id. at 3–4, 18.  The court noted, however, that there was some 
evidence that the trees had special value to Morabit and that he had reasons 
to keep this part of his land undeveloped.  Id. at 19. 
 66.  Id. at 18 (citing Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108–09 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980); Vaught v. A.O. Hardee & Sons, Inc., 623 S.E.2d 373, 374 (S.C.  
2005)).  
 67.  Id. (citing Evenson v. Lilley, 282 P.3d 610, 617 (Kan. 2012)). 
 68.  Id. at 19. 
 69.  Id. at 18. 
 70.  Id. at 19. 
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COMMENTARY 
In this case the court found occasion to clarify that the 
Daubert analysis, incorporated into Rhode Island law in 
DiPetrillo,71 is meant to make it easier, not harder, to admit 
expert testimony related to a novel field.72  This seems to be a 
wise approach.  A novel field of science or a particular expert’s 
theories need not be impeccable to be admissible.  Upon remand, 
when the trial justice admits Professor Thorson’s testimony rooted 
in stone wall science, opposing counsel will have the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness.  Counsel could then highlight for the 
jury the same weaknesses identified by the trial justice when she 
originally excluded much of the testimony.  As long as expert 
testimony is relevant and a reasonable jury could find the 
underlying science reliable, a trial justice should not rob jurors of 
the chance to weigh the evidence according to their own judgment.  
So long as cross-examination can point out any novelty-related 
deficiencies, more expert testimony will help juries fully 
understand the evidence and ultimately render the fairest possible 
outcomes. 
This case also reminds us that unless expert testimony is first 
determined to be based on novel or technical theories, the Daubert 
analysis should not come into play at all.73  The court’s apparent 
skepticism that stone wall science was indeed novel74 suggests 
that it was probably inappropriate for the trial justice to apply the 
Daubert factors at all.  But while the court offered several reasons 
to doubt the novelty of stone wall science, it never clearly stated a 
conclusion on the issue.  Perhaps it did not see the need to 
explicitly overturn this finding of the trial justice since it was able 
to reverse her decision based on the way she applied the Daubert 
 
 71.  DiPetrillo v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677, 689 (R.I. 1999) 
 72.  See Morabit, 80 A.3d at 13 (“[T]he factors mentioned in DiPetrillo 
were intended ‘to liberalize the admission of expert testimony by providing a 
mechanism by which parties can admit new or novel scientific theories into 
evidence that may have previously been deemed inadmissible.’” (quoting 
Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 892 (R.I. 2003))). 
 73.  See id. at 12 (“We have emphasized . . . that ‘when the proffered 
knowledge is neither novel nor highly technical, satisfaction of one or more of 
these factors is not a necessary condition precedent to allowing the expert to 
testify.’” (quoting Owens, 838 A.2d at 892)). 
 74.  See id. at 12–13. 
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analysis.75  It would be interesting to see whether, upon remand, 
the trial justice adjusts course on her finding of novelty and avoids 
the Daubert analysis altogether or if she will sustain her original 
finding but apply the test in the flexible manner prescribed by the 
court. 
One lingering issue is how the court’s guidelines for tree 
valuation should be applied in light of section 34-20-1 and its 
mandate that the victim of unpermitted tree removal be 
compensated for “twice the value” of any tree so removed.76  Are 
juries supposed to calculate a fair and reasonable baseline figure, 
based on the court’s guidelines in this case and then simply double 
it?  We cannot presume that the court meant to ignore the statute 
and its clear language.  In its discussion of these guidelines, the 
court references cases from several other states, but does not 
mention whether any of those states’ approaches are controlled by 
a statutory damages regime similar to section 34-20-1.77  While 
the court shared the trial justice’s concern about avoiding a 
windfall for Morabit,78 the plain language of the statute suggests 
that the Rhode Island General Assembly was perfectly willing to 
let plaintiffs profit from the untimely demise of their trees in the 
interest of punishing wrongdoers and deterring intentional or 
negligent tree destruction.79  Indeed, the same statute provides for 
triple compensation for any “wood or underwood” destroyed or 
removed from a plaintiff’s property.80  It would have been helpful 
for the court to clarify whether this statute creates an exception to 
 
 75.  Id. at 13 (“Nonetheless, even if we accept the trial justice’s assertion 
that the study of stone walls is a novel science, we ultimately conclude that 
the trial justice erred in excluding Professor Thorson’s testimony because she 
applied an overly rigid standard for the admission of expert opinions.”) 
 76.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-1 (2011) (emphasis added).  The entire 
section reads:  
Every person who shall cut, destroy, or carry away any tree, timber, 
wood or underwood whatsoever, lying or growing on the land of any 
other person, without leave of the owner thereof, shall, for every 
such trespass, pay the party injured twice the value of any tree so 
cut, destroyed, or carried away; and for the wood or underwood, 
thrice the value thereof; to be recovered by civil action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 77.  See Morabit, 80 A.3d at 16–18. 
 78.  Id. at 19. 
 79.  See § 34-20-1. 
 80.  Id. 
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the usual policy of “plac[ing] the injured landowner as near as 
possible to his or her pre-injury position” while “not [granting] the 
landowner a windfall.”81 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice 
should not apply the Daubert analysis too rigidly, and as long as 
proposed expert testimony is supported by reliable and 
established scientific concepts and methodologies, a trial justice 
should allow the testimony lest she abuse her discretion and 
usurp the jury’s task of weighing the evidence; that, in any case, 
historic stone wall science is probably not a novel field for 
purposes of a Daubert analysis; and that for purposes of 
calculating damages, trees should be valued according to whether 
they were intended to be sold as commodities or, if not, whether 




 81.  Morabit, 80 A.3d at 18 (citing Lampi v. Speed, 261 P.3d 1000, 1004 
(Mont. 2011); Evenson v. Lilley, 282 P.3d 610, 617 (Kan. 2012)). 





Family Law.  O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 79 A.3d 815 (R.I. 2013).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that in the absence of a written 
settlement, the stenographic record of an oral agreement reached in open 
court is sufficient to form an enforceable, binding nonmodifiable marital 
settlement agreement.  Mere wishes to no longer be bound by such an 
agreement will not inform the court to set it aside, especially when the 
stenographic record clearly reflects the parties’ intentions to be bound. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In December of 1999, after nineteen years of marriage, John 
O’Donnell (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for divorce based on 
irreconcilable differences.1  The defendant, Anne Alexandra 
deBaun Allardt2 (“Defendant”) counterclaimed for divorce, also 
based on irreconcilable differences.3  In 2002, three years after 
Plaintiff first filed for divorce, the case reached trial; however, in 
November of 2002 the parties requested a court hearing to 
formalize settlement talks.4  At the November hearing, Plaintiff 
requested that he be allowed to read the outlines of the agreement 
into the record.5  The family court justice allowed the parties’ 
agreement to be read into the record and warned the parties that 
they were bound to the outlines of the settlement agreement—
therefore, the parties could not “come back to court and say, ‘Gee, 
we changed our mind . . . I don’t want to do that.’”6  The idea was 
that the outlines read into the record would be form the basis for 
the written agreement presented at a later hearing.7  Plaintiff’s 
 
 1.  O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 79 A.3d 815, 817 (R.I. 2013).   
 2.  Following the divorce action, the Defendant retook her maiden 
name.  Id. at 817 n.1.  For purposes of clarity, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court referred to her by first name or as the Defendant throughout the 
opinion.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 817. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. 
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counsel then proceeded to go over the terms of the parties’ 
agreement in open court.8 
The terms of the agreement included a provision that 
required Plaintiff to pay for Defendant’s healthcare.9  The detailed 
healthcare provision specifically obligated Plaintiff “to maintain 
coverage for [D]efendant under the health and dental insurance 
plan in effect at the time of [the parties’] divorce, or provide 
coverage under an equivalent plan.”10  After this agreement was 
read into the record, the family court justice questioned both 
parties to determine “whether they had . . . reflect[ed] on the 
terms” of the agreement, “whether they were entering into the 
agreement voluntarily,” and “whether they understood that they 
would be bound by those terms.”11  With each party’s counsel 
present, both parties answered affirmatively to the justice’s 
questions.12  The justice then allowed for a continuance in order 
for the parties’ attorneys to prepare a written agreement 
incorporating the terms agreed upon at the hearing.13 
The hearing was held on December 6, 2002.14  However, the 
attorneys had not yet completed the written agreement.15  
Instead, the attorneys for both parties agreed to enter the 
stenographic transcript from the November 12, 2002 hearing as a 
joint exhibit, “evidencing the terms of the parties’ agreement.”16  
During questioning, Plaintiff “affirmed his understanding” that he 
would provide Defendant with healthcare in accordance with the 
healthcare provision and recognized that he was also obligated to 
pay for any copay expenses, were Defendant to have employer-
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  The healthcare coverage agreement provided that when 
Defendant reached the age of sixty-five years old Medicare would offset the 
cost of the coverage.  Id.  The cost would be similarly offset were Defendant to 
receive employer-provided health coverage prior to becoming eligible for 
Medicare.  Id. at 817–18. 
 10.  Id.   
 11.  Id. at 818.   
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that at the time of the 
December 6, 2002 hearing, there was no explanation provided for not having 
completed a written settlement.  Id. at 818 n.3.   
 16.  Id. at 818.   
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provided health insurance.17  When asked “whether [he] 
understood the terms of the agreement and if he agreed it [would] 
become a binding agreement between [him] and [his] wife,” 
Plaintiff answered affirmatively.18  Defendant similarly agreed 
that she understood the terms of the agreement reflected in the 
stenographic transcript.19  The justice approved the marital 
settlement, holding that the agreement “was to remain a separate 
and independent contract between the parties and was to be 
incorporated by reference but not merged into the final decree of 
divorce.”20  The final decree of divorce was entered six months 
later in June of 2003, and it included a specific reference to the 
marital settlement from the December 6, 2002 hearing.21 
On June 21, 2011, Defendant filed a motion to enforce 
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay for her health insurance under the 
marital settlement.22  Defendant alleged that Plaintiff sent her a 
certified letter explaining that he would no longer pay for her 
health insurance because he had remarried and enrolled his new 
spouse in his health insurance plan.23  In his answer, Plaintiff 
argued, “the mere reading of an agreement’s outline on the record, 
without a written agreement having been executed by the 
parties . . . was not binding.”24 Plaintiff specifically argued that 
the court transcript was not a valid writing to serve as a valid 
marital settlement agreement.25 
The family court justice found in favor of Defendant and held 
that the November 12, 2002 hearing transcript was valid as the 
written settlement agreement.26  She determined that it properly 
served as a written agreement because the hearing transcript was 
submitted as a joint exhibit and because the parties affirmed their 
assent at the December 6, 2002 hearing.27  The justice’s order and 
opinion, issued on January 6, 2012, “required [P]laintiff to comply 
 
 17.  Id.   
 18.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 19.  Id.   
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. at 818-19.   
 22.  Id. at 819.   
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  
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with the terms of the agreement and to obtain and maintain the 
health insurance pursuant to the parties’ agreement.”28  From 
that decision, Plaintiff timely appealed.29 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court primarily 
addressed the question of whether a stenographic record of an oral 
agreement reached in open court is sufficient to form a 
nonmodifiable marital settlement agreement.30  The court 
affirmed the family court decision and held that the stenographic 
transcript was sufficient to form a valid marital settlement 
agreement.31 
While noting that special attention must be paid to 
contractual agreements between divorcing spouses, the court 
explained that the record in this case showed “that the parties 
freely entered into and agreed to be bound by the terms that were 
submitted on the record in open court.”32  The parties intended for 
the stenographic transcript to serve as the memorialization of 
their agreement and, in open court, acknowledged and assented to 
 
 28.  Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29.  Id.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that it did not need 
to address the issue of whether a contract exists between parties that 
incorporate but do not merge an agreement into the final divorce decree 
because Plaintiff did not raise the issue on appeal to the court.  Id. at 819 n.5.   
 30.  Id. at 820.  While this was the issue of utmost concern, the court also 
addressed the following: whether there was a meeting of the minds between 
the parties to establish mutual assent for contract formation; whether the 
agreement, if one had been formed, needed additional provisions included 
within its terms; and whether it was necessary to have a writing signed by 
the parties in place of the hearing transcript.  Id.  On the first two questions, 
the court found that there was sufficient mutual assent to form a contract 
and that the lack of additional provisions could not upend the agreement 
made in open court and submitted as a joint exhibit.  Id. at 820, 822.  On the 
third issue, the court held that a writing was not necessary, relying on Rule 
1.4 of Family Court Rule of Practice, which only required that “[a]ll 
agreements of parties or attorneys touching the business of the court shall be 
in writing, unless orally made or assented to by them in the presence of the 
court.”  Id. at 821–22 (alteration in original).  The transcript was not a 
collection of stenographic notes as Plaintiff contested; rather, as the Court 
found, the transcript was a valid mode of agreement, given the overwhelming 
evidence of assent in open court.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 820, 822.   
 32.  Id.  
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its binding effect.33  The court concluded that the stenographic 
transcript entered as the settlement agreement was a binding and 
enforceable contract—one which Plaintiff was obligated to 
perform.34  In affirming the family court decision to order Plaintiff 
to provide health insurance to his ex-wife pursuant to their 
agreement, the court remarked, “[i]t is not the function of this 
Court, or the Family Court, to set aside [an agreement] simply 
because a party no longer wishes to be bound by its terms or is 
unhappy with the result.”35  As such, Plaintiff’s new marriage did 




In holding that the stenographic record coupled with evidence 
of mutual assent to an agreement, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court made a reasonable ruling.  The court was presented with 
insurmountable evidence that both Plaintiff and Defendant freely 
and voluntarily entered into a marital settlement.  The lack of a 
writing drawn up by the parties’ attorneys was not enough to 
overcome the evidence.  Not only did both parties testify under 
oath to understanding and assenting to the terms of the marital 
settlement, they also agreed to enter the stenographic record as a 
joint exhibit as the memorialization of their fully formed 
agreement.37  This evidence left the court with no choice but to 
enforce the healthcare provision as a binding and enforceable 
contract to which Plaintiff must adhere.38  As Justice Goldberg 
put it, Plaintiff could “not retreat from that agreement simply by 
entering into a new marriage.”39  In other words, a party cannot 
divorce himself from the obligations of his first marital settlement 
merely by wishing it away. 
This decision puts attorneys representing divorcing parties in 
a creative position.  On the one hand, allowing a hearing 
 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 822 (first alteration in original) (quoting Vanderheiden v. 
Marandola, 944 A.2d 74, 78 (R.I. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  Id.  
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transcript to serve as a valid marital settlement agreement will 
lift the burden on attorneys to compose a written agreement.  
Undoubtedly forming a written and signed agreement is a 
contemptuous process in a divorce action.  On the other hand, the 
newfound ability to enter hearing transcripts as nonmodifiable, 
binding marital settlement agreements offers attorneys greater 
liberty to forego the fine-tooth-combing process of composing a 
written settlement agreement.  This may result in agreements 
that present future contractual disputes—this case serves as such 
an example.  Yet the principle of freedom of contract is unlikely to 
be lost, and attorneys looking to ensure optimal results for their 
clients are likely to still craft a written agreement. 
With this in mind, the court set a considerably high standard 
for parties looking to submit a hearing transcript as a marital 
settlement agreement in lieu of a written agreement.  Not only 
must the agreement comport with Rule 1.4’s requirement of 
assent in open court, but there also must be clarity as to the 
parties’ intentions to be bound.  The court has lifted part of an 
attorney’s burden in a divorce action by allowing a stenographic 
transcript as a binding marital settlement agreement.  Yet, the 
written agreement has little to fear, as parties looking to avoid 
future litigation should still prefer to contract in writing.  As with 
most legal precedent, only time will tell how attorneys use this 
new tool for crafting marital settlement agreements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In affirming the decision of the family court, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that in the absence of a written and signed 
settlement agreement, a stenographic transcript can serve as 
sufficient evidence of a binding and enforceable contract.  In other 
words, a marital settlement, agreed to in open court, will not fail 
for lack of a drafted writing where the weight of the evidence 
indicates mutual assent and a presentable “writing” is available. 
Edward Pare 
 





Remedies.  Carrozza v. Voccola, 90 A.3d 142 (R.I. 2014).  The proper 
method to calculate compensatory damages in an action for slander of title is 
to subtract the property’s fair market value on the day that the encumbrance 
on the property’s title was removed from the property’s highest achieved fair 
market value during the time period when the property was subject to 
slander.  This method of valuation applies regardless of whether the owner 
of the property in question had an actual buyer who was ready, willing, and 
able to purchase the property at the time that the property had reached its 
highest value. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In November, 2002, Frederick Carrozza, Sr. (“Frederick Sr.”), 
a Counterclaim Defendant,1 filed a petition in the superior court 
seeking to enforce a trust over four properties that were part of his 
deceased son’s, Frederick Carrozza, Jr.’s (“Frederick Jr.”), estate.2  
On November 15, 2002, in connection with his petition, Frederick 
Sr. filed notices of lis pendens on each property at issue.3  In 
response to Frederick Sr.’s filings, the Counterclaimants filed a 
claim for slander of title, alleging that Frederick Sr. filed the 
notices of lis pendens maliciously.4  The Counterclaim Defendants 
 
 1.  Since the court’s opinion focuses on the original Defendants’ 
counterclaim for slander of title brought against the original Plaintiffs, for 
clarity, in this survey, the original Defendants are referred to as the 
“Counterclaimants” and the original Plaintiffs are referred to as the 
“Counterclaim Defendants.” Carrozza v. Vaccola, 90 A.3d 142, 146 n.1 (R.I. 
2014).  
 2.  Id. at 146–47.  The properties which were at issue in this case were: 
“‘[(1)] Unit 47 River Farms Condominium, West Warwick, Rhode Island; [(2)] 
1101 Post Road, Warwick, Rhode Island; [(3)] Prospect Hill Street in 
Newport, Rhode Island; and [(4)] 103-111 Bellevue Avenue, Newport, Rhode 
Island.’”  Id. at 147 n.2 (quoting Carrozza v. Voccola, 962 A.2d 73, 74 (R.I. 
2009)).  
 3.  Id. at 147.  The notice of lis pendens was not removed until February 
of 2009, despite both the superior court and the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island’s holdings that there was no resulting trust in the properties at issue.  
See id.  
 4.  Id. at 147. The Counterclaimants included: the executor of Frederick 
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did not remove the notices of lis pendens “until February of 2009,” 
even though the superior court had previously granted the 
Counterclaimants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that 
there was no resulting trust associated with any of the properties 
at issue.5  In December of 2010, the Superior Court, after a jury-
waived trial, held the Counterclaim Defendants liable for slander 
of title because the court found that Frederick Sr. did file the 
notices of lis pendens maliciously, and, therefore, the court 
awarded the Counterclaimants: compensatory damages; 
prejudgment interest accrual from the date the original suit was 
filed; attorneys’ expenses; attorneys’ fees; and punitive damages.6  
The trial court’s compensatory damage award represented the 
 
Jr.’s estate (Michael Voccola), Frederick Jr.’s widow (Angela Giguere), and 
Frederick Jr.’s adopted daughter (Christine Giguere–Carrozza).  See id. at 
146 n.1. 
 5.  Id. at 147.  
 6.  Id. at 148–49.  Frederick Sr. actually filed the notices of lis pendens; 
however, the trial court also held his living children liable for slander of title, 
even though they were not joined as parties to the action when Frederick Sr. 
filed the notices.  Id. at 150.  The court upheld the trial justice’s 
determination that Frederick Sr.’s living children were also liable for slander 
of title because the court reasoned that Rule 15(c) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure can be applied so that the amended complaint (that joined 
Frederick Sr.’s living children as parties to the action) can relate back to the 
date Frederick Sr. filed the notices of lis pendens. Id. at 172–74. Thus, it was 
possible to ascribe Frederick Sr.’s malice in filing the lis pendens to his living 
children.  Id. at 172.  
  Furthermore, the court upheld the trial justice’s conclusion that 
Frederick Sr.’s living children were liable for slander of title because the 
children essentially “adopted the notices of lis pendens through their own 
actions (or lack of action) subsequent to being joined as plaintiffs in the case.” 
Id.  The children “affirmatively embraced the [l]is [p]endens and the 
consequences that followed therefrom” because they did not “[renounce] an 
interest in the properties at issue,” even though they knew that there was no 
support to their claim. Id. at 173.  Moreover, the children affirmatively 
ratified the notices at trial by objecting to the “Defendants’ Motion to Quash 
and Remove Lis Pendens” in an effort to assert their interest in the 
properties at issue. Id.  Therefore, the court held that the children possessed 
the malice necessary to be held liable for slander of title. Id. at 173–74.  The 
trial justice did not improperly attribute Frederick Sr.’s malice to his 
children; rather, he properly found the children possessed malice themselves, 
since they “affirmatively embraced” the notice of lis pendens with the 
knowledge that their claim to title was unsubstantiated. Id. at 172 n.33, 174. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the court also held the 
children liable to pay the compensatory damages; however, the punitive 
damages were awarded only against Frederick Sr. Id. at 150, 173–74.  
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properties’ greatest loss in value during the time that the 
properties were subject to slander of title; the trial justice 
measured the damages by subtracting the properties’ fair market 
value on the day that the notices of lis pendens were removed 
from the properties’ highest attained fair market value during the 
time the properties were encumbered by the notices of lis 
pendens.7  In February, 2011, the superior court denied the 
Counterclaim Defendants’ motion for a new trial.8  The 
Counterclaim Defendants appealed the superior court’s 
judgment.9 
On appeal, the Counterclaim Defendants disputed all of the 
superior court’s rulings on damages.10  Specifically, the 
Counterclaim Defendants argued that the trial justice’s measure 
of compensatory damages was erroneous; they proposed a 
different method of calculation (which, if applied here, would 
result in the finding that the Counterclaimants did not sustain 
any compensable loss).11  The Counterclaim Defendants also 
asserted that the trial justice’s award of prejudgment interest was 
incorrect because the justice calculated the interest from the date 
the suit was filed, rather than from the date of injury (the date 
when the properties at issue had reached their highest value, 
according to the trial court).12  Finally, the Counterclaim 
Defendants argued that the trial justice erred in calculating the 
punitive damage award because he “failed to take [Frederick Sr.’s] 
current financial condition into account when assessing punitive 
damages” and ultimately awarded an amount of punitive damages 




 7.  Id. at 163.  
 8.  Id. at 147. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See id. at 150–51. The Counterclaim Defendants also disputed the 
superior court’s finding that Frederick Sr. filed the notices of lis pendens 
maliciously. Id. at 150.   
 11.  Id. The Counterclaim Defendants argued that the court should have 
measured the Counterclaimants’ damages based on the difference in the 
properties’ values from “the time the notices of lis pendens were filed in 2002 
[to] the time at which clear title was restored in 2009.”  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 150–51 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.  Compensatory Damages 
To prove a claim for slander of title, the complainant must 
show that he or she suffered an “actual pecuniary loss.”14  
However, because the tort of slander of title causes harm of an 
intangible nature, it is difficult to value a party’s actual loss in 
 
 14.  Id. at 160 (quoting Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 666–67 
(R.I. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In a claim for slander of title, 
the complainant must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) that 
the alleged wrongdoer uttered or published a false statement about the 
plaintiff’s ownership of real estate [;]” and “(2) that the uttering or publishing 
was malicious.” Id. at 151–52 (alterations in original) (quoting Beauregard v. 
Gouin, 66 A.3d 489, 494 (R.I. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On 
appeal the Counterclaim Defendants also argued (in addition to their 
contention that the trial justice erred in calculating compensatory damages) 
that Frederick Sr. had a colorable claim to title of the properties, since he had 
provided funds with which to purchase the properties. Id. at 152–53.  Next, 
they argued the trial justice misconceived Frederick Sr.’s testimony regarding 
his intention in filing the lis pendens. Id.  Finally, they argued that the trial 
justice impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the Counterclaimants 
to the Counterclaim Defendants by requiring the Counterclaim Defendants to 
prove Frederick Sr. did not act with malice.  Id. at 153. 
  The court gave deference to the trial justice’s findings of fact 
regarding Frederick Sr.’s credibility and intent to determine whether 
Frederick Sr. acted with malice. See id. 152–54. The court found no evidence 
in the record that indicated the trial justice erred in holding the 
Counterclaim Defendants liable for slander of title and found nothing to 
support the contention that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked any 
material evidence. Id. at 151, 158. The court held that the evidence in the 
trial record clearly supported the finding that Frederick Sr. “could not 
honestly have believed in the existence of the right he claim[ed]” in the 
properties at issue. Id. at 155 (quoting Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 
667 (R.I. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Frederick Sr.’s claim that 
he had provided the funds used to purchase the properties was wholly lacking 
in evidentiary support. Id.  Further, the Counterclaimants did fulfill their 
burden to prove that Frederick Sr. acted with malice, and thus, the trial 
justice did not improperly shift the burden of proof onto the Counterclaim 
Defendants. Id. at 155–56. The court reasoned that because Frederick Sr.’s 
contrived and inconsistent statements were the only evidence offered to prove 
Frederick Sr.’s interest in the properties at issue, the trial justice did not err 
in requiring Frederick Sr. to further substantiate his testimony. Id. at 156. 
Finally, the court rejected the Counterclaim Defendants’ assertion that 
malice requires an intention to frustrate the property’s development or to 
injure the property; a false filing of a notice of lis pendens is sufficient to give 
rise to a claim for slander of title. Id. at 155, 157. Therefore, the Court 
affirmed the trial justice’s judgment and held the Counterclaim Defendants 
liable for slander of title.  Id. at 158.  
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such an action.  Here, the court resolved this issue by adopting a 
bright line formula to calculate compensatory damages in an 
action for slander of title.15  The court’s decision was guided by the 
policy that the purpose of awarding compensatory damages is to 
make an injured party whole.16  Therefore, the court’s measure of 
damages should reflect the amount that would be needed to put 
the injured party back into the position that he or she would have 
been had the wrong not occurred.17 
The trial justice determined that the compensatory damages 
in an action for slander of title should be equal to the loss in value 
that the properties sustained during the time that the notices of 
lis pendens were in effect.18  The trial justice calculated the 
properties’ loss in value by subtracting the properties’ fair market 
value on the date the lis pendens was removed from the highest 
value the properties attained during the time period that the 
notices of lis pendens were in force.19  The Counterclaim 
Defendants argued that the trial justice’s compensatory damage 
calculation was incorrect because it did not reflect the 
Counterclaimants’ actual loss.20 The Counterclaim Defendants 
asserted that the Counterclaimants did not suffer any loss 
because they did not have a ready buyer for the properties and 
had continued to “enjoy[] the profits of continued ownership of the 
properties (receiving rental income, for example)” during the time 
the notices of lis pendens were in effect.21  The Counterclaimants, 
on the other hand, argued that the trial court’s valuation was 
proper because the notices of lis pendens rendered their properties 
inalienable, thereby preventing the Counterclaimants from 
collecting any possible profits that may have been gained during 
the time the notices were in force.22 Further, the 
Counterclaimants contended that the measure of compensatory 
damages should not depend on whether a property owner has a 
ready buyer because the property owner “should not be faulted for 
 
 15.  See id. at 163. 
 16.  See id. at 162.  
 17.  See id.   
 18.  Id. at 158. Real estate appraiser, Paul Hogan, determined the 
properties’ fair market values. Id. at 147.  
 19.  Id. at 158–59. 
 20.  Id. at 159.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
REMEDIES_CARROZZA_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  2:50 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 715 
failing to sell unmarketable properties.”23 
The court conducted a de novo review to determine the proper 
method to calculate the compensatory damage award; after a 
thorough review of the record, the court upheld the trial justice’s 
method of valuation.24 
The court determined the value of the Counterclaimants’ loss 
by assessing the type of injury that they sustained.25  The court 
noted that “[t]he thrust of the tort of . . . slander of title is 
protection from injury to the salability of property,”26 thus 
“pecuniary loss in this context includes that from the impairment 
of vendibility or value by the disparagement . . . .”27 In its essence, 
slander of title renders a complainant’s title to property 
unmarketable. The injured party is deprived of the ability to do 
what he or she wishes with his or her own property; the party 
cannot sell, gift, or even refinance the property.28 The injured 
party effectively loses the opportunity to realize any gains from 
the encumbered property.29  Thus, the court held that the 
Counterclaimants’ loss is most accurately approximated by 
determining the amount of potential profit the Counterclaimants 
would have realized had the properties not been wrongfully 
deprived of marketable title while “held hostage” by the notices of 
lis pendens.30  This measure would effectively put the 
Counterclaimants back in the position they would have been had 
the wrong not occurred and, thus, would properly compensate the 
Counterclaimants for their loss.31 
The court held that the trial justice’s compensatory damage 
calculation was correct because it awarded the Counterclaimants 
the greatest amount of profit that they could have realized had the 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 160, 163.  
 25.  See id. 160–61. 
 26.  Id. at 160 (alteration in original) (quoting Truck Ins. Exch. v. 
Bennett, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 27.  Id. at 160 (alteration in original) (quoting Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake 
Shore Investors, 471 A.2d 735, 742 (Md. 1984)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 28.  See id. at 162.  
 29.  See id.  
 30.  Id. at 160–62.  
 31.  See id.  
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properties’ titles been alienable at the most lucrative time during 
the period when the properties were subject to slander.32 Thus, 
the court reasoned that the award properly compensated the 
Counterclaimants for the loss of their ability to profit from the 
increased market value of their properties.33 Therefore, the trial 
justice’s compensatory damage award “properly accounted for the 
real harm suffered by the [C]ounterclaimants.”34 
Further, the court held that it is not necessary for a 
complainant to show that he or she had an actual purchaser ready 
to buy the property “for the damages to be calculated from the 
date the properties involved in the case were at their highest 
value during the time period when the properties were subject to 
the notices of lis pendens,” because the Complainant’s loss still 
“‘exist[s] even where no purchaser is involved, as where the 
plaintiff is harmed by a loss of value to the property.’”35  The court 
refused to “create a situation whereby the owner of a property 
encumbered by a notice of lis pendens would be placed in the 
position of having to constantly attempt to sell a property even 
though he or she could not provide a clear marketable title.”36 If 
the court required a complainant to show that they had a 
prospective buyer for the property, the complainant would be 
forced to “continuously look for buyers” even though “it is a 
fruitless endeavor to attempt to sell a property with a cloud on its 
title.”37 The court reasoned that the Counterclaimants suffered a 
pecuniary loss even though they did not have a prospective buyer 
ready to purchase their properties since they were “rendered 
unable to sell or refinance their property for a period of 
approximately seven years solely due to the malicious acts of the 
[C]ounterclaim [D]efendants.”38 
Moreover, the court found that the trial justice’s method of 
 
 32.  Id. at 163.  
 33.  See id. at 160.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 161 (quoting C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 
321, at 419 (2005)).  Attorney Michael Voccola testified that “he saw no 
reason to go through the motions’ of attempting to sell any of the properties 
when he could not ‘provide a clean, marketable and insurable title.’”  Id. at 
159 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 36.  Id. at 162.  
 37.  Id. at 163.  
 38.  Id. at 161.  
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valuation was warranted because of the intangible nature of the 
tort of slander of title.39  Further, here, and in all cases where 
slander of title is proven, an actual injury has occurred—the 
property at issue has been “held hostage by the lis pendens,” 
which inhibits the property’s alienability.40  It is necessary to 
compensate the injured party for the loss of the right “to freely 
decide what to do with the properties,” which can only be 
accomplished by putting the injured party back in the same 
“position the person would have occupied had” the property’s title 
never been subject to slander.41  Therefore, the court held that the 
trial justice’s method of calculation, which compared “the highest 
value of the properties during the time period they were subject to 
the notices of lis pendens with the value of the properties on the 
date the notices of lis pendens were removed,” was the proper 
method to calculate loss in an action for slander of title because 
that measure puts the complainant in the closest possible position  
to that which he or she would have occupied had the wrong not 
occurred.42   Thus, the trial court’s formulation did remedy the 
Counterclaimants’ harm.43 
 
B.  Pre-judgment Interest 
The court held that the trial justice did not err in calculating 
the prejudgment interest beginning on the day that the notices of 
lis pendens were filed in 2002, rather than from the date the 
properties were at their highest value in 2005, as urged by the 
Counterclaim Defendants.44 
The court reasoned that prejudgment interest should begin to 
accrue “‘from the date the cause of action accrued’” pursuant to 
the express command in the governing statute, section 9-21-10(a) 
 
 39.  Id. at 162.  A claim for slander of title requires that the accused 
acted with malice—an “intent to deceive or injure.”  Id. (quoting Arnold Rd. 
Realty Assocs., LLC v. Tiogue Fire Dist., 873 A.2d 119, 126 (R.I. 2005)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. (quoting James M. Fischer, The Puzzle of the Actual Injury 
Requirement for Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L.REV. 197, 197–98 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 42.  Id. at 160–63.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 164.  
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of the Rhode Island General Laws.45  Here, the court found that 
because the notice of lis pendens effectively held the 
Counterclaimants’ property hostage “from the moment the notices 
of lis pendens were filed,” a “cause of action for slander of title 
accrued at the moment the notices of lis pendens were filed.”46  
Therefore, the prejudgment interest properly began to accrue from 
the date the notices of lis pendens were filed in November 2002.47 
 
C.  Punitive Damages 
The court rejected Frederick Sr.’s argument that the trial 
justice erred in awarding punitive damages because Frederick Sr. 
lacked the ability to pay the award.48  The court did not find any 
precedent to support Frederick Sr.’s proposition that a party’s 
“ability to pay” is a necessary prerequisite to hold the party liable 
for punitive damages.49  Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
Frederick Sr. cannot now complain that he is unable to pay the 
award when he had every opportunity at trial to present evidence 
to show his inability to pay, but presented nothing to substantiate 
such claims.50  If a party liable to pay punitive damages wishes to 
have the award mitigated by his or her financial circumstances, 
then that party has the burden to prove his or her inability to 
pay.51  Here, the court found that Frederick Sr. conveniently chose 
not to offer evidence of his poor financial condition because 
“evidence of his wealth was helpful to his theory of the case.”52  
The court did not allow Frederick Sr. to “have his cake and eat it 
too” and, thus, held that there was no indication the trial justice 
 
 45.  Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10(a) (2012)).  The pertinent 
language in section 9-21-10(a) reads “there shall be added by the clerk of the 
court to the amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) 
per annum thereon from the date the cause of action accrued.”  § 9-21-10(a) 
(emphasis added).   
 46.  Carrozza, 90 A.3d at 164.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 168–69. 
 49.  Id. at 167. 
 50.  Id. at 167–68; see also Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 
485 A.2d 1242, 1245 (R.I. 1984) (holding the defendant liable to pay the 
punitive damages ordered in the lower court where he “was on notice that 
punitive damages were being sought, and he made no effort to introduce any 
evidence of his modest means”). 
 51.  Carrozza, 90 A.3d at 167–68.  
 52.  Id. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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misconceived any evidence or abused his discretion in determining 
that Frederick Sr. was able to pay the punitive damages 
ordered.53 
However, the court did hold that the trial court’s punitive 
damage award of $845,000 was excessive because it exceeded the 
amount required to deter like behavior in the future.54  The court 
ultimately held Frederick Sr. liable to pay $422,500 in punitive 
damages (one-half of the trial justice’s award) because that 
amount would be “‘adequate to punish’ Frederick Sr. and deter 
future misuse of notices of lis pendens.”55 
 
COMMENTARY 
The court’s valuation of compensatory damages in an action 
for slander of title, while appropriate on the facts of the case at 
bar, has the potential to yield both too generous and too stringent 
results. The court’s method of calculation reveals the need for a 
case-by-case determination of damages in actions for slander of 
title.56  Given that the tort of slander of title causes intangible 
harm, it was necessary for the court to create some artificial 
guideline to determine the value of the loss suffered by a person 
whose property is maliciously encumbered.57  However, the court’s 
formula will result in making future complainants either more 
than whole or less than whole.58   
The court’s formula may over-compensate future 
complainants because he or she will be compensated whether or 
not he or she suffered an actual loss, since the formula 
compensates the complainant for his or her loss of ability to sell 
the property at issue, regardless of whether he or she ever 
intended to sell that property. Further, the formula may put the 
complainant in a better position than he or she would have been 
 
 53.  Id. at 168–69. 
 54.  Id. at 169.  Again, the compensatory damages ordered in this case 
were equal to $630,000; thus, the amount of the trial justice’s punitive 
damage award was greater than the amount of compensatory damages 
themselves.  Id. at 149. 
 55.  Id. at 169 (quoting Minutelli, 668 A.2d at 319).  
 56.  See id. at 161–62. 
 57.  Encumbered by a notice of lis pendens or whichever utterances or 
publications constituted slander of title such that a court will have to 
calculate compensatory damages.  
 58.  See id. at 161–62. 
REMEDIES_CARROZZA_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  2:50 PM 
720 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:710 
had the property’s title never been subject to slander because the 
court’s compensatory damage formula does not expressly take into 
account whether, or when, the injured party had a ready buyer to 
purchase the property.  Rather, the formula indiscriminately 
awards the injured party the greatest diminution in the property’s 
fair market value during the period of time the title was rendered 
unmarketable.59  Even if the complainant did not or could not 
have found a ready buyer willing to pay the highest market value 
ascribed to the property, the complainant would still recover the 
maximum unrealized profit even though, in reality, the 
complainant would not have realized such a large profit.60  
Therefore, the court’s holding may function to deter persons from 
asserting an interest in a property because it is possible to be held 
liable to pay a windfall judgment to the property’s owner if the 
interest asserted in the property is not substantiated.  Future 
litigants should take caution in pursuing claims in which they 
assert an interest in another’s property—where the interest 
asserted is knowingly improper, there is a risk that the party may 
be held liable for damages in an amount that could even exceed 
the value of that party’s asserted interest in the property at 
issue.61 
Simultaneously, the court’s formula may undercompensate 
future complainants because it only pays damages to a 
complainant if the property at issue lost value during the time its 
title was subject to slander. The formula does not account for 
situations in which the property’s value remains the same.  This is 
problematic because, even though the complainant can sell the 
property at no loss once the title is relieved from slander, the 
complainant was still wrongfully deprived of his or her alienable 
title for a period of time.  Therefore, the complainant would still be 
 
 59.  See id.  In this case the notices of lis pendens were filed on the 
properties for seven years; the price of a property can drastically fluctuate 
over such a large period of time, as can the owner’s prospects of finding a 
buyer.  See id. 
 60.  See id. at 161.  
 61.  For example, here, Frederick Sr. was held liable to pay a large 
amount of punitive damages, attorney’s fees, attorney’s expenses, and 
prejudgment interest; since Frederick Sr. was not asserting a full interest in 
the properties at issue, it is possible that he, in the end, had to pay a larger 
sum in damages than he would have recovered had his claim to title been 
held to be legitimate. See id. at 149.   
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harmed and deserving of compensation.62  Further, the formula 
would also undercompensate a complainant where the 
complainant had a buyer for the property willing to pay more than 
the market value for the property because the formula does not 
take prospective buyers into account. 
The court’s efforts to protect the Counterclaimants in this 
case reflect its commitment to protect individual property rights.63  
However, it is possible that the court’s holding was influenced by 
the specific, sympathetic facts of this case, which may have lead 
the court to implement an arbitrary bright-line formula to 
calculate compensatory damages even though a case-by-case 
analysis would be more appropriate.64  In this case, the notices of 
lis pendens encumbered the properties at issue for many years, 
despite the fact that the Counterclaim Defendants knew that their 
claim to title was unsubstantiated.65  This may have influenced 
the court’s decision because the Counterclaimants were 
dispossessed of marketable title to four of their properties and, 
thus, were “deprived of their rightful inheritance” for over seven 
years.66 Further, the court was likely sympathetic to the 
Counterclaimants, Frederick Jr.’s widow and adopted daughter 
who, in the wake of Frederick Jr.’s death, could have benefitted 
from selling the properties, as evidenced by the fact that they did 
try to find a buyer in an effort to liquidate their assets.67  To make 
matters worse, as discussed, Frederick Sr. was not a sympathetic 
witness due to his perceived lack of veracity throughout the 
trial.68  In an effort to make the sympathetic Counterclaimants 
whole, the court implemented an arbitrary formula that is capable 
of producing inconsistent and inequitable results. In future cases, 
 
 62.  See id. at 161–62.  
 63.  See id.   
 64.  Further, because this was a jury-waived trial, the trial justice was 
responsible for determining factual issues; the sympathetic nature of the 
facts of this case likely had a strong impact on the trial justice’s ultimate 
determinations. See id. at 147.  
 65.  See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 66.  See Carrozza, 90 A.3d at 161–62.  
 67.  See id. at 147, 159, 165. It is important to note that the trial justice 
found that the only buyer who testified at trial on behalf of the 
Counterclaimants was not a serious purchaser; instead, the trial justice 
“found that the testimony of the only interested buyer was not credible and 
that the buyer had merely been engaging in ‘tire-kicking.’” Id. at 159.  
 68.  See id. at 154. 
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this method of calculation may overcompensate or 
undercompensate the injured party. 
The intangible harm caused by slander of title makes it 
nearly impossible to avoid over or under compensation because it 
is difficult to calculate the actual damages the injured party 
sustained. Therefore, in such actions, one party is bound to get a 
windfall. This supports the contention that such damages are 
better decided on a case-by-case basis so that the facts of each 
individual case may guide a court’s calculation in order to best 
approximate the actual loss the injured party suffered. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the proper 
method to calculate compensatory damages in an action for 
slander of title is to subtract the value of each property when the 
notices of lis pendens were removed from the highest value of each 
property during the time period that the notices of lis pendens 
were in force.69  This method of calculation will apply regardless 
of whether the injured party had an actual buyer ready to 
purchase the property at that time.70  In addition to compensatory 
damages, the court held that a party liable for slander of title may 
also be ordered to pay punitive damages in an amount sufficient to 
deter future misconduct, regardless of the party’s ability to pay.71 
Given the sympathetic facts of this case, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s holding likely was intended to maximize the 
compensation provided to the injured property owner and, 
simultaneously, to deter malicious findings against a person’s 
property ownership interest.  However, the court’s artificial 
construction of the proper measure of compensatory damages 
 
 69.  Id. at 149.  
 70.  Id. at 162.  Further, the court held that prejudgment interest will be 
calculated pursuant to section 9-21-10(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws, 
which expressly states that prejudgment interest begins to accrue “‘from the 
date the cause of action accrued,’” and not the date of injury.  Id. at 164 
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10(a) (2012)). 
 71.  Id. at 166. Any punitive damage award which exceeds the amount 
necessary to deter future misconduct is excessive and will be reduced. See id. 
at 169.  An individual’s ability to pay punitive damages will only be taken 
into account to mitigate the amount of punitive damages awarded if the liable 
party offers probative evidence of his or her financial circumstances at the 
appropriate time.  See id. at 167.  
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could result in inequitable results, such as windfall judgments 
that chill future filings of lis pendens or, conversely, vastly 
inadequate judgments that undercompensate aggrieved property 
owners.72  
Ashley B. Kocian 
 
 
 72.  See infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text.  





Tort Law.  Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805 (R.I. 2014).  Upon appeal of a 
motion for summary judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court used an ad 
hoc approach to determine that an independent medical examiner hired by an 
employer to review employee medical documents does not establish a 
traditional physician-patient relationship.  Additionally, there is no 
imposition of a duty of care on independent medical examiners when the 
review is only of medical documents and not a physical examination of the 
employee. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2008, Michael Woodruff (“Woodruff”), who had 
been a commercial pilot for approximately twenty years, was 
involved in a car accident that required him to submit his second-
class medical certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”).1  He was subsequently placed on temporary leave.2  One 
year later, Woodruff submitted a request to the FAA for 
reinstatement.3  In response to Woodruff’s reinstatement request, 
the FAA had its chief psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Chesanow (“Dr. 
Chesanow”) review Woodruff’s medical records to determine if 
Woodruff would meet standard criteria to return as a commercial 
pilot.4  Dr. Chesanow determined from his examination of 
Woodruff’s medical records that Woodruff was dependent on 
alcohol and, therefore, required recovery for such dependence.5 
After such determination, the FAA retained psychiatrist Dr. 
Stuart Gitlow (“Dr. Gitlow”) to offer a second opinion on 
Woodruff’s medical records.6  At the subsequent trial, Dr. Gitlow 
stated that he had only received portions of Woodruff’s medical 
 
 1.  Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 808 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (2014) (concerning medical certificate 
requirements)).  
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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records and that his expert opinion derived from only those files 
that were provided to him by the FAA and not any physical 
examination of Woodruff.7  In September 2009, Dr. Gitlow 
determined that Woodruff was alcohol dependent in concurrence 
with Dr. Chesanow’s original review.8  As a result of the findings, 
the FAA refused to reinstate Woodruff as a commercial pilot.9 
In November 2010, Woodruff sued Dr. Gitlow in Rhode Island 
Superior Court under the theory that Dr. Gitlow had acted 
negligently in conducting a review of Woodruff’s medical records.10  
Alleging that there was no duty of care and that his review was 
protected under the state’s Anti-SLAPP statute,11 Dr. Gitlow 
moved for summary judgment.12  The superior court denied Dr. 
Gitlow’s motion after determining that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to the relationship between Dr. Gitlow and 
Woodruff.13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The court first addressed whether the superior court trial 
justice erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the relationship between Dr. Gitlow and 
Woodruff.14  Dr. Gitlow argued that his analysis for the medical 
review was based solely on the files the FAA had provided to 
him.15  Dr. Gitlow further argued that, not only did he not conduct 
a physical examination on Woodruff, but he did not have any 
 
 7.  Id. Dr. Gitlow had received Woodruff’s “hospital, medical, and 
driving records, along with FAA forms that had been filled out by Woodruff.” 
Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  “The legislature finds and declares that full participation by persons 
and organizations . . . are essential to the democratic process. . . that such 
litigation is disfavored and should be resolved quickly with minimum cost to 
citizens who have participated in matters of public concern.” R.I. GEN LAWS § 
9-33-1 (1995); see Woodruff, 92 A.3d at 808. 
 12.  Woodruff, 91 A.3d at 808. 
 13.  Id. at 808–09. 
 14.  Id at 810. In establishing its standard of review, the court 
determined that it would affirm the judgment of the superior court only if it 
found that, in the light most favorable to Woodruff (the nonmoving party), 
there was no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 810 (quoting Reynolds v. 
First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC, 81 A.3d 1111, 1115 (R.I. 2014)). 
 15.  Id. 
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direct contact with Woodruff when conducting his review.16  The 
court agreed with Dr. Gitlow and found that there was no 
traditional physician-patient relationship between Dr. Gitlow and 
Woodruff.17  In addition, the court concluded that the trial justice 
should have resolved the issue instead of attempting to send the 
issue to the jury since “the facts suggest[ed] only one reasonable 
inference.”18  Therefore the trial justice should have resolved the 
issue as a matter of law.19 
After it determined that no traditional physician-patient 
relationship existed, the court then addressed the second issue as 
to whether Dr. Gitlow owed Woodruff a duty of care under an 
alternative theory.20  In order for Woodruff’s negligence claim to 
survive, he had to show that Dr. Gitlow owed him a duty of care, 
and that Dr. Gitlow breached that duty.21  Dr. Gitlow argued that 
he did not owe a duty of care to Woodruff because he had been 
retained as an independent medical examiner and rendered his 
expert opinion based solely on the files that the FAA provided 
without any contact with Woodruff.22  The court considered 
decisions from other jurisdictions and determined that none of 
them addressed the issue of duty when an independent medical 
examiner had not physically examined the patient during the 
review.23  The court also failed to find guidance in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552,24 which limits liability “to 
loss suffered . . . by the person or one of the limited group of 
persons for whose benefit the guidance he intends to supply the 
 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 811. 
 19.  Id. (quoting Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013)). 
“We disagree with the trial justice . . . and are of the opinion that the 
undisputed facts lead only to one reasonable conclusion. We conclude . . . that 
the record does not establish a traditional physician-patient relationship.” Id. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. (quoting Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, LLC, 78 A.3d 747, 750 (R.I. 
2013)). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 811–13; see also Peace v. Weisman, 368 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the doctor had a duty to not injure the patient in 
the course of an examination); Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 445 (N.J. 2001) 
(holding that an independent medical examiner has a duty to his or her 
patients “to the extent of the examination and in communicating its 
outcome”). 
 24.  Id. at 814; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
TORTLAW_WOODRUFF_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  2:51 PM 
2015] SURVEY SECTION 727 
information.”25  In response to this analysis, the court reasoned 
that, because the FAA hired Dr. Gitlow for its own purposes, the 
FAA was the only group to benefit from Dr. Gitlow’s report, not 
Woodruff.26 
Due to a lack of direction from other jurisdictions and the 
Restatement, the court took an ad hoc approach to the case.27  The 
court then applied the five factors from Banks v. Bowen’s Landing 
Corp.28  When the court applied the Banks factors to the facts, it 
determined that Woodruff’s alcohol dependence caused him the 
harm, not Dr. Gitlow’s review reporting the dependence.29  
Additionally, in its analysis of the fourth Banks factor, the court 
found that holding Dr. Gitlow responsible for his report would “do 
little to prevent future harm because the harm Woodruff suffered 
arose from the conclusion that he was alcohol dependent; a 
conclusion the FAA had already reached.”30  Lastly, the policy 
concerns raised by the fifth Banks factor exposed great concern for 
the community as placing liability on independent medical 
examiners may alter their neutrality and “could result in a 
chilling effect on their willingness to serve as independent 
evaluators.”31  Based on the application of the Banks factors to the 
facts of this case, the court ultimately declined to impose any duty 
of care on Dr. Gitlow as an independent medical examiner.32 
COMMENTARY 
In this matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court refused to impose a bright-line rule but rather adopted an 
 
 25.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552. 
 26.  Woodruff, 91 A.3d at 814. 
 27.  Id. (quoting Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 633 (R.I. 2009)).  
 28.  Id. at 815; Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 
1987). The Banks factors include: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff has suffered an injury, 
(3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
injury suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of 
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community for imposing 
a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for the breach.  Id. at 1125. 
 29.  Woodruff, 91 A.3d at 815. 
 30.  Id. at 816 (emphasis added). The FAA sought Dr. Gitlow for a second 
opinion of Dr. Chesanow’s finding.  Id. 
 31.  Id.; see also Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213, 219 (Colo. 1998); 
Erpelding v. Lisek, 71 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2003).  
 32.  Woodruff, 91 A.3d at 816. 
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ad hoc approach to the issue of whether an independent medical 
examiner has a duty of care when only reviewing a patient’s 
medical files.33 While the court’s ad hoc approach creates 
uncertainty for similar issues in the future, the intended focus on 
the specific facts of each case are wholly consistent with the public 
policy concerns the court relied on. 
The main concern was imposing liability on an independent 
medical examiner whose main purpose is to act as a neutral party 
between parties with sometimes competing interests.34 The court 
rightfully acknowledges that the potential for bias towards one 
party due to a fear of litigation is a cause for concern because the 
profession might lose the credibility upon which its occupation is 
based on—neutrality.35 
Additionally, should the occupation lose its credibility as a 
neutral party, the number of independent medical examiners 
might decrease. While the court does not state outright that 
independent medical examiners have an essential role in the 
complexities of employer and employee, an inference can certainly 
be drawn that the court values the independent nature of the 
independent medical examiner.36  It appears that the court, in 
refusing to impose liability, preserves the ability of independent 
medical examiners to review records neutrally without fear of 
recourse. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon appeal of a motion for summary judgment, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court used an ad hoc approach to determine that 
a traditional physician-patient relationship between an 
independent medical examiner and his or her patient does not 
exist in a situation where the opinion comes solely from a review 
of medical files and not a physical examination of the person 
under review. In addition, the court refused to impose a duty of 
care on such independent medical examiners, finding issues with 
causation, prevention of future harm, and policy concerns. 
Kelley Nobriga 
 
 33.  Id. at 814. 
 34.  Id. at 816. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  See id.  
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2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 048, 055.  An Act Relating to Food 
and Drugs – Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  This Act adds a 
class of individuals to whom information contained in the 
prescription drug monitoring database maintained by the 
Department of Health may be disclosed.  In addition to a 
practitioner who is prescribing or considering prescribing a 
controlled substance, or a pharmacist who is dispensing or 
considering dispensing a controlled substance, an authorized 
designee of the practitioner or pharmacist may consult the 
prescription drug monitoring database on behalf of the 
practitioner or pharmacist.  The designee must be employed by 
the same professional practice or pharmacy.  The practitioner or 
pharmacist must ensure that such designee is sufficiently 
competent in the use of the database, ensure that access to the 
database by the designee is limited to authorized purposes and 
occurs in a manner that protects the confidentiality of information 
obtained from the database, and terminate the designee’s access to 
the database upon termination of the designee’s employment.  Any 
breach of confidentiality resulting from the designee’s access to 
the database is the responsibility of the practitioner or 
pharmacist.  Furthermore, the practitioner or pharmacist, 
reasonably informed by the relevant controlled substance history 
information obtained from the database, shall make the ultimate 
decision as to whether or not to prescribe or dispense a controlled 
substance.  Finally, this Act adds the requirement that all 
practitioners, as a condition of the initial registration for or 
renewal of their license to prescribe controlled substances, register 
with the prescription drug database maintained by the 
Department of Health. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 83, 86.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure – Domestic Violence Prevention Act.  This 
amendment expands the protections of this Act to include more 
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victims of domestic violence.  As amended, those who are not 
married or related to his or her attacker but have been in a 
substantive dating relationship with his or her attacker within the 
past one year have the right to request from the district court an 
order restraining the attacker from committing abuse and  
directing the attacker to leave the household, unless the attacker 
has the sole legal interest in the household.  The Act also provides 
these victims with information on the services available to them.  
In cases where the officer has determined that no cause exists for 
an arrest, the Act requires that the officer remain at the scene as 
long as there is danger to the safety of the person or until the 
person is able to leave the dwelling.  The officer shall transport 
the person if no reasonable transportation is available and inform 
the person that she or he has the right to file a criminal complaint 
with the responding officer or the local police department. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 151, 168.  An Act relating to 
Taxation – Cigarette Tax.  This Act establishes enhanced 
penalties and increases already existing penalties for violations of 
cigarette tax stamp requirements.  Any person who distributes a 
tax stamp that fails to conform to state standards faces a 
mandatory fine for a first offense not to exceed ten thousand 
dollars, with each subsequent offense resulting in a fine not to 
exceed twenty thousand dollars or five years imprisonment.  
Those who use or store cigarettes that are improperly stamped 
and subsequently fail to report such violations are now guilty of a 
felony, facing a ten thousand dollar fine, not more than three 
years of imprisonment, or both.  Any distributor found to have 
sold, offered for sale, displayed for sale, or possessed with intent to 
sell any cigarettes, packages, or boxes that do not bear stamps 
evidencing the payment of the tax imposed by this chapter shall 
be fined, imprisoned, or both.  The fine or prison term is 
determined in accordance with a subsequent offense calculation, 
which includes enhanced fines and consideration of evidence of 
mitigating factors such as history, severity, and intent.  Each 
subsequent offense proscribed in this Act as to unstamped 
cigarettes, general violations, and civil penalties is limited to a 
twenty-four month parameter and calls for consideration of 
evidence of mitigating factors, including history, severity, and 
intent.  Generally, penalties for a myriad of tax stamp violations, 
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including fines and terms of imprisonment, were significantly 
increased. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 153, 170. An Act Relating to Health 
and Safety – Schools.  This Act requires the person in charge of an 
educational institution having more than twenty-five students to 
train the students, through drills, to exit the school buildings 
without confusion or panic in the event of an emergency.  In all 
school buildings that house students through the twelfth grade, 
which are occupied by six or more persons for four or more hours 
per day or more than twelve hours per week, there must be at 
least one emergency egress drill conducted every month that the 
facility is in use.  One additional drill must be conducted in 
buildings that are not open on a year-round basis within the first 
thirty days of operation.  At least one out of every four emergency 
egress drills or rapid dismissals shall be obstructed by means of 
which at least one or more exits and stairways in the school 
building are blocked off or not used.  In addition, there shall be 
two evacuation drills and two lockdown drills.  The amended 
portion of the Act raises the fine for noncompliance from fifty 
dollars to two hundred dollars. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 157, 164.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Sexual Assault.  This Act amends the crime of 
second-degree sexual assault. This Act expands the scope of sexual 
conduct for second-degree sexual assault to include the element of 
surprise. 
 
2014 Pub. Laws ch. 180, 181.  An Act relating to State 
Affairs and Government – State Emblems.  This Act designates 
calamari as Rhode Island’s official state appetizer.  Calamari’s 
designation as the official state appetizer was inked to recognize 
both the economic importance of squid fishing and the appetizer’s 
uniquely delicious taste. 
 
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 188, 207.  An Act Relating to Education 
and Labor – Social Media Privacy and Student Data – Cloud 
Computing.  This Act, as amended, adds a host of protections for 
student and employee users of social media networks throughout 
the State.  The Act forbids educational institutions and employers 
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from requesting passwords or access to a student, employee, or 
applicant’s social media page. It also forbids the educational 
institution or employer from disciplining a student, employee, or 
applicant for failing to grant access to their page.  This Act does 
not apply to publicly available information and does not restrict 
employers from complying with duties established by the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(26), which 
requires the supervision of certain communications of regulated 
financial institutions. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202, 215.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Computer Crime.  This Act criminalizes 
online impersonation.  A person commits such a crime if he or she 
uses the name or persona of another person to create a webpage, 
post messages to a social networking site, or send an electronic 
communication, without obtaining the other person’s consent and 
with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any 
person.  A person also commits this crime if he or she sends an 
electronic communication that references an item of identifying 
information belonging to any person without obtaining the other 
person’s consent and with the intent to cause the recipient of the 
communication to believe that the other person authorized or 
transmitted the communication with the intent to harm or 
defraud any person.  Finally, a person commits the crime of online 
impersonation if he or she uses the name or persona of a public 
official to create a webpage, post messages to a social networking 
site, or send an electronic communication, without obtaining the 
public official’s consent and with the intent to induce another 
person to submit to such pretended authority in order to solicit 
funds or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense to the 
other person’s detriment.  Every person convicted of online 
impersonation is guilty of a misdemeanor for the first offense and 
is subject to imprisonment up to one year and a fine of one 
thousand dollars.  For a second or subsequent offense, every 
person convicted of online impersonation is guilty of a felony and 
is subject to imprisonment up to three years and a fine of three 
thousand dollars.  Every person convicted of an offense shall also 
be subject to an order for restitution. 
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2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 262, 320.  An Act Relating to 
Animals and Animal Husbandry – Cruelty.  This Act, as amended, 
seeks to prohibit any person from entrapping any animal in a 
motor vehicle in a manner that poses risk to the animal’s life or 
threatens health consequences to the animal by subjecting the 
animal to extreme heat or cold without proper ventilation.  After 
making a reasonable attempt to locate the owner of a motor 
vehicle in which an animal is kept, an animal control officer, law 
enforcement officer, or firefighter with probable cause to believe 
that this section is being violated may enter such vehicle using 
any reasonable means under the circumstances.  The officer may 
use any reasonable means to extricate the animal from the vehicle 
to prevent injury to the animal’s health.  When entering the 
vehicle with the sole purpose to rescue the animal, the officer may 
not search the vehicle unless otherwise authorized by law.  After 
extracting the animal, the officer must leave written notice, 
including the officer’s name and the address of the location where 
the animal may be retrieved in a secure and conspicuous location 
to notify the owner of the vehicle of the animal’s whereabouts.  
The officer will not be held criminally or civilly liable for the 
removal of the animal.  Only after the owner makes payment of all 
charges incurred can the owner be reunited with the animal.  
Such charges include fines, maintenance, care, impoundment, and 
medical treatment of the animal.  Any person who knowingly 
violates this section is subject to imprisonment not to exceed one 
year or a fine of no more than one thousand dollars, or both. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 263, 311.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure.  As amended, the Act defines a criminal 
street gang as “an ongoing organization, association, or group of 
three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one 
of its primary activities the commission of criminal or delinquent 
acts; having an identified name or common identifiable signs, 
colors, or symbols; and whose members individually or collectively 
engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.”  
Any person convicted of knowingly committing a felony for the 
advancement or benefit of or in association with a criminal street 
gang with the intent to further, assist, or promote the affairs of a 
criminal street gang will be subject to imprisonment of not more 
than ten years, in addition to the penalty for the underlying felony 
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committed.  If the Attorney General believes that the felony was 
committed for the benefit of a street gang, he or she shall file with 
the court, at a time no later than the first pretrial conference, a 
notice that the defendant is subject to the additional sentence 
upon conviction of the felony.  At trial, the defendant will be 
allowed to produce additional evidence to rebut the assertion that 
the felony was committed for the advancement or in association 
with a criminal street gang.  If the jury finds the defendant was 
acting in association with a gang or the defendant pleads guilty or 
nolo contendere to the additional charge, the additional penalty 
will be added to the sentence for the felony committed.  The 
additional penalty imposed by this Act is to run consecutively with 
the penalty imposed for the underlying offense.  
 
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 279, 280.  An Act Relating to Elections – 
Conduct of Elections.  This Act, as amended, requires that voting 
machines and paper ballots not include an option that allows the 
voter to vote for all members of a single party through the push of 
one button or the making of a single mark.  The amended Act 
requires voters seeking to vote along a party line to cast each vote 
individually. 
 
2014 Pub. Laws ch. 346, 391.  An Act relating to Criminal 
Offenses – Weapons – Mental Health.  This Act removes language 
that prevented “habitual drunkards” from possessing firearms.  
Restrictions on firearm possession for mental incompetents and 
drug addicts remain in place. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 404, 373.  An Act Relating to 
Education – Curriculum.  This Act acknowledges that child sexual 
abuse, affecting up to one in four girls and up to one in six boys, 
has long lasting damaging effects on the health and safety of those 
affected.  Child sexual exploitation, including child pornography, 
child prostitution, and child abduction pose similar threats to the 
health and well-being of children and puts victims of such offenses 
at a greater risk of death or severe bodily or mental injury.  
Raising awareness of such offenses by telling children of the 
common dangers and warning signs empowers children to protect 
themselves from sexual predators and to obtain any necessary 
assistance.  This Act establishes a comprehensive program that 
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will provide age-appropriate instruction in preventing child 
abduction, child sexual exploitation, and child sexual abuse.  To be 
known as “Erin Merryn’s Law,” this section provides that all 
public school children in grades kindergarten through grade eight 
shall receive instructions designed to prevent child abduction, 
sexual exploitation, and sexual abuse.  Such instructions will 
either be provided or supervised by regular classroom teachers.  
Such instructions will also be assisted by the Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education through guidance and 
technical assistance.  It is the responsibility of the school 
committees to incorporate the curricula described into existing 
health education courses. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 412, 441.  An Act Relating to 
Education – Adult Education.  This Act, as amended, requires the 
education board to consider all available high school equivalency 
tests that meet Rhode Island academic standards.  The board 
shall give priority to tests that are provided at the lowest costs to 
test takers.  The board must consider:  (1) the recognition of the 
test by other states, (2) the portability of the test, and (3) any 
other criteria that meets the needs of test takers.  The board must 
adopt a rule that grants a waiver of fees associated with the high 
school equivalency test for those with limited income and financial 
hardship.  To be eligible for such a fee waiver, the individual must 
receive a passing score on the equivalency practice test or 
pertinent section of the test.  A sliding scale based on individual 
income may be used to determine the waiver. 
 
2014 Pub. Laws ch. 413, 449.  An Act relating to Labor and 
Labor Relations – Payment of Wages.  This Act expands the 
penalties for the misdemeanor offense of failure to pay wages in 
accordance with state law to include imprisonment of up to one 
year.  The first violation remains a misdemeanor, carrying the 
punishment of a fine of up to one thousand dollars, imprisonment 
not more than one year, or both.  A second or subsequent violation 
is now a felony that requires a punishment of imprisonment for 




2014 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2015  1:10 PM 
736 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:729 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 423, 455.  An Act Relating to 
Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities, and Hospitals 
– Relief from Firearms Prohibitions.  This Act permits the 
firearms prohibitions board to consider petitions for relief from a 
firearms prohibition due to an adjudication of commitment.  The 
board is comprised of a licensed psychiatrist, a licensed 
psychologist, an active member of law enforcement in the state, 
the director of the Department of Behavior Health, Developmental 
Disabilities and Hospitals, or his/her designee, and the Attorney 
General or his/her designee.  In considering the petition for relief, 
the petitioner may present evidence to the board in a closed and 
confidential hearing on the record, and a record of the hearing 
must be maintained for purposes of appellate review.  In 
determining whether to grant relief, the board shall consider 
evidence of the following: the circumstances regarding the 
firearms disqualifiers, the petitioner’s mental health record 
(including a certificate of a medical doctor or psychiatrist 
certifying that the petitioner is no longer suffering from a mental 
disorder that prevents the petitioner from handling deadly 
weapon), petitioner’s criminal history, and evidence of the 
petitioner’s reputation through character witness statements or 
testimony.  The board also has the authority to require the 
petitioner to undergo a clinical evaluation and risk assessment, 
which may also be considered as evidence.  The board must grant 
relief if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
petitioner is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public 
safety and granting the relief will not be contrary to the public 
interest.  The board shall issue a decision in writing justifying its 
reasons for granting or denying relief. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 437, 467.  An Act Relating to 
Human Services – Youth Pregnancy and At-Risk Prevention 
Program.  This Act serves the purpose of reducing and preventing 
youth pregnancies and other at-risk behavior (including drug 
abuse, gang involvement, child abuse, and failure in school) by 
establishing and expanding after-school and summer programs for 
such at-risk teens.  The Act looks to expand programs that offer 
prevention services such as mentor and developmental programs 
in accordance with the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Program (“TANF” program) as enacted in Title IV Part A 
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of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 et. seq.  The 
Department of Human Services (the “Department”) administers 
the prevention program, and its development is contingent upon 
the availability of federal funding.  If such funds are made 
available, the director of the Department may allocate up to two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars annually to the program.  It is the 
responsibility of the director of the Deparment to promulgate rules 
and regulations necessary to advance the goals of this chapter. 
The Rhode Island Alliance of Boys and Girls Clubs is 
authorized to make application to receive funding under this 
chapter.  In order to be eligible to receive funding, an organization 
must demonstrate that its members are affiliated in good standing 
with a nationally chartered organization as under Title 36, 
Subtitle II, Part B of the Patriotic and National Organizations, 36 
U.S.C. 311 et. seq.  The organization must also provide programs 
that are tested and proven to prevent or reduce at-risk youth 
activities, demonstrate that programs are facility-based, and have 
programs offered for a minimum of ten hours weekly during the 
school year and twenty hours weekly during the summer vacation 
months.  The available programs must meet or exceed the TANF 
guidelines, and the organization must exist in a minimum of seven 
towns within the State.  The organization must also show that it 
is eligible to receive TANF funding and raise four dollars for every 
one dollar of funding received from the State through federal 
TANF funding. 
The director of the Department must make reports available 
annually to the General Assembly, no later than March 1st of each 
year, indicating the program’s impact on at-risk youth as well as 
the success of the program.  The Department shall also provide 
reports to the federal government and comply with any request or 
direction of the federal government. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 483, 546.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Assaults.  This Act adds to the crime of 
assault or battery an assault or battery for the purpose of causing 
unconsciousness, otherwise known as a knockout assault.  It is a 
felony for any person to make an assault or battery, or both, by 
causing or attempting to cause another person to be rendered 
unconscious by a single punch, kick, or other singular striking 
motion to the head of the other person.  It is also a felony to 
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knowingly assist, aid, abet, solicit, encourage, counsel, command, 
or conspire to coerce any person to commit such a knockout act.  
Any person convicted of this crime shall be imprisoned for up to 
three years and fined up to one thousand five hundred dollars. 
 
2014 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 488, 521.  An Act Relating to 
Insurance – Rhode Island Title Insurance Act.  This Act creates a 
duty to redact for attorneys who face conflicting duties to both 
produce documents for review as well as ethical duties to their 
clients.  This provision addresses situations when the title 
insurance producer is also an attorney and that attorney asserts 
an ethical duty to withhold the disclosure of documents in 
connection with the state-mandated title insurer’s biennial review.  
If such privilege concerns arise in the context of this review, the 
title insurance producer/attorney must identify in writing the 
particular document and the applicable privilege and provide a 
redacted copy of that document to the title insurer. 
 
R.I. Pub Laws ch. 518, 554.  An Act Relating to Criminal 
Procedure – Sentence and Execution. This Act, as amended, 
allows the parole and probation unit of the Department of 
Corrections to ask the courts, at any time during the sentence 
imposed, to modify the conditions of a defendant’s probation or 
parole by either adding or removing conditions set at the time of 
sentencing to provide for more effective supervision of the 
defendant. 
 
 
